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 The object of this dissertation is to establish the existence and reach of the Socialist 
Movement for the United States of Europe (SMUSE). The SMUSE was a transnational group 
of socialists and federalists from a dozen European countries, counting notably Italian 
Socialist Mario Zagari, French cabinet member André Philip French President Guy Mollet, 
and Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak. The Movement’s members collaborated 
actively beginning in 1947 with a view to establishing a supranational European 
community operating on the basis of democratic majority.  
 Founded in the United Kingdom, it was soon spearheaded by the French, in close 
collaboration with the French Socialist party. It established a relationship between the 
internationalist wing of the Labour party and Continental socialists in the late 1940s. In 
mid-1950 it became deeply involved in the campaign for the European Defense Community 
and the political umbrella under which the EDC would operate. Beginning in 1955, it 
functioned as a forum of coordination in the context of the Treaties of Rome.  
After the establishment of the European Communities, many of its adherents 
became leading members of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament, and the 
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Parent movement 
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MDSFEUE – Mouvement Démocratique et Socialiste Français pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe 
(1948-1950s) 
MGE – Mouvement Gauche Européenne (NB: the French section adopted this as its name 
before the parent-Movement did) 
OFGE – Organisation Française de la Gauche Européenne (1961 onwards) 
 
Other 
GE – Gauche Européenne (the Movement’s magazine, 1953-1958) 
ILP – Independent Labour Party 
SFIO – Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (French Socialist Party) 






   
 
The history of European integration has been thoroughly explored over the last 
70 years, and for good reason. Never before in history have a group of states 
volunteered to give up sovereign prerogatives: the modern European Union, imperfect 
as it may be, remains a unique phenomenon. There are dozens of major works on the 
project and its stages, variously describing and explaining the process, many beginning 
with the Congress of Europe of 1948, but others tracing the idea back to the last part of 
the 19th Century. A number of primary actors have been identified with the 
establishment of the first “EU” institutions – Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Paul-
Henri Spaak, Jean Monnet – and have consequently been the subject of biographical 
works centered on their personal contributions. The smaller groupings and informal 
institutions that facilitated the European project have received somewhat shorter shrift, 
though several works have drawn attention to the role of Christian Democracy – in 
particular the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI) – in fostering personal 
relationships which played out successfully at the transnational level.  
The NEI was one of several transnational groups with a broadly integrationist 
vision that would help found the European Movement; these included Altiero Spinelli’s 
Movimento Federalista Europeo (MFE), the Union of European Federalists (UEF), and 
Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Paneuropean Union. Another such group, though an 
initially hesitant adherent to the European Movement, was the Movement for the United 
Socialist States of Europe, or MUSSE. While the NEI and other groups are reasonably 
well known, the MUSSE (later SMUSE) remains to this day one of the more obscure and 
misunderstood groups involved in the elaboration of the European project. It was 
founded in 1946 based on a wartime manifesto by two members of the fledgling 
Independent Labour Party (ILP), but would soon grow to involve the Labour party 
proper and the French Socialist party (Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière, or 
SFIO), and would survive in various forms for close to 50 years. Its geopolitical 
orientation evolved rapidly in its first years, from a geopolitical “bridge” position 
between the emerging power blocs to one that might be described as “Western-leaning 
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anti-capitalist” focused on the development of an integrated, independent Europe 
resistant to both the Soviet Union and the perceived exploitative forces of private 
capitalism.  
The Movement had specific continental harmonization goals from the outset: at 
their preliminary meeting in 1946, they evoked the need for standardized 
transportation infrastructure; at their first major conference in June, 1947, they called 
for a central banking system, a common currency, a customs union and the abolition of 
internal tariffs. In 1949, they folded these into a comprehensive set of institutions and 
competences that, while ambitious at the time, was remarkably prescient. They resolved 
to pursue the creation of a European political authority consisting of an executive 
branch answerable to a directly-elected Assembly of the People and an Assembly of the 
States, monitored by an independent judiciary. Under control of that authority would be 
- in addition to the competences above - the harmonization of the primary economic 
sectors including agriculture, the internationalization of coal and steel, and the 
supranational control of the atomic sector. It would include a European army under 
unified command and a common foreign policy; it would include dual European and 
National citizenship.  
 The foregoing list of objectives is not exhaustive – certain plans, such as the 
elaboration of complex democratic structures within each major industry, have never 
been seriously pursued; and the existing European Union falls short of some of the 
Movement’s goals, notably a more directly democratic repartition of powers at the 
legislative level. Nevertheless, I agree with the basic premise of neo-federalist 
historiography in considering that the fact that the modern European Union so 
resembles the federalist (in this case SMUSE) vision warrants an investigation into the 
extent to which the MUSSE might have had a role in its development.  
 It is also important to note that the SMUSE program was not entirely new or 
unique. As Brian Shaev has noted,1 the notion of “binding arbitration” (ie functionally 
supranational judicial structures) brought a number of transnational groupings together 
as early as 1889; and German theoretician Karl Kautsky called for a raft of federal 
European structures like the SMUSE’s in 1911. In other words, the Movement’s goals fell 
into line with long-standing goals of the non-communist Left in Europe, and broadly 
 
1 Shaev, Brian. “Liberalizing Regional Trade: Socialists and European Economic Integration” Contemporary 
European History 27.2 (2018). 258-279 
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with the several other parties with origins in the first half of the 20th Century and who 
would come together under the European Movement.   
The personnel of the organization, meanwhile, such as were in a position to enact 
the Movement’s objectives, is impressive, and only further recommends a thorough 
examination. Several national parties formally joined the Movement and signed on to its 
program, most importantly the French SFIO. The Movement soon drew hundreds of 
adherents from some 18 countries across Europe, (including some on the other side of 
the Iron Curtain). After its earliest years, when it emulated the strict and exclusionary 
philosophy of the more radical interwar “Left” movements, it began to attract the 
participation of certain mid-level Federalists like Henri Frenay and Altiero Spinelli and 
Christian-Democrats including Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Robert Buron and Heinrich von 
Brentano. The Movement, once it reached maturity, would functionally be led by a small 
coterie of higher-profile European personalities, first centered around French Socialist 
André Philip and then increasingly around Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak. 
These men had direct access to the levers of power at crucial moments: the former had 
Churchill’s ear at the very dawn of the ill-fated European Defense Community; the latter 
managed the elaboration of the treaties of Rome in active collaboration with the SFIO 
government under Guy Mollet. Various members held seats in national parliaments, 
senates and governments, and played leading roles in the European institutions from 
their very earliest incarnations: presiding over the Council of Europe (Spaak), heading 
the ECSC High Authority (Paul Finet), laying the groundwork for direct elections to the 
European Parliament (Fernand Dehousse) and, eventually, advising and supporting the 
Delors Commission’s campaign for the Treaty of Maastricht (Raymond Rifflet). 
Despite all this, the Movement has been the subject of very little scholarship. 
Wilfried Loth’s cursory chapter on the United Socialist States of Europe is the only 
academic treatment of the movement, and it consists of a short summary of members 
and conferences followed by the major resolutions, reprinted in chronological order. 
Loth’s treatment ends with the resolutions of a conference in 1953.2 The online CVCE 
archive is marginally more comprehensive, including some documentation from 1956.3 
 
2 Loth, Wilfried. "The Mouvement Socialiste pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe (MSEUE)." in Lipgens, Walter, 
and Wilfried Loth, eds. Documents on the History of European Integration, Volume 4; Transnational 
Organizations of Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the Struggle for European Union, 1945-1950. 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991. 277-319. 
3 CVCE.eu. https://www.cvce.eu/search?q=MSEUE 
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There are scattered references to the Movement elsewhere, particularly in the context of 
the European Defense Community and the political umbrella under which it might have 
operated,4 and in various autobiographical accounts.5 (There is also a short German 
Wikipedia page,6 which, alas, is full of inaccuracies.) Generally, however, a lack of 
recognition of the group’s agency – or even its existence – is a notable feature of 
historiography on the European integration process, the most recent exception being 
Talbot Imlay’s 2017 chapter on postwar Socialism, to which I will return below. 
 
There are two likely reasons for this lack of historiographical recognition. The 
first is that, from the archival record, it can be very difficult to recognize as a single 
entity; the second is that insofar as the movement’s primary movers were often high-
ranking politicians in their own right, their professional and personal papers, including 
Movement-related correspondence in both categories, are scattered across a wide range 
of national and political archives throughout Europe. 
 The Movement manifests itself under an alphabet soup of acronyms like none 
since the New Deal, and scholars can be forgiven for not recognizing the connection.  Its 
central organ went through several name changes: as noted, it was baptized as the 
Movement for the United Socialist States of Europe. English-language documents used 
the abbreviation MUSSE while the French styled it MEUSE (German and Italian sources 
would have their own acronyms). In late 1948, the movement decided to collaborate 
with other integrative movements and recast itself as the Socialist Movement for the 
United States of Europe (SMUSE, or the better known French MSEUE). In 1961 it 
rebranded itself again as the Mouvement Gauche Européenne (MGE), with variations 
including the term “Socialist” for use in countries that did not denote parties on a left-
right spectrum. A final rebrand in 1973 dubbed it “Mouvement Socialiste Européen 
(Gauche Européenne),” or MSE-GE. For the sake of simplicity, I have chosen most often to 
refer simply to the “Movement.” 
 
4 Fursdon, Edward. The European Defence Community, London: The Macmillan Press, 1980. Griffiths, 
Richard. Europe’s First Constitution; the European Political Community, 1952-1954. London: The Federal 
Trust, 2000. Noël, Gilbert. Du Pool Vert à la Politique Agricole Commune. Paris: Economica, 1988. 
5 Griffiths, Richard (ed.). Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950s. New York: EJ Brill, 1993. 





These name changes either reflected changes in the movement’s organizational 
statutes, or in the political orientation of members it sought to attract. However, the 
movement’s core objectives remained consistent across all these changes, and its 
membership was remarkably stable. The most notable break was in 1964 (hence the 
chronological focus of this study), when Spaak, Philip, and General Secretary Enrique 
Adroher “Gironella” left the Movement. Numerous other high-profile members 
nevertheless remained, including Altiero Spinelli, Belgian Socialists Raymond Rifflet and 
Lucien Radoux, Italian PSDI co-founder Mario Zagari, and French SMUSErs Gerard 
Jaquet and François Mitterrand. 
The Movement’s semi-autonomous national sections, meanwhile, had their own 
names which didn’t always resemble the umbrella organization’s (“Sinistra Europea” in 
Italy; “Europaische Sozialistische Bewegung” in Germany). The UK initially used “MUSE,” 
but sometimes informally referred to itself as the “British Centre” and at one time 
identified itself as the “Labour Committee for Europe.”7 The French section was the most 
freewheeling with its appellation: initially styled “Mouvement Socialiste Français pour les 
Etats-Unis d’Europe” (MSFEUE), it added the qualifier “Démocratique” in 1948 
(MDSFEUE); in the late 50s it began to use “Mouvement Gauche Europeénne,” before 
finally adding “Organisation Française” (OFGE) in the 1960s. I most often refer simply to 
national “sections.” 
(An added complication applying to both the organization and its sections is the 
fact that not all stationery and letterhead was immediately converted after a change, so 
that on a given date, the organization might appear under different names.)  
Finally, the Movement published a magazine in at least three countries: the 
French edition, which lasted some five years, was titled “Gauche Européenne;” an Italian 
one, translated as “Sinistra Europea,” appears to have run for three decades, while a 
German edition is alluded to by at least three different names in the Movement’s 
archives.  
 
 The second obstacle to reconstituting the Movement’s history is its constellation 
of archival repositories. The dominant one, and the primary source of information used 
in this dissertation is the International Institute of Socialist History (IISG), in 
 
7 “Conference schedule, May 24-25 1968, London.” Amsterdam: IISG MSEUE 47 
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Amsterdam. It is the only archive to have a dedicated SMUSE record group, and it holds 
most of the movement’s circulars, conference reports, and publications (including 
virtually the complete run of the Movement’s magazine), mainly between 1949 and 
1964. It is by far the most valuable source of information on the movement, at least 
during its most active period in the 1950s.  
Two other archives centralize several record sets. The French Socialist 
establishment was very closely associated to the Movement, and the archives of the 
French Socialist party (SFIO) and its Comité Directeur (including Guy Mollet), are at the 
Office Universitaire de Recherche Socialiste (OURS). The Fondation Jean Jaurès, (FJJ), 
mercifully located in the same offices as OURS, has the papers of related individuals, 
notably Gérard Jaquet, a leading figure starting in the 1960s. The second collection of 
related papers are at the European University Institute in Florence, which has a well-
catalogued and increasingly digitized collection of papers and correspondence belonging 
to Paul-Henri Spaak, Fernand Dehousse, Raymond Rifflet, and the European Movement.  
 A handful of further individual records were consulted for this project. The LSE 
library in London has the records of the ILP, the Movement’s founding party; and the 
Movement’s delicate relations with the Labour Party in the late 1940s can be traced in 
the Labour Party archives at the People’s History Museum in Manchester. Various 
records can be found at the French Archives Nationales and Archives Diplomatiques near 
Paris, including the papers of French cabinet members Christian Pineau (a SMUSEr and 
member of the Guy Mollet cabinet particularly active during the negotiations on the 
Treaty of Rome) and André Philip. Founding member Marceau Pivert’s papers are in 
Paris at the Centre de l’Histoire Sociale du Vingtième Siècle. Several boxes of documents 
pertaining to Raymond Rifflet’s time as head of the Movement are at the Université 
Catholique de Louvain in Belgium.  
 Aside from the IISG, few of these record sets clearly identify materials related to 
the Movement, and none categorize them separately. The discovery process can be 
tedious and bear very mixed results. The personal papers of participants typically 
contain either published material or personal correspondence. In the first case, we are 
seeing the results of discussions, but there are virtually no minutes of the committee 
meetings where those discussion took place, leaving unanswered questions about 
internal dynamics and debates. Personal correspondence, often short and functional, 
leaves much to be desired in the same areas but can contain valuable references to 
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meetings and personnel. Letters between SMUSErs and non-SMUSErs can be quite 
instructive since they tend to include details that were not common knowledge outside 
the Movement itself. In terms of internal debates, the most illuminating material is 
summaries of conference speeches, where high-ranking member lay out their arguments 
on particular subjects. These have their limits too, however: first, speeches are not 
discussions, so while it is possible to discern areas of general disagreement, it is much 
harder to trace how a final consensus was finally reached. Second, speeches concerning 
political philosophy and general strategy, prepared ahead of time for an audience in the 
hundreds, are necessarily more broad and polished than the kinds of discussions among 
members of a committee, where the more practical concerns – including the topics to be 
addressed at conferences – are worked out. This leaves a lot of interpretation up to the 
historian. 
Finally, two archives provide some marginal contribution to the present work: 
the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington DC, where I consulted 
the Congressional Record to determine the attitude of the American legislature towards 
financing Europe’s Socialist integrationists; and the Bodleian Libraries at Oxford, 
repository of the papers of Sir Geoffrey De Freitas which yielded little more than 
confirmation that he was titular head of the Movement for a period of time. 
 I should note that the foregoing list of archives consulted for this project, though 
extensive, is not comprehensive. Several other leads could not be pursued for various 
reasons: the personal papers of Enrique Gironella, a founding member and the 
Movement’s general secretary from 1948 to 1964, have been turned over to the Partido  
de los Socialistas de Cataluña, but numerous requests for information or access have 
gone unanswered; the same is true of multiple messages to the current “European Left”8 
seeking to unearth any records or continuity after 1993. Prospects for further research 
on the Movement will be outlined in the conclusion. 
 The last difficulty in telling a complete story of the SMUSE is far more banal: 
there is likely to be material in the papers of Italian or German members (Mario Zagari, 
for instance, or Anna Siemsen), which I can’t read. Published research from Italians like 
Antonio Varsori or Sandro Guerrieri, or the chapter on the German section by Norbert 
 
8 The movement’s statutes (https://www.european-left.org/statute/) refer to a “founding congress” in 
2004, though it is also a member of the European Movement (https://mouvement-europeen.eu/la-
gauche-europeenne/), which describes it as the movement founded in 1947. 
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Gresch are not included here for the same reasons. It is never possible to cover every 
single dimension of a given subject in a dissertation, especially considering the long 
timeframe here, and the material that exists in French and English has provided enough 
material to fill these pages, but the primary goal of the present work it to establish the 
scope of the membership and activities of the Socialist Movement, leaving room for 
further research on the subject. Recent trends (see below) suggest that there is room for 
a reappraisal of the role of transnational groups in mediating European policies and 
negotiations, and the SMUSE is an important and poorly understood protagonist in that 
story.  
I describe the origins and evolution of the group through 1964, with an epilogue 
tracing the outlines of the Movement’s activities through the early 1990s; I reveal the 
movement’s agency at some of the key moments of European integration, and I highlight 
the adherents to the Movement with notable connections to other facets of the European 
project.  
 
The SMUSE in brief 
The Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe9 was a “movement” 
largely in name. It was established by a group of individuals numbering in the low 
double digits, though at its peak in the mid-50s, conferences drew attendees in the 
hundreds. It had affiliations with several mainstream political parties, though these did 
not translate to a reliable constituency: the French SFIO was in crisis in the early 50s, 
with a working-class electorate torn between them and the Communists; the Italians 
faced a similar dilemma that had already splintered the Socialist party; the British ILP 
was very small and lost its final Parliamentary seats in January 1948. There were loose 
ties with Labour, whose leaders tolerated the existence of Keep Left while keeping 
European pressure groups at arms’ length; relations with the German Socialist Party 
(SPD) were initially cordial, but took a distant back seat to the latter’s strategic 
priorities. Even despite some proportionally broad support from the Belgian political 
class, the record does not indicate that this translated to much public support for the 
organisation.  
 
9 Initially the “Movement for the United Socialist States of Europe”, or MUSSE. 
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On the other hand, the movement and its leaders clearly believed that they had a 
natural constituency worth repeatedly investing in. Early on, they launched an effort to 
expand the network to the colonial world; in the early 50s they invested a great deal in 
redesigning the Gauche Europeénne policy journal into a general-audience magazine; 
finally, in the late 1950s, they would attempt to reinvent themselves by creating a 
European workers’ union. The SMUSE operated under the assumption of a latent 
working-class constituency, though its active members consisted largely of mid-level 
members of the European political class.  
Comprehensive lists of members have not surfaced, but we can trace the 
movement’s growth through its conferences, held annually from 1947 to at least 1954 
and more sporadically thereafter. The trajectory in that first period is fairly steady, with 
attendance growing from a dozen to several hundred. At its peak in 1953-54, roughly 
half of the attendees came from the political class, including senators, parliamentarians, 
and the occasional cabinet minister. The other half, who leave little trace in records of 
the Movement’s day-to-day activities, numbered engineers, academics, trades-unionists, 
journalists, civil servants, lawyers, jurists and students. The repartition of politicians to 
what might be termed “civilians” differed from country to country: aside from the 
occasional SPD representative, the German delegations numbered far more professors 
and trades-unionists than politicians; the Italians and French were split more evenly; 
and the Belgians numbered more politicians than civilians. National sections had 
roughly the same politician-civilian ratios as conference delegations. In 1953, for 
instance, the German section included former Senator Otto Bach, a Hamburg banker, and 
Professor Hermann Brill; the Italians included Public Works Minister Giuseppe Romita 
and two members of the struggling PSDI; the Belgians included once-and-future Foreign 
Minister Spaak, Senator Fernand Dehousse, and Paul Finet of the ECSC High Authority. 
By the mid-50s, the largest delegations -  France, Germany, Belgium and Italy - 
numbered between 35 and 50. The second-tier delegations  - Dutch, Austrian and 
Saarlander, - numbered in the teens. They were complemented by small delegations 
from a dozen other, largely Eastern-bloc countries.  
 
 Nor can the SMUSE properly be called a political party, insofar as, while it 
propagandised for its members and displayed a certain pride in their professional 
achievements, it did not run its own political candidates. There is no evidence that the 
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group ever carried out political research to gauge public opinion or to identify issues 
that might gain traction, nor that it had a sophisticated understanding of its existing 
constituency (though it is worth noting that General Secretary Gironella’s papers, which 
are most likely to contain such information, could not be consulted for this project). The 
initial MUSSE had been more an intellectual exercise than a viable political one, 
presenting itself as distinct from and opposed to the nationally-based political 
structures of its time, and this legacy could be felt throughout the Movement’s existence. 
The period under André Philip’s leadership produced a politically viable path to the 
movement’s objectives, but it would operate via existing parties and institutions such as 
Labour, the Strasbourg Assembly, or the European Movement, bypassing the need for 
public proselytising except in specific contexts.  
   
 By the mid 50s, the movement had become a fairly well-articulated political 
network. Annual conferences produced resolutions that would define the movement’s 
objectives and inform members’ domestic political strategies. Between conferences, 
those objectives were pursued by an international committee and a number of national 
sections, supervised by an executive committee composed of the Movement’s leadership 
and the heads of a half-dozen sections.  
 The precise relationship between the executive and the national sections 
changed over time: dual membership in the SMUSE and domestic political parties 
created conflicts of interest which kept internal power relationships somewhat fluid. In 
the earliest days, the movement was run by the ILP, which at that time had little in the 
way of a national electorate, the result being that ILP and MUSSE objectives could 
overlap almost completely without doing much harm to the former’s electoral position. 
In France, the situation was more delicate: the significant overlap between SMUSE 
leadership and the SFIO that developed in the late 40s created a lot of friction, especially 
when domestic concerns pushed the SFIO to adopt positions that conflicted with the 
SMUSE’s. Guy Mollet’s relationship to the Movement is particularly instructive: while he 
endorsed the Movement’s integration objectives and never openly broke with the 
SMUSE, he nevertheless sometimes held it at arm’s length. SMUSE positions articulated 
in Gauche Européenne were the source of some tensions as well, and the Movement 
agreed to keep the SFIO in mind in its editorial decisions. Perhaps at the furthest end of 
the spectrum lay the Labour Party. The Labour executive tolerated its Keep Left group, 
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and its ties to the SMUSE, as long as there was no conflict of interest or the appearance 
of convergence with the Conservatives, as in the case of  the European Movement. They 
also jealously guarded their autonomy, very much at the expense of transnational 
engagement. The viability of national sections as agents of SMUSE policy was contingent 
on domestic constraints, which had to be accommodated lest national-party partners cut 
ties with the Movement altogether. For this reason, the SMUSE had little concrete 
leverage or enforcement powers: there is no record of any disciplinary measures either 
in the Movement’s statutes or internal communications, nor of any sanctions or 
expulsion from the movement. 
 The result is that the Movement could draw and retain members exclusively by 
what it offered: a transnational network of well-placed politicians with a shared 
purpose. This did not happen overnight: there were few concrete avenues for 
multilateral transnational cooperation in the late 40s, so that the Movement essentially 
pursued bilateral arrangements. The European Movement provided an early forum, 
though the SMUSE had held off for some time. There was a great deal of overlap between 
the SMUSE and members of the other federalist groups involved: notable participants 
included Altiero Spinelli, who had founded his own movement and was involved with 
the UEF; the UEF was led at various times by fellow SMUSErs Henri Frenay, Hendrik 
Brugmans and Raymond Rifflet. These members would help mediate a mutually 
beneficial relationship with the European Movement and its constituent groups. The 
launch of the Schuman Plan in 1950 provided the strongest reinforcement to the 
network in that all six founding members were represented in the SMUSE, and already 
shared common goals for functionalist expansion of a supranational authority. Through 
the 1950s the Franco-Belgian axis that launched and shepherded the first few forays 
into European supranationalism was reflected in a Franco-Belgian axis leading the 
Movement.  
 In the simplest terms, the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe was 
a very well-connected political action committee pursuing integrationist projects, in 
direct collaboration with certain cabinets, national parties, European institutions, and 
the wider federalist community. Basic functionalist assumptions – that proto-
“European” parties and institutions were inherently powerful and self-sustaining – 
governed the group’s strategic approach. Basic Marxist assumptions that the working 
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class would inevitably recognise that socialist policies were in its own interest governed 
its political one. 
 
Historiography 
This dissertation does not contradict the record in any major way, nor does it 
attempt to weigh the relative importance of economic, political and personal factors in 
the development of Europe. It does, however, add an important layer to the literature in 
several areas.  
It adds to the story of Franco-British engagement in the late 1940s. There is an 
abundance of existing literature, but much of it is focused elsewhere than on the 
potential socialist solutions discussed here: most are primarily concerned with cabinet-
level relations;10 Alan Milward and Roger Woodhouse11 have offered analyses based on 
economic considerations. P.M.H Bell, in The Long Separation,12 covers a fifty-year period 
and is concerned primarily with relations between governments. Other works view the 
relationship primarily through the lens of strategic externalities, notably the questions 
of Russia, Germany, and the US.13 
The present work, in looking at contacts at the parliamentary-committee level, 
reveals a heretofore unacknowledged forum of discussion and cooperation, in particular 
via the intermediary of Labour’s Keep Left group. Kenneth Morgan, in “Labour in 
Power”14 identifies forces within the party pushing for a more Eurocentric orientation 
and a “Third Force” geo-position (Keep Left and the Parliamentary Labour Party). His 
focus being on the Cabinet’s ultimate decisions, however, he misses an opportunity to 
discuss the policy alignment between those forces and the Continent. John Young’s 
Britain, France, and the Unity of Europe15 might best benefit from the discussion here: he 
 
10 Greenwood, Sean. The Alternative Alliance; Anglo-French Relations Before the Coming of NATO, 1944-48. 
London: Minerva Press, 1996. Bitsch, Marie-Thérèse. Histoire de la construction européenne. Editions 
Complexe, 1999. Bossuat, Gérard. "Le rêve français d'une Europe franco-britannique." Matériaux pour 
l'histoire de notre temps. 18.18 (1990): 3-11. Web. 20 Oct. 2011. 
11 Woodhouse, Roger. British policy Towards France, 1945-51. London: Macmillan, 1995. Also Milward, 
Alan S. The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1952. London: Routledge, 2003. 
12 Bell, P.M.H. France and Britain 1940-1994: The Long Separation. London: Longman, 1997 
13 Bernier, Serge. Relations franco-britanniques (1947-1958); étude du comportement d'une alliance. 
Editions Naaman, Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada, 1984. Bossuat, Gérard. L'Europe des Français. Publications 
de la Sorbonne, Paris 1996. Bossuat, Gerard: La France, l'aide Americaine et la construction europeenne 
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1997. Massigli, René. Une comédie des erreurs 1943-1956. Paris: Plon, 1978 
14 Morgan, Kenneth O. Labour in Power 1945-1951. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984. 
15 Young, John W. Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951. Rossendale: Leicester University 
Press, 1984 
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devotes a great deal of attention to efforts at multiple levels of government, including a 
section on the “Third Force.” The existence and activity of a forum of coordination 
centrally focused on producing just such a geopolitical alignment is an important part of 
that story. 
This dissertation also establishes the personal connections between actors in the 
context of the ill-fated European Defense Community and European Political Authority – 
the existing works cover the agency of some of the Movement’s adherents with very 
little acknowledgement of the Movement itself.16 The same is true of some of the works 
on the Treaty of Rome, which draw attention to several relevant members of the 
Movement without acknowledging their connection:17 the Guy Mollet government and 
its foreign policy leaders, widely credited with a decisive commitment to the Treaty of 
Rome, was composed of SMUSErs, while Spaak, leading the negotiations, was head of the 
Movement.  
The literature on the early European Parliament, and particularly the Socialist 
Group,18 can also be complemented by the present work. There has been some recent 
work on SMUSEr Fernand Dehousse, notably by Umberto Tulli,19 though no literature 
existed at the time to establish the connection between Dehousse (and other 
parliamentarians like Marinus van der Goes van Naters and Maurice Faure) and the 
SMUSE. 
Finally, the positions and activities of the Socialist Movement add to the existing 
works on international Socialism in the period after World War II. A proper 
understanding of the SMUSE network – or even an acknowledgement of those links’ 
existence – reinforces the premise that transnationalism was both broad and effective. 
Most directly concerned is Imlay’s recent work, which makes several references to the 
MSEUE (he uses the French acronym, reflecting the language of his sources)20 but 
 
16 Griffiths, 2000. Fursdon, 1980. 
17 Parsons, Craig. A Certain Idea of Europe. Cornell University Press, 2003. Küsters, Hanns Jürgen. 
Fondements de le Communauté Economique Européenne. Luxembourg: Office des publications officialles 
des Communautés européennes, 1990.  
18 Hix, Simon and Urs Lesse. “Shaping a Vision; A History of the Party of European Socialists.” Brussels: 
Party of European Socialists, 2002. Available at http://urs-lesse.de/History_PES_EN.pdf Shaev, Brian. 
Estrangement and Reconciliation: French Socialists, German Social Democrats and the Origins of 
European Integration, 1948-1957.” Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburg, 2014 
19 Tulli, Umberto. “Which democracy for the European Economic Community? Fernand Dehousse versus 
Charles de Gaulle.” Taylor & Francis online, 2017. 
20 Imlay, Talbot. “Constructing Europe, 1945-1960” in The Practice of Socialist Internationalism: European 
Socialists and International Politics, 1914-1960.” Oxford Scholarship online 
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nevertheless reflects the current dearth of material on the movement. He provides a 
short summary of the Movement’s engagement with Labour and its affiliation to the 
European Movement, and touches lightly on the relationship with the SFIO. His coverage 
peters out in the mid 50s, however, citing a growing “isolation from mainstream 
Socialism” and the SFIO “losing interest.” This overview does a disservice to the SMUSE 
in not acknowledging the Movement’s British origins, its extensive international 
network, its collaboration with the SFIO in the context of the EDC and the Treaties of 
Rome, and more broadly its staying power.  
Socialist internationalism begs the question of relations between the national 
socialist parties in various countries. However, the Socialist Movement was a 
transnational organization with unique means and goals, and insofar as it regrouped 
personalities more consistently than political parties, the present work engages only 
briefly with variations between, or conflict within, those parties. It draws to some extent 
on Imlay, and more so on Brian Shaev’s recent work concerning the SFIO and the SPD.21 
He has notably ascribed agency to different forums of Socialist internationalism such as 
the Socialist International (or its preliminary entity COMISCO), the socialist groups in 
the various European assemblies, or even Monnet’s Action Committee.22 He identifies 
important sub-official contacts between the SPD and the SFIO in the late 40s mediated 
notably by André Philip, Guy Mollet, Gérard Jaquet and Salomon Grumbach (identified as 
members of COMISCO, though all were also SMUSErs), and credits them, among other 
things, with creating a public convergence on internationalism in the late 1940s and 
“foster[ing] a recognition of the challenges of the domestic political contexts in which 
the other party existed.” This piece does not attempt to determine whether COMISCO or 
SMUSE links were the more salient in this case. However, the fact that the personnel and 
the objectives of both groups (in this case to win SPD participation in socialist 
internationalism) were the same, and the argument that the SPD and SFIO benefitted 
from back-channel contacts despite the political risks, supports the inclusion of both 
groups in the historiography. 
 
21 Shaev, Brian “The Algerian War, European integration, and the Decolonization of French Socialism” in 
French Historical Studies 41-1 (February 2018). Shaev, Brian. Estrangement and Reconciliation: French 
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comparison of the French and German cases” History of European Ideas 46-1. 41-58 
22 Imlay, “Constructing Europe;” Brian Shaev (2020) Nationalism, transnationalism and European 
socialism in the 1950s: a comparison of the French and German cases, History of European Ideas, 46:1, 41-
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 In terms of Socialism more broadly, the Movement, its conferences, and to a 
greater extent its magazine (absent from the existing secondary literature) functioned 
as focus groups, where Socialists from various countries could share and compare 
respective positions. Overall, the SMUSE should be recognized as an important driver of 
Socialist thought and activism in the late 1940s and 50s, and a useful network of 
activists thereafter. 
In addition to complementing to the story of postwar Socialism, this dissertation 
might be categorized alongside the work done on the role of Christian Democracy in the 
post-war period, particularly in the context of the “Geneva Circle.”23 Analogously to how 
the Circle fostered the development of a relationship between, among others, Konrad 
Adenauer and Robert Schuman, the SMUSE fostered connections and allowed a degree 
of policy coordination between powerful political actors in France and Belgium, perhaps 
most notably Guy Mollet and Paul-Henri Spaak. If the ECSC owes a debt to the Geneva 
Circle, I argue, the Treaties of Rome owe one to the SMUSE. 
 
Theoretical approach 
European Union historiography has gone through several phases in ascribing 
credit for the integrative measures discussed herein, none of which have produced an 
entirely satisfactory framework for understanding the process of European integration. 
This dissertation borrows elements from several approaches, but it is ultimately a neo-
federalist approach – though its conclusions do not suggest generalised federalist 
origins for the current state of the European Union – cognisant of the shortcomings of its 
historical antecedents. 
The basic premise of the functionalist school developed by Ernst Haas and others 
in the 1950s and 60s was that integration was a self-reinforcing mechanism insofar as it 
further empowered supporters of integration and created institutions led by 
“supranational entrepreneurs” positioned to spur further development. As Moravcsik 
notes,24 the approach was brought into question by the observation that integration in 
fact grew in fits and starts, and that it did not consistently move the locus of decision 
making from national governments to supranational officials. Thus the functionalist 
 
23 Kaiser, Wolfram. Christian democracy and the origins of European Union, 2007. Kaiser, Wolfram and 
Michael Gehler. ‘Transnationalism and early European integration: The NEI and the Geneva Circle 1947-
57’, The Historical Journal, 44 (2001) 
24 Moravcsik, Andrew. The Choice for Europe. Cornell University Press, 1998. 13-14 
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school could neither accurately describe the process nor have much in the way of 
predictive value. This dissertation is not a defence of the idea, though it does show that 
Haas’s assumptions about self-sustaining functional expansion were shared by the 
SMUSE and provided a strong motivation for their strategy . 
The notion that functionalist assumptions have some compelling explanatory 
power, not necessarily in describing the end result, but in explaining the underlying 
motivations of some of the European project’s protagonists, betrays a fundamental 
premise of this work, which is that perceptions and motivations are more relevant to the 
historical process than objective truth. The fact that objective factors might track well 
with particular theoretical models – the evidentiary basis for grand theory arguments – 
is not proof that these factors spurred individual human actors to action. History is 
replete with historically consequential but objectively incorrect ideas, from the 
centuries-long notion that Jewish Europeans were actively damaging the social and 
economic health of their home countries to the more recent conviction among many 
Americans that Donald Trump was defrauded of victory in the 2020 presidential 
election. In other words, I contend that perceptions drive historical change more than 
facts do, and that the compatibility of perception and truth is close but incidental. This is 
particularly true in the realm of ideology, which is ultimately – ironically – a theoretical 
framework of its own. Adherents to given ideology – political, religious or otherwise – 
are inherently predisposed to reject inconvenient facts as a harmful perversion rather 
than to critique the ideology itself, and to act on those convictions. For this reason I pay 
particular attention to describing what motivated the movement internally, often at the 
expense of a thorough examination of complementary factors in any given historical 
event, because it has better explanatory power for their behavior.  
 
The federalist approach developed in the 1980s was spearheaded largely by 
Walter Lipgens, whose work most directly inspired the line of investigation herein. In 
brief, Lipgens and his colleagues (most notably Wilfried Loth) argue that there existed a 
number of ideologically-driven transnational groups who worked largely parallel to the 
normal structures of government to create common ground for international 
agreements which struck at the foundations of nationalism and state sovereignty. Their 
contentions have since been largely shunted aside in favour of more prosaic 
explanations focusing on statesmen and functionaries, and on the economic and 
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geopolitical externalities in force at any given moment. The best-know “debunking” of 
the federalist approach is perhaps Alan Milward’s The European Rescue of the Nation 
State, which argues that nationalist and economic priorities - not some nebulous fantasy 
of international harmony implemented by “European saints” - drove the creation of a 
system that in fact strengthened national power and autonomy while granting only 
nominal concessions to the supranationalism so cherished by federalist interest-groups. 
Andrew Moravcsik similarly explains the process of integration as a series of choices by 
national leaders “who consistently pursued economic interests.” These approaches are 
empirically rigorous and convincing on a macro level: from a distance, economic 
priorities do convincingly circumscribe the decisions ultimately reached. Moravcsik’s 
“rationalist” approach, in The Choice for Europe, is of a particularly scientific character, 
systematically testing various theories against the negotiations of five major integrative 
projects. The result of such an approach is to produce a theoretical framework that is 
best compatible with, or most useful in describing, the events under consideration. But 
human endeavour cannot be reduced to a theoretical construct: once determined, this 
“best-fit” approach, rigorous as it might be, throws out the baby with the bathwater in 
minimising, or indeed ignoring altogether, the role of individuals and groups at the 
micro level whose actions are deemed either incidental or irrelevant to the bigger 
picture, an inconsequential aberration in the “true” principles at work. In fact, while 
these federalist groups did not control very much of the institutional construction 
process (as compared to the normal institutions of state involved in direct negotiation), 
this thesis argues that they did play a decisive role in laying the groundwork for 
integration before state-level negotiation got under way - producing agreement on 
substance rather than on the final form of the agreements – and in navigating certain 
national obstacles to international agreement. 
 Another implicit assumption of federalist historiography is that the federalist 
groups represented the true will of the people, a will thwarted by political leaders intent 
on maintaining sovereign powers.25 The present examination does not corroborate the 
view that federalism was a grass-roots movement, although it is clear that the SMUSE 
believed that for all intents and purposes they were just that, and simply needed to raise 
awareness of their existence among the working class, rather than convincing the latter 
 
25 Pasquinucci, Daniele. “Between Political Commitment and Academic Research: Federalist Perspectives.” 
European Union History: Theme and Debates, Kaiser and Varsori, eds. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 66-84. 73.  
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of the need to follow their approach. Beginning in the late 1940s, the SMUSE tried - 
albeit without much demonstrable effect - to become a grass-roots party based in the 
European socialist constituency. In the late 1950s, they would ultimately explain their 
failure to rally the working class not as a flaw in their outlook but as the result of Gaullist 
obstruction and a misunderstanding of the significance of the Rome treaties. 
 
 This dissertation also responds to what Moravcsik identifies as a central fallacy in 
international relation studies,26 which is the tendency to “assume that [long-term] state 
preferences are fixed,” unaffected by exogenous temporal factors. These factors wreak 
havoc with grand-theory-style systemic explanations, and Moravcsik rightly rejects such 
explanations out of hand. The French, protagonists of the first two major integrative 
projects (the ECSC and the EDC), were particularly prone to inconsistency as result of 
the highly unstable nature the Fourth Republic, and the negotiations around the Treaty 
of Rome constitute a glaring example of rapidly-shifting state priorities: the Mollet 
government that took office midway through the process was markedly more 
supportive of the project than the preceding administration. Moravcsik’s adoption of a 
“rationalist” approach promises to avoid the pitfalls of systemic explanations by treating 
each negotiation as distinct. This is doubly flawed. First, while this approach is 
scientifically sound, it explicitly casts aside any notions of consistency between rounds 
of negotiation, and in doing so ignores the existence of long-term, ideologically coherent 
and politically viable conceptions of Europe. These conceptions existed within federalist 
movements in general and within the SMUSE in particular, though the latter’s practical 
prescriptions went through a significant evolution over the course of 1947-1949, 
influenced largely by the sharpening lines of the Cold War in the same period. They were 
debated and fleshed out outside the structures of national politics, yet shared by 
influential political actors from across Europe, most importantly France and Belgium. 
These parallel structures afforded political actors the luxury of ideologically-based 
signposts towards integration despite the shifting externalities that underpin the 
rationalist approach. SMUSE leadership, including Fenner Brockway, André Philip, Guy 
Mollet and Paul-Henri Spaak, believed in the viability of the project to the point of 
devoting considerable time and efforts to the SMUSE program, and this despite – or, I 
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argue, because of – their occupation in sometimes top-level political posts very much 
subject to the winds of political change. 
 The second flaw in the rationalist approach is that while Moravcsik treats each 
set of negotiations as largely distinct, he treats each individual negotiation as reflecting 
stable motivating interests, denying new government cabinets any consequential 
individuality. This is particularly problematic in his treatment of the French position 
with respect to the Treaties of Rome, to which I will return below. 
 
 Another trend undermining the federalist narrative is the string of important 
biographical works which have weighted EU historiography in favor of the 
interpretation that individual political actors (Milward’s “saints”) deserve credit for the 
commitments undertaken by their respective governments. Some of these arguments 
are stronger than others. As French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman did in fact have 
the singular authority to launch what became the ECSC; as manager of the Messina 
Project, Paul-Henri Spaak had the authority to make the strategic choices to produce 
acceptable treaties for the EEC and Euratom.27 The primary issue with these approaches 
is that nobody operates in a vacuum - despite their job title, there are considerable 
constraints on political actors: their superiors in government; the political optics of any 
given proposal, and, in an international context, the degree of convergence with 
international partners. It was not enough for Schuman to decide on a resource-sharing 
agreement, for instance: it was necessary to workshop it thoroughly, to send a private 
emissary to Bonn to confirm that the Germans were on board, to propose it - delicately - 
at a cabinet meeting for approval, and to choose his words carefully in selling it to the 
public.  
The “great person” approach falters the further the subject is from the levers of 
power. Jean Monnet, an eminently capable career civil servant with an impressive 
resume and an even more impressive contacts list could still not personally lead 
European integration efforts. He was, for instance, commissioned by Schuman to 
produce a draft proposal for the ECSC; and his idea for an atomic pact had to be 
introduced to the Six by Paul-Henri Spaak. Fundamentally, biographies address their 
subjects’ character and principles, answering the question as to why they might endorse 
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a particular worldview or how they overcame a particular set of obstacles. But by the 
very nature of the exercise, biographies rarely tackle the degree to which their subjects 
are entirely responsible for the things which made them famous, lest by the same token 
the importance of the biography itself be brought into question. Comprehensive 
accounts of major historical events should treat biographical subjects as case studies in 
the circumstances that led to a given event, not explanations of that event in and of 
themselves. In the present context, the very fact that these personalities operated within 
national structures meant that had to look to transnational organizations to pursue 
integrative projects: these groups offered them something they could not accomplish on 
their own regardless of character or position. The SMUSE includes some high-profile 
actors subject to biographies of their own, but the approach herein, while recognising 
individuals’ professional capacities, focuses far more on the coordination between them 
required to overcome external constraints. 
 The central figure of André Philip constitutes a compelling case study in the 
degree to which political actors can be substituted for broader forces. By late 1949, after 
a period of rapid adjustment, Philip took the reins of the SMUSE and moulded it largely 
in the image of his own convictions. It would be tempting for a biographer to interpret 
this fact as more significant than it really is. Philip was instrumental – perhaps 
determinant – in the development of the SMUSE, but he did not control the organization. 
It predated him and would outlast him. Its participants debated him publicly in print and 
at conferences, and could be internally critical of his character. The relationship between 
Philip and the SMUSE was, at best, symbiotic, and while he is perhaps the movement’s 
most active leading figure, the evidence does not support the interpretation that it was 
an extension of his character. The same is all the more true of Paul-Henri Spaak, subject 
of several biographical works28 of his own, and the movement’s highest-profile 
adherent. The story herein suggests that in both cases, the movement was likely worth 
as much to both men as they were to it. 
 
 Besides the shifting trends in EU historiographic approaches, a phenomenon 
common to any discipline as new information is incorporated into increasingly more 
comprehensive and sophisticated overviews, federalist historiography of the European 
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Union has also been charged with two major academic shortcomings29. One is the close 
connection between early federalist politicians and the historians who wrote about 
them: federalist and historian John Pinder is a case in point, as are the close contacts 
between Walter Lipgens and German Christian-Democrat (and SMUSEr) Heinrich von 
Brentano, or between certain Italian federalist historians and Altiero Spinelli’s 
Movimiento Federalista Europeo. Of this charge I can claim innocence. Aside from a 
grandfather who helped found the French MRP,30 I have no dog in this race beyond the 
fact that I live in – and support the general principles of – the modern European Union.  
The second charge concerns the restricted source material common to federalist 
histories. The Lipgens-Loth volumes Documents on the story of European Integration31 
may be the most glaring example: they are a collection of the writings and publications 
of federalist groups,  and they draw connections with European developments rather by 
implication than by tracking causal chains. The arguments are fundamentally 
teleological: since there now exists something akin to what the federalists envisioned, it 
stands to reason that those federalists had a hand in producing it. This dissertation 
could admittedly fall under this umbrella. The source material here is composed 
overwhelmingly of the internal communications and publications of the SMUSE: I do not 
weigh these publications against other factors, political, economic or otherwise. I would 
argue that it is simply too great a task to deal comprehensively with all the archival 
material related any given event, nor is it necessary to the development of compelling 
arguments: as Morten Rasmussen has pointed out, Alan Milward’s highly regarded 
works on state sovereignty and national economic conditions are based exclusively on 
state archives.32 However, while Milward purports a grand explanation, I explicitly do 
not claim that the European project can be comprehensively explained by the activities 
of federalist groups. Instead, I have traced a number of concrete, specific instances of 
coordination in the context of the SMUSE with direct causal links to results in the 
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political arena, something which Lipgens and his followers were unable to do.33 This is 
not a grand theory argument about the development of the EU: it is a tightly focused 
exploration of the history of the SMUSE establishing that this group had an indisputable 
part to play in the process of European integration, and that any history of the European 
Union that does not acknowledge that contribution is incomplete.  
Kiran Patel has most recently recast the process of European construction, 
identifying the development of the European Economic Community in the 1960s as the 
watershed moment in the modern bloc’s history. This approach avoids the teleological 
pitfalls of looking for a continuous motivating force for a process beginning as far back 
as the late 19th Century, or at least institutionally with the launch of the Schuman plan. 
He describes a “densely populated field” of transnational groups and institutions active 
in the two decades after the war, emphasising that they continued to exist, and indeed 
multiply, during the 1950s, and that several of them were far larger than, and in some 
cases direct competitors with, the ECSC. Rather than positing a singular driving force, he 
invites an examination of the “web of relationships [between] Western European 
organizations and transnational forums”34 that influenced the European process. This 
approach challenges the assumption, implicit in both grand-theory arguments and in 
federalist historiography, that there exists an objective hierarchy of consequential 
groups or institutions active in the 1940s and 50s. It suggests instead that these groups 
ought to be seen as operating on a level playing field, each contributing to a sort of 
proto-European zeitgeist that did not take a definitive shape until the 1960s. The effort 
herein dovetails with the consequent need to re-examine the actions of transnational 
groups, and it leaves little doubt that the SMUSE was an integral part of the proto-
European engine of the 1950s. 
 
 This leaves the question of at what stage of the process of institutional formation 
the SMUSE interceded. Moravcsik argues that EU integration history can be understood 
as the result of three distinct and sequential processes: the formation of national state 
preferences, negotiations mediated by the balance of power between parties, and the 
capacity of proto-EU institutions to support the commitments made. This thesis 
moderates at least the first two stages in small but important ways. The SMUSE’s 
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primary influence was essentially coeval with the first stage, but this paper challenges 
the assumption that the formation of national state preferences was located entirely 
within national structures. Transnational federalist groups, and in specific instances the 
SMUSE, permitted actors from separate national structures to coordinate their 
approaches precisely to circumvent these structures. One well-known example of this 
mechanism was detailed by Gehler and Kaiser in “The Geneva Circle.” For a number of 
years in the late 1940s and early 1950s, high-ranking European Christian Democrats 
gathered in Geneva, Switzerland, in the utmost secrecy under the umbrella of the 
Nouvelles Equipes Internationales. Block reservations were made and participants 
travelled incognito and on their own personal authority. The meetings in question were 
politically risky, especially since they included Germans who, for a time, did not yet have 
full diplomatic powers. The risks paid off: the relationship between Robert Schuman and 
Konrad Adenauer has been credited with facilitating the launch of the ECSC, and 
meetings continued for several years even after West Germany became a sovereign 
entity. The SMUSE had analogous results, though there was no need for the kinds of 
secrecy that characterised the Geneva Circle. Its members developed relationships 
outside diplomatic channels and developed a shared roadmap, which in turn allowed 
some crucial moments of international coordination targeted at national considerations. 
 More than simply an intellectual and policy framework around which political 
leaders gravitated, the SMUSE can also claim a small measure of influence in Moravcsik’s 
second stage: the negotiation process. As noted above, this thesis suggests that the 
process cannot be explained entirely by a static quantification of the balance of power 
within each round of negotiation. In the context of the Treaties of Rome, Moravcsik 
acknowledges the change in the French government, but posits a set of stable 
“commercial interests” that homogenized the motivations of the cabinets in question 
and outweighed any ideological or other factors.35 This thesis argues that  French 
SMUSERs were more influential in the Mollet government than they’ve been given credit 
for, and that they worked together with Spaak to circumvent issues such as France’s 
colonial commitments which, they felt, had they been given importance in the 
negotiation process commensurate with their centrality to the French economy, 
threatened to scuttle the process entirely. 
 




This initial scope of this project was limited to the late 1940s and early 50s, based 
on the minimal secondary work and the impression that the Movement did not achieve 
very much, if anything, after 1953. The true extent of the Movement’s lifespan, and the 
considerable wealth of its records revealed itself as the research progressed, 
concomitantly extending the chronology. The work is constrained in part by the typical 
length of a dissertation, as weighed against a concern to both fully explore the 
movement and represent as much of the archival material as possible; it is also 
admittedly limited by the inability to track down every relevant source. Its areas and 
degree of focus are proportional to the record, and I have prioritized the breadth of the 
Movement’s activities over the depth of any given issue.  
I have endeavored to reference any secondary literature that intersects directly 
with the Movement’s efforts, but some of the better-known secondary literature is 
perhaps less integral than might be expected in a work largely concerned with the 
building blocks of the European Union. That being said, this work is not designed to 
retell the story of Europe, nor does it cover all the typical “greatest hits” except insofar 
as the Movement had anything to do with them (the establishment of the ECSC, for 
instance, is barely evoked). Major retrospectives such as those by Geir Lundestad, 
Andrew Moravcsik and Mark Gilbert, for instance, with their necessarily broader 
coverage and synthesis of the forces at play, feature only sporadically.36 I have made 
more use of targeted works like those mentioned above, several edited volumes, and 
journal articles with an emphasis on contemporaneous ones which reflect the “reality” 
in which the Movement was operating better than those written with the benefit of 
hindsight.  
  
The first chapter covers the origins and early stages of the Movement. It had its 
roots in the London Bureau, where its first members had cut their teeth in the anti-
fascist activism of the 1930s and struggled to define an anti-Stalinist Left. Two members 
of the London Bureau would write a Marxist pamphlet during the Second World War 
and establish a small movement under the auspices of the British Independent Labour 
 
36 Moravcsik 1998. Lundestad, Geir “Empire” by Integration. Oxford University Press, 1998. Gilbert, Mark. 
European Integration; A Concise History. Plymouth: Rowan & Littlefield, 2012.  
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Party. A Franco-British collaboration soon developed, which gingerly attempted to find 
its way into the established political landscape, and to reconcile the founders’ original, 
geopolitically neutral, post-nationalist vision with the fast-evolving American policy 
towards Europe, notably its increasingly broad anti-Communism and its selective 
economic largesse. By the end of 1947, the Movement had established ties with both the 
French SFIO and the British Labour Party’s “Keep Left” group, and had articulated a 
position that, while optimistic, was at least compatible with the geopolitical realities of 
the emerging Cold War. 
The second chapter, covering 1948 and 1949, traces the movement’s maturation. 
During the first half of 1948, the Movement’s default orientation was still a Franco- 
British one, and the Movement’s Fenner Brockway was able to bring an encouraging 
measure of influence to the British government via Labour’s Keep Left group. In the 
event, the Labour connection fell through, and the Movement was left adrift. The result 
was a completion of the movement’s leadership shift to France and the formalization of 
an approach more conciliatory to the diverse integrationist movements active in the 
period. The SMUSE would formally join the European Movement and change their name 
to signal that, if their inspiration was socialist, the sought-after political union did not 
have to be strictly so. Finally, the movement found an energetic, high-profile leader in 
André Philip, who presided over the development of a rational, comprehensive program 
and concrete means for implementing it. 
Chapter 3 opens with a discussion of how the French, out of over a dozen 
adherents to the Movement, came to dominate the SMUSE. An overview of the European 
political landscape reveals that, in the final analysis, only the French were both disposed 
and able to engage in the integration process on the terms that had been laid out by the 
end of 1949. Thereafter, the major part of the chapter concerns the Movement’s efforts 
to establish a European Political Authority beginning in 1950. Its new president, André 
Philip, was instrumental in launching the EDC project and a number of SMUSErs worked 
to obtain the inclusion of the treaty article that would have produced a political 
authority. The Communist and Gaullist opposition had a large part to play in the 
ultimate rejection of the treaty, but special attention is devoted here to the crippling 
cleavage in the SFIO, the SMUSE’s primary agents in France.  
The final main chapter covers the period between 1954 and 1964. It first 
discusses the role of the Movement’s magazine, Gauche Européenne, which ran for five 
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years in the mid ‘50s. The magazine was concerned primarily with presenting the 
socialist viewpoint on various aspects of the European project. It went through several 
incarnations, and while it did not ultimately garner a sufficient audience to stay afloat, it 
provided a valuable service as a source of information and a forum of debate. The 
second part of the chapter focuses on the Movement’s contributions to the Treaties of 
Rome. An examination of the Movement’s records reveals an important degree of 
coordination between negotiation leader Paul-Henri Spaak and the French cabinet on 
several issues, most notably the linking of the two executive branches. The chapter 
closes with the rapid decline of the movement’s institutional vitality, resulting from a 
combination of factors: a drying up of the Movement’s financial resources, a reduction in 
the movement’s access to power, and the establishment of European institutions that 
constituted a better avenue for the Movement’s members. 
The Movement would be rather unrecognizable after 1964, but it continued to 
exist in various forms until 1993. The movement’s activity, and therefore its archival 
record, is far less dense in this latter period; it is also beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, which is already far more chronologically extensive than had been 
projected. Nevertheless, in the interest of giving the Movement its due and hopefully 
spurring further research, the epilogue traces the major stages of the Movement after 
1964. There are three: a rather inactive period under British Labour MP Geoffrey de 
Freitas, a more active one centered on the French section under Gérard Jaquet between 
the mid 70s and mid 80s, and a final period when longtime SMUSEr Raymond Rifflet put 
the surviving network to use in service of the projects of European Commission 












 In the immediate aftermath of World War II – a war effectively the result of 
nationalism codified into a political system – there arose a broad spectrum of ideas for 
some degree of harmonization or integration between the nation-states of the Old 
World. Marxists predicted a sort of post-nationalist socio-political homogenization; 
Altiero Spinelli’s proposed an integrated “free and united Europe;”37 America called for a 
vague “European solution”38 to the continent’s near-existential crisis; and Churchill 
would soon call for a “United States of Europe” (more on which later). These were 
widely divergent conceptions, but each was a variation of cooperation across national 
lines, a breakdown of the exclusively self-interested “national”39 boundaries that had 
been a basic premise of political organization in Europe since the late 19th century. 
Radical for the time, these are nevertheless the ideas that have given rise to the modern 
European Union, that imperfect but unique grouping of European countries. 
In this context, there appeared a small, more-or-less fringe group inspired by the 
ideas of the interwar Left. Its manifesto was written by two second-tier members of a 
once-respected breakaway wing of the British Labour Party that had not run a 
successful parliamentary candidate since 1935. Their rhetoric was aggressively Marxist; 
their attitude towards the dominant political systems of the day uncompromisingly 
hostile; their ideas inchoate and outlandish. Considering its general hostility, and its 
authors’ complete lack of political agency, this tract should have stayed relegated to a 
dusty cardboard box in the basement of some university library – where it in fact 
 
37 Spinelli, Altiero and Ernesto Rossi. The Ventotene Manifesto. Ventotene: The Altiero Spinelli Institute 
for Federalist Studies, [s.d.]. p. 75-96. 
38 Marshall, George. Speech at Harvard University, 5 June 1947. 
39 The precise common denominator of “nationhood” (race, religion, language…) differed widely. 
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survives to this day40 – a curio of little interest save as an example of political 
desperation in the chaos of war.  
And yet this booklet struck a chord among a few of the re-emerging Socialist 
politicians of postwar Europe, enough to bring together a small group of people looking 
for a platform upon which to build a cooperative socialist European program. Over the 
next two years, enough people stayed united around the basic principles of the 
manifesto to shape them from an exercise in Marxist dogma into a set of goals that both 
accepted the status quo, and provided compelling solutions to some real problems. This 
chapter is the story of that transformation. 
This chapter will first discuss the ideological and personal origins of the 
Movement for the United Socialists States of Europe (MUSSE) in the interwar period. It 
will then describe the actual establishment of the movement, its founding members and 
early conferences, and its initial relationship to the parties in power. It will focus heavily 
on the major reason for the Movement’s rocky start: a lack of clarity from the United 
States as the latter carved out its opening posture in the Cold War. There follows a 
chronological account of the first 18 months or so of the movement’s existence, during 
which it held several meetings and one major conference where it refined its program, 
and when it made significant inroads into the political landscape of both France and 
Britain.  
The Movement’s origins were somewhat dogmatic and rigid, and its first two 
years were first and foremost a period of adjustment, as the Movement developed broad 
potential and prescient ideas about the European project. By the end of 1947, the major 
ingredients of a successful political pressure campaign – a pertinent message and a 
national stage – seemed in place. 
 
The promise of Socialism 
 Socialism saw an encouraging resurgence after the war, establishing the 
groundwork for an internationalist approach led by France and Great Britain, if they 
could find a basis of agreement.   
De Gaulle’s provisional government had included a number of Socialists – not 
least André Philip as minister of the interior during the war and minister of the economy 
 
40 Edwards, Bob and F. A. Ridley. The United States of Europe. London: LSE, ILP 3/76 
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soon thereafter. Early in the French Fourth Republic, Léon Blum led an interim 
government for a month, from December 1946 to January 1947, with a virtually all-
Socialist cabinet, laying the basis for the only Franco-British bilateral agreement of the 
early postwar period. British ambassador Duff Cooper, a “devoted Francophile”41 had 
arranged, on his own authority,42 an official visit by French Socialist representatives to 
Great Britain, which eventually produced the mutual-assistance treaty signed at Dunkirk 
in March, 1947, an encouraging sign for Franco-British Socialist cooperation. 
 The British Labour party won a sweeping victory in the 1945 elections and 
remained in power through 1951, The French Section française de l’Internationale 
ouvrière (SFIO) gained government representation in late 1946 in the new 4th Republic. 
The ensuing four years saw no fewer than ten administrations, with tenures ranging 
from 2 days to 13 months, but the SFIO consistently held about one third of the cabinet 
seats in the ruling coalition governments. As always in coalition politics, the SFIO had to 
compromise as a matter of political expediency; the Labour Party, meanwhile, faced a 
range of opposing pressures on foreign relations and Europe; it was thus difficult for the 
two to overcome practical pressures and engage on an ideological basis. Starting in 
1946, however, what was then the “Movement for the United Socialist States of Europe” 
(MUSSE) developed and successfully leveraged representation in both the French and 
British governments. 
 The MUSSE had held its first meeting under the auspices of the Independent 
Labour Party (ILP), in May, 1946. Its most valuable member was Fenner Brockway of 
the ILP,43 who shortly adhered to the Labour Party and served in the House of 
Commons. He was a good bridge between the two Labours and would act as something 
of a Trojan Horse, carrying the MUSSE program into Labour’s Keep Left group. As 
chairman of the international Socialist “London Bureau” (see below) for some seven 
years between the wars, Brockway also knew some key continental socialists. 
Brockway’s once-and-future collaborator Marceau Pivert, meanwhile, an influential, 
principled socialist and member of the SFIO’s Comité Directeur, was the movement’s 
earliest champion in France. A common Socialist outlook had already demonstrated the 
 
41 Bell, P.M.H. France and Britain, 1940-1994: The Long Separation. London: Routledge, 2014. 72 
42 Bell. 74. 
43 “Minutes of ILP Executive committee meeting 12 May 1946” and “ILP NAC meeting, 15-16 June, 1946” 
London: LSE, ILP/3/34. Brockway, Fenner. Towards Tomorrow. Suffolk: Granada Publishing Limited, 
1977. 146. Brockway resigned from the ILP in May, 1946 (his last meeting was 16 June) over his party’s 
opposition to the Labour Party. He joined the latter but remained part of the MUSSE. 
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potential to produce bilateral alignment, and together, the ILP and the SFIO had motive, 




Roots of the MUSSE 
 
 The MUSSE, in its original form, can be understood as a continuation of the quest 
for a viable non-Stalinist Left which had materialized as the “London Bureau” of the 
1930s. Little literature exists on the subject, but I will base this section on Michel 
Dreyfus’ very useful account of the development of the main Leftist movements of the 
interwar period, including the doctrinal variations that defined them.44 Ultimately, the 
heterogeneous and fragmented parties of the interwar Left could not accomplish 
anything of any great note, constricted by a relative minority status, the unavoidable, 
fraught relationship with Soviet Communism, and the massive political and economic 
crises of the 1930s. However, over the course of the London Bureau’s existence, we see 
emerge the central tenets of what would become the MUSSE.  
 
 A significant split in the global Marxist movement had followed the establishment 
of the Communist International (Comintern) in 1919 and its later cooptation by Joseph 
Stalin. In 1923, Leon Trotsky formed a competing International Left Opposition (ILO), 
which operated under intense pressure in Russia in the 1920s before being relegated to 
exile status in the following decade. Meanwhile, a so-called “Vienna International” - 
derisively called the Second-and-a-half International by the Soviets - held a few 
conferences in 1921-22 before splintering in turn. A majority of the “Vienna” parties 
merged with the remnants of the Second International in 1923, creating another direct 
competitor to the Comintern, the “Labour and Socialist International” (LSI).45  
 Contrary to the Comintern, the LSI did not see itself as a central command 
organism for the labor forces of the world. The remaining Vienna parties, however, 
 
44 Dreyfus, Michel. “Bureau de Paris et Bureau de Londres: le socialisme de Gauche en Europe entre les 
deux guerres.” Le Mouvement social  #112 (July-Sept 1980). 22-55. 
45 See also Daniel Laqua’s “Democratic Politics and the League of Nations: The Labour and Socialist 
International as a Protagonist of Interwar Internationalism.” Contemporary European History 24.2 (May 
2015). 175-192 
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though unaffiliated with the Soviets, did consider it imperative to organize and manage 
those forces. These parties regrouped in a unit sometimes referred to as the “Paris 
International,” another loose coalition (in fact also based in Vienna), whose constituent 
parties began to splinter towards the end of the decade. In 1932, a new coalition called 
the International Workers’ Union (IWU) was formed in Berlin.  
 As Dreyfus tells it, these latter two groups had several commonalities: 1) unlike 
the LSI, they envisioned a formalized global labor movement; 2) they considered the 
existing movements - primarily the Comintern - to have demonstrably failed to harness 
the global labor movement46; and 3) they considered it their primary task to fight the 
rise of Fascism. In 1933, members of the Paris Bureau and the IWU began to meet in a 
new forum bearing the unwieldy name of the “International Revolutionary Marxist 
Center,” or, more colloquially, the “London Bureau.”47 
 Logistically, the Bureau was managed in London by the Independent Labour 
Party (ILP), hence the moniker. The grouping was not entirely homogenous, and Dreyfus 
identifies three main tendencies. The first was towards a reconstituted global workers’ 
movement in the Social-Democratic vein, a position which implied the rejection of the 
Stalinist model and any sort of coercive unitary structure; the second, led by the ILP, 
envisioned an independent line with a possible future alignment with the Comintern; 
the third, largely inspired by Trotsky, envisioned a new anti-Stalinist global unitary 
movement (eventually, the short-lived “Fourth International”) based on strict Marxist-
Leninist theory. 
 The London Bureau’s first meeting in 1933 had been prompted by Hitler’s 
election,48 and so if there was a central unifying factor, it was opposition to Fascism. 
Within that position, however, there existed another divergence over Capitalism. On one 
side were those who felt that an effective front against the Fascist tide could only come 
in collaboration with the existing Capitalist national structures. On the other, the group 
that eventually prevailed espoused a strictly anti-Capitalist view. In short, the interwar 
Left, and the London Bureau, struggled to agree on much of anything except militant 
 
46 Stalin exercised covert influence over a number of international Communist cells, in service of foreign 
policy goals. Official Soviet policy sought “Socialism in one country,” and did not seek to harness world 
labor in any Marxist sense. 
47 The ILP’s Fenner Brockway notes that this was the most commonly used name. The IRMC was only 
officially constituted in 1935, but Dreyfus argues reasonably that the IWU-Paris Bureau merger occurred 
de facto in ’33. 
48 Dreyfus 1980. 33. 
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antifascism.  
 Some of the personnel of the London Bureau would remain politically engaged 
after the war. The Bureau was led and organized by the ILP under the guidance of 
Fenner Brockway; his colleagues Bob Edwards and Francis Ridley were also leading 
members. The 1933 meeting had included Trotsky’s ILO group, the largest constituent 
party of which was the Greek Archeo-Marxist Party, led by Dimitrios Giotopoulos, alias 
“Witte.” While Trotsky would not continue to participate, he and Witte had a falling out 
later that year, and Witte’s Archeo-Marxists remained with the London Bureau. French 
Socialist Marceau Pivert member of the leftist faction of the French SFIO, known as 
Gauche Revolutionnaire, joined the London Bureau in 1935; his offshoot Parti Socialiste 
Ouvrier et Paysan (PSOP) also adhered in 1937.  
The Spanish POUM joined the Bureau in 1935, establishing a connection with 
another central player of the MUSSE: Enric Adroher I Pascual.49 Adroher had been 
teaching in Catalonia, writing under the nom-de-plume Gironella, when he helped found 
the POUM in 1935. It is unclear whether he was personally present at any of the London 
Bureau meetings; he organized and fought alongside the Spanish anti-Franco forces in 
the mid 1930s until his arrest and imprisonment in northern Spain in May, 1937. During 
that period, however, the Bureau, and the ILP in particular, spent considerable resources 
supporting the POUM and affiliated anti-fascist forces in Spain. Among others, Bob 
Edwards drove an ambulance and helped organize British volunteers; Pivert helped 
organize those volunteers’ trip through France, in both directions; John McNair was 
briefly arrested in June, 1937, as he worked on logistics in Spain, and Fenner Brockway 
made a trip later that year to secure the release of some 15,000 prisoners, including 
some 1,000 POUMistas.50  
By 1938, the Bureau included independent factions of the British, French, 
German, Italian and Polish Socialist parties, the Greek Archeo-Marxist Party, the Spanish 
POUM, and a number of eastern European parties, all complemented by the American 
Socialist Party and several parties from “the Colonies” (Dreyfus does not specify which 
ones) in an observer capacity. 
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The last London Bureau meeting was held in April, 1939; the next, scheduled for 
September of that year, was rendered impossible by the outbreak of World War II. Aside 
from interrupting the Bureau’s activities, the war also scattered some of its members, 
notably Pivert and Gironella who both ended up in Mexico. By 1938, Gironella had found 
himself freed from prison in Spain, and ended up in France, where he was interned near 
Toulouse; in 1940, he found passage to Mexico via Bordeaux.51 Pivert, in the meantime, 
had encouraged the French working class to boycott any military activity or 
preparation: while on a speaking tour in the United States, he was tried in absentia and 
convicted of inciting insubordination, precluding his return. Some months later, a 
speech he gave at an American Socialist Party rally cost him his US visa; he too would 
spend the rest of the war in Mexico City,52 where he met Gironella in September, 1940.53 
With the London Bureau no longer a working forum, members’ programs 
diverged, constituting something of an ideological break. Gironella tried to form a 
Socialist union of parties exiled in Mexico. In 1943, Pivert formed the movement 
“Socialisme et Liberté;” and in London, in 1944, Bob Edwards and Francis “Frank” Ridley 
penned what would become the founding document of the Movement, a new manifesto 
titled “The United Socialist States of Europe.”54 The two men were members of the ILP 
and shared certain communist sympathies. During the 1920s, Frank Ridley had sought 
to join Trotsky’s ILO before joining the ILP.55 Riley was a Marxist revolutionary, and 
would ultimately drift away from the party he helped found in the late 1940s. Bob 
Edwards would remain involved into the 1950s. He was not particularly active, but 
likely had ulterior motives: he was eventually exposed as having longstanding ties to the  
Soviet Union, and was awarded the Order of the People’s Friendship by the Soviet 
Union.56 
 
 Edwards and Ridley’s program was well in line with, and can be seen as a fusion 
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of, the major tendencies of the London Bureau. It advocated an anti-capitalist, 
transnational European left, with a program elaborated democratically by its constituent 
members. This particular combination had been untenable in the 1930s, when the 
central raison d’être of the Bureau had been dealing with Fascism: nobody could 
concretely combat the Fascist advance other than via the extant - capitalist - 
governments (though a few militant anti-capitalists in the Bureau had advocated civil 
wars to overthrow them). The line espoused by the ILP at that time, meanwhile, which 
held out the possibility of joining the Communist International, conflicted with the anti-
Stalinist line that had attracted many of the Bureau’s other constituent parties. The final 
stages of the war resolved these internal contradictions by eliminating Fascism from the 
equation, except for its comparatively minor manifestation in Spain (which remained a 
concern), and by producing a short window of time during which the Soviet Union’s 
posture in the world was an open question.  
The Edwards-Ridley outlook was solidly Marxist, conceptualizing history as 
driven by economic relations between classes, predicting the empowerment of the 
working class and an end to traditional national boundaries, and taking for granted that 
a generalized socio-economic homogeneity would resolve all human conflicts. Just as the 
Thirty-Years War had reflected the inability of European feudalism to manage the effects 
of global commerce, they argued,57 the present war reflected the inability of the nation-
state system to handle the forces of the “Machine Age,” or what might today be termed 
global capitalism. With World War II still raging, they predicted that if the anachronistic 
Nation-state system, “no more suited to the modern age than Eskimo or Aborigine 
culture,”58 was not done away with, there would certainly be a World War III. The Allied 
pretense to righteousness was ridiculed: 
 
"The united nations,59 which include the two most ruthless 
dictatorships on earth, those of Stalin and Chiang Kai-Shek, are no 
more fighting for Democracy against Dictatorship than, on the 
other side, the Germans are fighting for the world supremacy of the 
 
57 While the war (1618-1648) is often characterized as a religious conflict, a Marxist interpretation (cf Neil 
Faulkner’s “Marxist History of the World”) is that commercial development had granted the (Protestant) 
Czech nobility a sphere of power and autonomy incompatible with the (Catholic) Holy Roman Emperor’s 
attempts at centralization, ultimately leading to the Westphalian solution recognizing the internal 
sovereignty (or proto-statehood) of the HRE’s polities. 
58 A pointed reminder of the racial attitudes of the time. 
59 As in the Allies, not the diplomatic forum. 
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white ("Aryan") races in collaboration with the Mongolian Japanese 
and the mongrel races who inhabit Italy and the Balkans."60 
 
But more than simply an imperialist war – “the tragic result of the failure of 
Europe to take the “Moscow Road” between 1917 and 1939”61 – this conflict was also an 
inevitable stepping-stone towards world Socialism. The inevitable end-product of 
history would be a United States of the World, they held, but the war having more or less 
reset Europe’s ideological landscape, the authors proposed to start with the United 
States of Europe (they would later cite their as their inspiration Lenin’s 1926 Europe and 
America62). And since Socialism was, and would continue to be, the only way to prevent 
yet another war, these would be United Socialist States.  
 
Ultimately, the MUSSE was not a direct continuation of the London Bureau, 
although the MUSSE could not have come about without it. Perhaps “offspring” is the 
best term. Its principles were a hybrid of the Bureau’s, made viable by a new geopolitical 
context. Its geographic aspirations were confined to Europe, in contrast to the interwar 
groups outlined above, which all envisioned a global movement.  There was some 
important continuity in the parties and individuals involved in the MUSSE and the 
Bureau, but it was far from complete, considering the disappearance of some parties and 
indeed some people. The MUSSE did not try to pick up where the Bureau had left off: at 
their first meeting, they called for papers establishing new positions, rather than trying 
to salvage the Bureau’s. Finally, in spite of the connections and similarities, nowhere and 
at no point do the MUSSE or its variants claim any kind of kinship, ideological, personal 





 The ILP looked forward to Pivert’s return to France in early 1946; having 
corresponded on a near-weekly basis throughout the war, Fenner Brockway and 
Secretary John McNair considered waiting for him before calling the first MUSSE 
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meeting.63 As enthusiastic as Pivert was to reengage in politics, however, the two-month 
journey from Mexico, in addition to two heart attacks he had suffered while there, saw 
him much diminished in the first months after his return.  
 On May 11 and 12, 1946, the ILP held an exploratory meeting, recorded under 
the title “First meeting of the International Socialist States of Europe.”  64 It was a 
reasonably small affair, but it drew participation from some familiar people, produced at 
least one resolution and elicited a series of questions to be addressed for the next 
meeting. For the ILP, Bob Edwards chaired, accompanied by Francis Ridley and John 
McNair. Jacques Robin of the SFIO attended (presumably in place of Pivert); as did the 
POUM’s Gironella, Germans Heinz Heydorn and Willi Dittmer of the SPD and Student 
Socialist Movements respectively, Witte (Giotopoulos) of the Greek Archeo-Marxists, 
and the Dutch Socialist Party’s Jef Last. French socialists Claude Bourdet and Simon 
Wichené attended as well, representing the Conseil National de la Résistance and the 
Union Internationale Contre le Racisme. The meeting might be seen as a passing of the 
torch: while many of the parties were the same, some of the faces had changed.  
Notable by his absence was Fenner Brockway: he’d been member of the ILP since 
1923, had led the London Bureau, and had been close enough to John McNair and 
Marceau Pivert to feature prominently in the wartime communication between them. 
The relationship between the ILP and Labour had been acrimonious, however, and 
Brockway was just then contemplating a change: on May 12 (the second day of the 
exploratory conference), he resigned his posts as Political Secretary and as editor of the 
magazine New Leader over the ILP’s refusal to work with Labour. He calculated that 
Socialist principles could better be served from within a party in power, and attended 
his last ILP meeting in June65 before rejoining the Labour Party. The overlap between 
ILP leadership and the MUSSE group would likely have made attendance awkward; but 
he would remain involved in the MUSSE for some time. His move to Labour would in fact 
prove advantageous to the Movement: Brockway would develop a close relationship to 
Labour’s “Keep Left” faction (see below), affording the Movement a direct conduit to the 
party in power. 
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Notable by his presence, on the other hand, was Enrique Gironella.66 Of the 
eleven men in attendance, Gironella was inarguably to play the most valuable role in the 
institutional history of the MUSSE; he was General Secretary by mid 1947, and remained 
so until 1964. For 18 years, he more-or-less singlehandedly managed communication, 
logistics, publishing and other administrative tasks. He wrote summaries and editorials 
for the party organs, delivered introductory and keynote speeches at conferences, 
liaised with affiliated movements, sought out sources of funding, and drove debates on 
the Movement’s orientation, mission and structure. It’s hard to imagine the movement 
ever functioning without him, and perhaps the single most glaring omission from this 
dissertation is the absence of material from his personal papers. He left France in 1976, 
after the death of Francisco Franco, returning to his native Catalonia. There, he joined 
the Partido de los Socialistas de Cataluña (PSC), which regrouped a number of the 
Socialist parties banned under Franco including Gironella’s POUM. According to his 
family, his papers were transferred to the PSC upon his death, but regrettably, repeated 
inquiries to the PSC over several years have gone unanswered. 
 The meeting’s single surviving resolution rather un-controversially called for the 
elimination of the displaced-persons camps that still existed in Germany and elsewhere 
(“The keeping of these men, women and children, victims of fascism, behind barbed 
wire, in conditions utterly unworthy of a genuine civilization, constitutes a crime against 
humanity”67). By contrast, the proposals to be addressed in the next conference rather 
more pointedly touched on coal, power, transportation, banking, the monetary system 
and the Spanish and Jewish questions. 
 Pivert finally reconnected with the ILP at their “Summer School” conference in 
Wales in July 1946,68 where he laid out his positions on French and European socialism. 
The MUSSE was not yet a wholly functioning organism, but in those early days, the line 
between MUSSE and ILP business was very blurry. Pivert and the ILP, who saw eye-to-
eye, decided that the best way to drum up support for the MUSSE was to expand the ILP 
newsletter Between Ourselves to France; until about 1950, Pivert contributed articles 
and translated English-language ones into French.  
 
66 Primary sources associated to the Movement overwhelmingly refer to him as Enrique Gironella, 
Gironella, or even a more familiar Giro; his given last name is virtually never used. Some sources, 
particularly Spanish ones, spell the first name “Enric,” and while his full last name was “Adroher I 
Pascual,” even Spanish sources generally just use Adroher. 
67 “Minutes of the first meeting of the International Socialist States of Europe.” LSE: ILP/3/76 
68 “Minutes of ILP NAC meeting 4-5 August 1946.” LSE: ILP/3/34. 
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 The MUSSE was not alone in trying to reconstitute a European Left after the war. 
Like the London Bureau, the interwar LSI had also ceased to function during the conflict: 
headquartered in Brussels, it had technically survived until the German invasion in 
194069. In May, 1946, the same month as the MUSSE’s exploratory meeting, the Labour 
Party hosted a conference at Clacton-on-Sea to see what could be salvaged of the LSI.70 
The two SFIO delegates to the conference - Salomon Grumbach, dispatched from Paris, 
and the London-based reporter Louis Lévy – reported that nobody suggested the 
creation of an International at that time and that no motions were submitted or passed, 
concluding that an international labor movement was far from being realized. The 
Clacton conference did decide to create a liaison office (SILO), headed by Labour’s 
International Secretary Denis Healey, and before a proper International could be 
reassembled, the movement would be spearheaded by a “Committee of the International 
Socialist Conference,” (COMISCO) led by Labour MP Morgan Philips.  
 The organization as a whole was spearheaded by Labourites, which goes some 
way to explaining Labour’s subsequent resistance to the MUSSE: it would be a 
competitor to their eventual International, run by a competing party. Labour was also 
considerably less concrete in its network and objectives than the MUSSE would be in the 
same period; Labour’s official position as late as mid-1947 was still that “the 
establishment of a formal Socialist International is not possible at the moment,” which 
functionally limited the organization to a forum of information exchange, but also 
implies that they felt that work could only properly commence once a sufficient number 
of parties had adhered. This is coherent in the context of a global movement, which is 
indeed more in the Marxist spirit than the more restricted geographical scope 
envisioned by Edwards and Ridley, but the result was that between 1946 and 1951, at a 
time when the MUSSE was the closest thing to a Socialist international, actively involved 
in European politics and advocating a concrete, actionable program, the COMISCO was 
essentially still building a clubhouse. 
  
 
69 Sibilev, Nicolai. The Socialist International. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980. English translation by 
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A second meeting of the MUSSE was tentatively planned for the autumn of 1946, 
but it does not appear to have occurred; the next meeting of the movement (later 
described as a “preliminary gathering”), was scheduled on February 22-23 1947.  It 
would again be hosted by the ILP, but in contrast to the exploratory meeting of the 
previous year they now sought official party delegates, and McNair sent out feelers to 
various groups, including Labour: Morgan Philips’ secretary replied curtly that the 
International Sub-committee had “discussed your conference and decided not to 
participate.”71  
McNair’s overture to the SFIO was somewhat more promising, even if ultimately 
unsuccessful.  The ILP was “extremely anxious” to have some SFIO heavyweights 
involved, McNair wrote, specifically Guy Mollet or André Philip. Philip, then Economic 
Minister, was a stretch, but for a fleeting moment, Mollet was slated to attend. However, 
the SFIO prioritized its relationship with the Labour Party, and Mollet wrote to Healey 
asking, in essence, for Labour’s blessing. Healey’s return letter was scathing. He called  
the ILP “a small and insignificant group […] split by internal dissention” and pointed out 
that some ILP members (notably Brockway) had recently left because of the group’s 
refusal to work with Labour. Considering the conflict between the two parties over a 
number of issues, “it would not be desirable for the French party to send a national 
delegate,” he concluded.” I strongly advise you not to do so."72 The SFIO declined the 
invitation.73  
 
 The meeting nevertheless went ahead, with 133 delegates in attendance – 
already twelve times the number present nine months before. Conference documents 
have not survived in either ILP or MUSSE archives, but the ILP’s National Administrative 
Council seems to have spent most of its next meeting discussing it.74 One major initiative 
was launched: an anti-Imperialist congress of representatives from Europe, Asia and 
Africa, which was intended to extend the program to European colonial holdings, laying 
the groundwork for a common political outlook on soon-to-be independent countries75 
(see next chapter).  
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Two principal political orientations came out of the conference. The first and 
most significant was a dedication to the “Third Front,” a position independent from the 
two major powers and “a powerful instrument for ensuring friendship with and in 
between the peoples of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R,” which also implied a common cause 
with non-Stalinist communists. This decision was a natural one considering the 
geopolitical situation of the moment: in these early months of 1947, the relationship 
between the Soviet Union and the Western nations was, on the surface, still a 
relationship among allies. To be sure, Churchill and Stalin had both publicly argued a 
year earlier that their two systems were incompatible and that the other side was to be 
feared;76 and as we shall see, in early 1947, the upper echelons of US policymaking were 
already adopting an antagonistic policy towards the Soviet Union. However, public 
indications were that the two sides could coexist peacefully: the joint occupations of 
Germany and Korea were proceeding according to plan, and though both sides were 
doing what they could to influence the political orientation of the counties they had 
liberated, there were at the time no formal economic or political unions that might 
properly constitute opposing “blocs.” The Third Force promised to be a friend and 
mediator to both, staving off any eventual conflict. 
 
The second orientations was a commitment to a democratic form of socialist 
planning, a “planned economy […] carried out through the organic structure of a real 
social and economic democracy, based on workers' control and not by any authoritarian 
medium of either monopoly capitalism or totalitarian state bureaucracy.”  
 This opposition to “monopoly capitalism,” while most directly a reference to the 
United States, echoes both the Bureau-era debate over whether to associate with the 
existing European governments, and the Edwards-Ridley indictment of the Allied 
governments. McNair, in his statement to the ILP congress, referred specifically to 
“Anglo-American Capitalism,” and while Germany, Greece, Italy etc. were in a state of 
considerable political flux at that moment, it could – and would – be taken to include the 
French government as well.  
Nor was the MUSSE goal of a unified continent entirely outlandish. Supranational 
structures had been on the Socialist wish-list as far back as 1889, and in the wake of the 
 
76 Winston Churchill; speech delivered at Fulton, Missouri, March 1946; Joseph Stalin; speech delivered at 
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war, a general post-nationalist thinking was increasingly more mainstream. Churchill’s 
call, in late 1946, for a “United States of Europe”77 had perhaps the highest public 
visibility and it was along superficially similar lines to what the MUSSE was proposing. It 
was something to work with, though the two visions were rather dissimilar. First, 
Churchill called for a Franco-German nucleus, which was at odds with the MUSSE’s 
default plan for a Franco-British arrangement – not only did Germany yet have nothing 
like a functioning, representative government, but the MUSSE’s organizational abilities 
were concretely restricted to a Franco-British axis. Churchill also offered up the British 
Commonwealth as a comparable example, which flew in the face of the centralized 
decision-making envisioned by the MUSSE. Churchill, it seemed clear, was seeking a very 
decentralized arrangement, which would essentially rely on a sort of historical and 
cultural fraternity to generate the political will to act in concert on major economic or 
foreign policy issues. The MUSSE’s socialist planning relied on a much more formal set of 
links and regulations.  Churchill sought a kind of “intergovernmentalism+” and the 
MUSSE were committed to democratic supranationalism. Some degree of federalism 
seemed at least likely, but for the moment, the MUSSE staked out a position of principle. 
 
The “third front,” or “Third Force,” bears some explanation here because it crops 
up in different forms in the late 1940s. It was proposed as a framework for foreign 
engagement, but was never an active government policy, nor was it ever clearly 
articulated in a practical sense. In its simplest and most common form, it is the notion 
that Europe could, if properly integrated and developed, constitute a bloc to rival the 
United States and the Soviet Union, or at least capable of resisting their influence. The 
MUSSE used the term to describe an integrated organism ideologically, financially and 
politically independent of both the United States and the USSR, and potentially 
comprising former colonial, non-European countries. 
 Ernest Bevin implied a different definition in a memorandum of January 1948, in 
the context of his celebrated Western Union initiative.78 The Western Union, an 
ultimately illusory concept that for a moment raised hopes for British leadership of the 
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integration project, was conceptually European, but not opposed to the US. Bevin’s 
definition of the force in question was the “democratic elements in Western Europe 
which are anti-Communist and, at the same time, genuinely progressive and reformist, 
believing in freedom, planning and social justice…” His union of west European 
countries, however, would be “backed by the Americas and the Dominions.”79 
 The difference is not negligible: Bevin’s description, despite the socialist 
elements, effectively precluded the involvement of any of the countries in the Soviet 
orbit, or the Colonies in an independent capacity. Even if Bevin’s Western Union never 
coalesced, it drew support from Europeanists on both sides of the Channel and thereby 
contributed to the alienation of the eastern bloc. This had mixed implications for the 
MUSSE: while it superficially meant that they shared common goals with the British 
cabinet, the imprecise definition would be a source of confusion and disappointment. 
 In France, Léon Blum advanced the term “Troisième Force” in 1947 to describe a 
national-level centrist political coalition between the Communist Left and the Right; it 
would often be used to describe the French governments of the late 1940s and early 50s.  
Overall, the term and its variants (“third force,” “third way,” “middle way”) have 
been used liberally as a general concept of strength and independence through unity, 




The American Problem 
 
But while a dialogue on European federalism was certainly in the offing in early 
1947, the MUSSE’s Third Front orientation was fast becoming anachronistic with 
respect to the geopolitical trends at work. In hindsight, one could see a certain naïveté in 
the notion that postwar Communist parties would be free to coordinate programs with 
Socialists, or to champion the kind of democratic structures envisioned by the MUSSE. 
But the interwar Leftist movements from which they came had existed on the premise 
that Stalinism and the Third International were not in fact real Communism – they 
sought, in a way, to save properly Marxist Communism, and this seemed a reasonable 
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objective when Stalin’s personal grip on Communist factions in central Europe was not 
yet entirely consolidated. The crucial developments in the viability of the Third Force 
that would trickle out over the next five months came from a source which the MUSSE 
had not considered: the United States. With the UK heavily indebted to, and dependent 
on the US, it was a factor that the Labour government could not afford to ignore, and as 
the US extended support to the rest of Europe, the continent too became subject to 
American influence.  
On February 22, 1946, precisely one year before the MUSSE decided on its Third 
Force policy, the American chargé d’affaires in Moscow George Kennan had laid out, in 
some 5300 words,80 why reason or conventional diplomacy would not prevent Soviet 
expansionism. In the simplest terms: the Soviet foreign policy establishment was self-
deluded, Stalin did not receive “anything like an objective picture of the outside world,” 
and the “Soviet party line [was] not based in any objective analysis of [the] situation 
beyond Russia’s borders.” The telegram was secret diplomatic correspondence at the 
time, but Kennan was consulted by the State Department, and was ultimately tapped to 
head the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff in April 194781 indicating that the 
central focus of US policy was already the Soviet Union, and that the executive branch 
trusted Kennan’s analysis. In late February, however, there was yet little overt 
indication that the US would follow an antagonistic orientation with respect to 
Communism. 
This changed somewhat on 12 March, some three weeks after the MUSSE 
conference, when the American President articulated the “Truman Doctrine” before 
Congress. He called, notably, for a significant investment to be made in shoring up the 
governments of Greece and Turkey. The specifics were restricted in scope: the argument 
and the aid demanded applied only to those two countries; there were no references to 
Russia or the Soviet Union; and the single reference to Communists described them very 
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narrowly as a group leading terrorists in Greece. Philosophically, however, the speech 
told a different story: “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples 
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” 
Kennan’s Long Telegram had laid out the “two planes” of Soviet Foreign Policy: 
outwardly unaffiliated Communist groups, offering a certain plausible deniability and 
cover for an innocent official policy carried out through regular diplomatic channels. 
The MUSSE understood that the sands were shifting, but did not grasp the full 
implications. The speech signalled that the United States would combat all facets of 
Soviet policy: not only the Soviet Union’s paramilitary agents (“armed minorities”), but 
also its client regimes and potentially susceptible political parties (all subject to “outside 
pressures”). The Americans were painting socialism with an exceedingly broad brush, 
effectively rendering moot the MUSSE’s premise that there was a valid wedge between 
Stalinism and “real” Communism. 
There were no MUSSE meetings scheduled until June, but Francis Ridley 
published a response to the Truman Doctrine in late March, 1947. Unite or Perish!82 
addressed the competing conceptions of Europe. He didn’t mince words in his appraisal 
of the intergovermentalist Churchill plan: “It is…obvious that any movement supported 
by Churchill and his liberal colleagues must inevitably be a capitalist and imperialist 
movement, however ‘left’ its slogans may be." More than simple opposition to the form 
of Churchill’s proposed union, we see here vestiges of the old ideological combativeness 
that had characterized the interwar movements. Capitalism itself was the enemy, and 
Ridley seems to have held out the hope that the old Capitalist structures and alliances 
could genuinely be done away with.  
With respect to Truman, Ridley blamed America’s aggressive behavior for the 
escalating tensions between East and West. He suggested that a United Socialist States of 
Europe would eliminate these tensions and that Russia could be brought into the union. 
He didn’t excuse “Russian totalitarianism,” but nevertheless doubled down on being a 
“third camp” between the blocs. He acknowledged the conflict, and, implicitly, the US’s 
superior position, but continued to extend the olive branch to the Communists.  
Though consistent with strict principle, this position did also reflect the practical 
situation of the Movement’s constituent parties: the Eastern European parties-in-exile 
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were in a very precarious position wherein they could not afford to antagonize the 
Soviet Union; the western German representatives, meanwhile, particularly the SPD, 
rejected any foreign control at all, and sought at least cordial relations with the East lest 
they antagonize the Soviet occupiers. Sometime between February and the June 
conference, the Movement sent out an “appeal to the German people” that meshed well 
with the SPD position: the stifling of German economic potential, they charged, was a 
crime against both Germany and Europe, a “criminal absurdity” that was simply an 
attempt by the two global imperialist blocs to prevent a revived Germany from joining 
one side or the other. The natural answer was to join an independent, centrist bloc that 
was open to both sides.83  
McNair argued Ridley’s new position at the ILP’s annual conference in Ayr in 
early April, calling for opposition to both Anglo-American Capitalism and Soviet 
Communism and explaining that “the Third Front is even more important now than 
during the war and is the only practical and ideal solution to our political difficulties.”84 
In its insistence on the viability of a centrist bloc in spite of the signals from the US, and 
in its wholesale rejection of capitalism, Ridley’s pamphlet is symptomatic of a certain 
ideological obstinacy that impeded the early Movement’s ability to engage on a practical 
level.  
In the tentative early months of America’s orientation process, to be fair, 
European policymakers (and idealists like the MUSSE) could be forgiven for not taking 
America’s anti-Communist posture as a fait accompli. The MUSSE was not alone in trying 
to find some accommodation with the Communist world in early 1947. Several Socialist 
parties in Europe sought, in the immediate postwar period, to bridge the gap between 
Communist and Socialist parties. In France, the SFIO had resolved at their 1945 National 
Conference to work towards a reconstitution of the working-class movement and 
cement solidarity with the Communist Party, with which they worked in the postwar 
government of national unity.85 Conflicting ideologies would prevent a rapprochement 
between them, and the SFIO would acquiesce in the expulsion of the Communist Party 
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from government in May 1947. Similarly, separate from the Edwards-Ridley pamphlet, it 
had been the official position of the ILP that Soviet recalcitrance was a result of 
American assertiveness and that fences could be mended; yet they too distanced 
themselves from Communist ideology starting in 1947. The German SPD would be most 
directly confined to a “bridge” posture, as we shall see, determined to avoid antagonism 
of either bloc in a bid to prevent a divide between the Western and Soviet zones of the 
country.  
 
A shift took place, however, sometime between the April ILP conference and the 
end of May, when the position papers for the MUSSE’s June conference went out. Two 
central tenets of Ridley’s vision – radical anti-capitalism and the Third Force position – 
were scaled down. The MUSSE fell back on the much more practical concerns evoked at 
the opening meeting of 1946: the rational planning of European economic assets like 
coal, transportation, and the banking sector.86 There remain some vestiges of the “third” 
orientation, implicit in muted criticism of both the US and the Soviet Union and a 
promise of humanitarian socialist planning, but gone are the aspirations to being a 
“powerful instrument for ensuring friendship with and in between the peoples of the 
U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R…."87 
In the context of a continent-wide program, the opening paragraph of the MUSSE 
program asserts that the primordial practical task “will be to [… draw] up a plan of 
production based on the needs of the people [of Europe] which will previously have 
been ascertained.” We will go into more detail below, but for the moment it was a 
pleasant surprise to discover that the new policy potentially meshed with a central facet 
of the announcement by American general George Marshall - now Secretary of State - on 
the afternoon of June 5. The announcement would ultimately tip the balance, forcing the 
MUSSE to definitively abandon the more doctrinaire positions advocated by Francis 
Ridley in favor of realpolitik.  
In the first instance, the Marshall speech torpedoed any illusions that there could 
be a Third Force. At an honorary degree ceremony at Harvard University, Marshall 
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announced the US’s intention to materially subsidize the recovery of Europe with a 
European Recovery Program (ERP). Marshall, a military man and a strategist more than 
a humanitarian, had created the Policy Planning Staff and put George Kennan in charge. 
Its very first task had been to define a strategy with respect to the reconstruction of 
Europe. In his first report, Kennan had indicated that “it would be essential that this be 
done in such as form that the Russian satellite countries would either exclude 
themselves by unwillingness to accept the proposed conditions, or agree to abandon the 
exclusive orientation of their economies.”88 Kennan had also predicted in the Long 
Telegram that while the Soviet Government may pay “lip-service” to general 
international trade, it would turn a “cold official shoulder” to the “principle of economic 
collaboration among nations.”89 The final speech would reflect Kennan’s premises that 
the Soviet Union should be treated as an adversary, with which there could be no 
accommodation… or “bridge.” 
Like Truman’s, Marshall’s speech included a sort of diplomatic doublespeak, 
which signalled an escalated position antagonistic to the Soviet Union itself. On the 
surface, Marshall offered American aid to all of war-torn Europe, technically including 
Eastern Europe and the geographically-European administrative centre of the Soviet 
Union, but the speech included an implicit “out” with respect to the Stalinist bloc: “Any 
government which manoeuvres to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect 
help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties or groups which seek to 
perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will 
encounter the opposition of the United States.”90 To the extent that the Soviets were 
liberally looting the countries they occupied, and that the promises of Communism 
appealed most to peoples facing existentially-threatening poverty, the implication was 
nakedly anti-Soviet. Marshall further insisted that US aid support a “joint program” 
produced by “agreement among the countries of Europe” including some commitment to 
the “part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect” to 
American contributions. The phasing is innocuous, but this was anathema to the 
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independently-controlled, centralized economy which was central to Soviet system, and 
it essentially precluded the Soviet Union and its satellites from participation in the 
European Recovery Program. As Kennan had predicted, the Soviets at first feigned 
interest, before pulling themselves and their clients out of the project on the grounds 
that it constituted “interfer[ence] in their internal affairs down to determining the line of 
development to be followed,” to the advantage of France and Britain. Without apparent 
irony, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov charged that “European countries would find 
themselves placed under control and would lose their former economic and national 
independence because it so pleases certain strong powers.”91 
 If the speech stopped short of signalling overt hostility, one detail further 
prejudiced the MUSSE’s political aspirations: the target of American intervention was no 
longer just “armed minorities and outside pressures,” but more pointedly defined as 
“governments, political parties, or groups.” Beyond the paramilitary threats evoked 
under the Truman Doctrine, the US would now also target perceived threats in the 
political arena. It was becoming increasingly difficult to envisage the US and its growing 
list of clients seriously entertaining a European policy of equivocation or 
accommodation with the Soviet Union. 
The final nail in the “Third Force” coffin would be the publication in Foreign 
Affairs, in July, 1947, of an article which made the public case for an openly anti-Soviet 
policy of “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian [sic] expansive 
tendencies.”92 The article’s author was George Kennan, now head of the Policy Planning 
Staff, under the pseudonym “X.” Kennan laid out directly the diplomatic quandary he had 
described in the Long Telegram: a diplomat “cannot hope that his words will make any 
impression on [the Soviets]. The most that he can hope is that they will be transmitted to 
those at the top […] But even those are not likely to be swayed by any normal logic in the 
words of the bourgeois representative. Since there can be no appeal to common 
purposes, there can be no appeal to common mental approaches. For this reason, facts 
speak louder than words to the ears of the Kremlin; and words carry the greatest weight 
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when they have the ring of reflecting, or being backed up by, facts of unchallengeable 
validity.” In other words, “there’s no talking with these people, only action.”  
Ironically, the content of the article dated back six months, and was effectively 
already policy. In January, Kennan had given a talk at the Council on Foreign Relations, a 
Washington-based think tank with an active relationship with the State and Defense 
departments, and which publishes Foreign Affairs. He had submitted the same content to 
his superior James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal would become 
Secretary of Defense in September, 1947). By March 7, the editor of Foreign Affairs had 
already agreed for Kennan to submit a write-up of his talk under a pseudonym.93 In 
other words, a fully-articulated public explanation of the explicitly antagonistic position 
the US would adopt towards Communism in any form had been authorized for 
publication before Truman’s Doctrine or Marshall’s Plan were presented. The oblique 
references and restricted terms of those announcements were not the markers of an 
inchoate policy, despite the MUSSE’s interpretation. The Third Force had been dead on 
arrival. 
 
The MUSSE’s newly muted and practical program therefore anticipated the 
direction of the United States, at least in terms of political objectives. It’s less clear 
whether the group could have anticipated the American strategy for strengthening 
Europe, which was predicated precisely on rationalizing the allocation of economic 
resources on a continental scale. It raised the potential of a federated Europe, and even if 
American motivations were certainly self-interested, they did not necessarily conflict 
with the form of the requisite rationalization. 
The US had remained engaged on the continent after the war for several reasons. 
The ongoing joint occupation of Germany involved a physical military presence; the 
mistrustful relationship with the Soviet Union entailed a certain amount of contingency 
planning; and America’s wartime economy threatened to collapse unless new markets 
could be established to replace military requirements. A European continent acting in 
concert would be something of a panacea: the German question could be resolved quite 
satisfactorily if it were to become interdependent with its western neighbors; a Europe 
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at full health would be both a valuable deterrent to Soviet expansionism and capable of 
absorbing surplus American manufacturing.94 
 General Marshall’s proposal can be seen as a response to these issues 
specifically:95 he evokes the absence of a peace settlement with Germany, expresses 
opposition to “governments […] which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to 
profit therefrom politically,” and warns of the “consequences to the economy of the 
United States” of the economic dislocation in Europe. Marshall also makes references to 
restoring faith in the economic future of “Europe as a whole,” and to drawing up a 
“European program” for reconstruction. Taken together and stated simply, it was in 
America’s national interest that the Europeans work together. 
Two factors would have been deal-breakers for a strictly Ridleyite response. 
First, the plan would bring a degree of dependence on the United States, effectively 
aligning Europe in that direction. Second, the products in question would be provided by 
American companies rather than produced by Europeans, inviting capitalist values and 
practices. However, Marshall was explicitly soliciting some degree of harmonization of 
the European economy, a European economic paradigm that the MUSSE happened to be 
developing at that very moment. Ultimately, the MUSSE’s more dogmatic principles were 
swept aside: though wary of American motives, the ILP’s Between Ourselves – now 
effectively the MUSSE mouthpiece – concluded that Europe needed the goods and that 
America needed the market… "It follows, therefore, that American and European 





The MUSSE headquarters were in London, and the International Committee 
established in February 1947 was headed by Bob Edwards and John McNair – the co-
author of the manifesto and the head of the ILP respectively. On a material level, the 
British were in a better position than their French counterparts, if only because they had 
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paper(!). Pivert and McNair worked together to overcome the rationing in France by 
having publications for the group’s French audience produced in London. The paper 
shortage forced Pivert to write microscopically on both sides of incredibly thin, almost 
transparent paper, and send that to London. Tasked with transcribing these scribblings, 
McNair was a little nonplussed, but game.97 Later, French invitations to the February 
conference also had to be sent from London: Pivert sent over a list of names and 
addresses, and McNair wrote them up as best he could (his confirmation letter to Pivert 
included a jocular, expletive-laden tirade about French tenses and accents.98) 
Aside from shouldering the costs of producing materials for the continent, the ILP 
also undertook a domestic publicity campaign for the USSE. Few materials have 
survived, and there is no way to know how much was printed or distributed, or to 
whom, or how much concrete impact it had. However, the ILP strained to make ends 
meet. The party, and its budget, were small: over the following year, the ILP’s MUSSE 
campaign incurred a net loss equivalent to about £2000, a rather small amount that 
nevertheless put the party accounts in the red.99 Any significant expansion of the 
movement would have been a challenge.  
This may go some way to explaining why the next conference, in June 1947, was 
held in France. Marceau Pivert organized the event in Montrouge, to this day a 
stronghold of the Left on the southern edge the Paris city limits.  However, his colleague 
Guy Mollet of the SFIO had evidently been rather interested in the MUSSE, and now that 
the conference was not organized explicitly by the ILP, the SFIO could participate 
without antagonizing the Labour Party. Mollet now insisted that invitations go out under 
SFIO letterhead. In this context, it’s reasonable to assume that conference materials 
were produced by the French, marking the beginning of the Movement’s transition 
across the channel. 
John McNair attempted a rapprochement with Labour, inquiring of Morgan 
Philips whether “any of your boys would like to come unofficially.” This time, Healey at 
least entertained the notion, requesting permission from Kenneth Younger. Younger’s 
response was dismissive at best, concluding that the conference materials Healey had 
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sent over were “abstract and doctrinaire” and that “that the socialists are no longer a 
practical proposition in France, but just a bunch of bloody intellectuals.”100 Healey 
declined the invitation. 
 Fenner Brockway was in a marginally more promising position… one of his new 
colleagues in Labour was Ian Mikardo a member of a low-key Labour faction known as 
Keep Left, which had published a first eponymous pamphlet in May.101 It was keeping a 
low profile for the moment, lest the Labour executive come down on them,102 but 
Brockway would shortly be invited to join the “innocuous study group.”103  Mikardo 
responded positively to the USSE idea and promised to discuss it with the rest of the 
“Keep Left boys, and see if we can’t do something as a group.”104 Pivert would make 
direct contact before the June conference, and though none of the Labourites attended 
except Brockway, the MUSSE was beginning to develop a way around the animosity 
between Labour and the ILP. 
 
Montrouge would attract some 164 delegates from 14 different countries to the 
MUSSE’s two-day conference, on 21 and 22 June, 1947. The leadership had not changed: 
Bob Edwards chaired with John McNair as treasurer and secretary. Ridley attended, as 
did Jacques Robin and Gironella. Heinz-Joachim Heydorn, Dittmer, Last and Witte had all 
been founding members. Pafsanias Catsotas of the Greek Progressive Labor Party105 was 
a new face, as was Zygmunt Zaremba, head of the exiled Polish Socialist Party, and 
several Americans. The only Labourite in attendance seems to have been Fenner 
Brockway. The proceedings of the conference have not survived, but the resolutions 
adopted essentially validated the pre-conference paper, except that they would have 
occasion to address the Marshall Plan.  
 
 The general logic and language of the June conference’s preparatory paper106 
remains Marxist, with references to class struggle and the bourgeoisie, to the inherent 
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“contradictions” of the existing Capitalist system, and to decentralized control by the 
working class. This material seems well in line with Ridley’s orthodox views. However, 
elsewhere, in a section on the state of Socialism in Europe, the Movement paper argues 
that most Socialist parties were effectively stuck in a prewar, oppositional mindset, and 
now needed to become a creative force. “They have often kept to the phraseologies of 
the past and have not dared to give new thought and reflection to the problems in the 
reality of their historic setting of today.” Tendencies within the movement were pulling 
in opposite directions.  The anti-capitalist language had been moderated somewhat, and 
there was no more mention of fraternity with European Communist movements (this is 
at least in part due to the recent expulsion of the Communists from several 
governments). Nor were they advocating some sort of homogenous super-state like the 
Ridley-Edwards pamphlet’s purportedly inevitable “United Socialist States of the 
World,” instead validating the local variations that developed within (otherwise much-
reviled) national boundaries. 
Rather than bridging Capitalism and Communism, the group now effectively 
positioned itself as nonaligned: “Socialist measures will differentiate Europe from 
American Capitalism” and “the principles of liberty will differentiate Europe from Soviet 
totalitarianism.” Betraying the lingering premise that both blocs were latently hostile, 
they hoped “it will be by our democratic will that we can take from the USA any 
justification of their eventual hostility: it will be by our socialist will that we can arrive at 
the same result with the USSR.”  
The group continued to predicate its success on Socialist alignment and, with the 
SFIO already on board, it made some general overtures to the UK. Without naming the 
Labour party, the program’s second point pledged to “further the economic 
nationalizations nobly realized within the national and capitalist framework of the old 
Europe.” However, there were some misgivings in the MUSSE that Labour’s 
nationalization program was not quite democratic enough. The position paper had 
elsewhere argued that centralization and top-down nationalizations along the Soviet 
model simply substituted the old form of capitalist domination for a new totalitarian 




considered undue influence, Labour might “threaten, very gravely, human liberties in 
the event of their becoming the future structures of totalitarian oppression.”107  
Social-democratic organization of was the most central theme in the MUSSE 
program, printed in capital letters:  
“POLITICAL DEMOCRACY SHOULD BECOME A GENUINE SOCIAL 
DEMOCRACY, ALL THE FORCES OF PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION SHOULD 
BE DIRECTED AND CONTROLLED BY THE WORKERS THEMSELVES AS WELL AS 
THE PLANS AND MEASURES FOR REALIZING A TRUE SOCIALIST ECONOMY.”108  
 
The reasoning was explicitly Marxist: this was “the decisive factor in the 
suppression of class domination without permitting the emergence of a new class.” As 
both Napoleon and Hitler had showed, a unified Europe could only be achieved by the 
“willing consent of the governed.” They further called for a charter of the rights of 
citizens and European peoples. 
 
The dialogue with Labour revolved around degrees of centralization at the 
national level, but the Movement in fact aimed at some degree of organization on a 
continental level, and at defining a new relationship between the constituent nations in 
terms of sovereign rights. A version of the dialogue was already playing out in Europe, 
and in the next chapter we will discuss the formation of the European Movement, but 
the MUSSE did present set of principles in the context of Churchill’s aforementioned 
“United States of Europe.” In the Montrouge preparatory paper, the structure of the 
union is referred to as a “federation,” which, while explicitly not intergovernmental, is 
not a particularly precise term. Technically, it simply describes a system wherein some 
powers are granted to a central government and others to regional ones; to this day, 
scholars disagree on the specificities, and the consensus is that there are “numerous 
overlapping definitions” of the term.109 On the weaker end of the Federalist spectrum, 
the initial American “Articles of Confederation” system (1781-1789) consisted of little 
more than the States contributing, on an essentially voluntary basis, to a central 
government in charge of little more than the military. One could make a case for 
something similar in the Holy Roman Empire, though it was largely devoid of a formal 
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power-allocation structure. Under the modern United States Constitution, the size and 
responsibilities of government is a matter of continual polemic and fluctuation. On the 
other extreme of the spectrum, “federation” might be applicable to the Soviet Union 
insofar as, on paper at least, there existed regional autonomy in the Republics. 
The paper was clear about what their union would not be: it would not be a 
simple political union of the kind envisioned by Churchill, nor would it mirror the United 
States in the sense that the existing bourgeois structures would be scaled up to the 
continental level. And it would not be the Soviet-style centralized totalitarianism. That 
said, the precise degree of federation is a little opaque. 
They evoked an arrangement on the weak end of the spectrum, wherein “all the 
forces of production and consumption should be directed and controlled by the workers 
themselves,” in as decentralized a manner as possible, “delegating only to central bodies 
powers which cannot be exercised locally.” There are no explicit examples of these 
powers, but there are certain specific references in the program that would imply some 
form of centralization. The only explicit transnational system in the program is a 
“European banking system with a standard currency,” but there was also a trade bloc 
and the “abolition of tariff walls.” However, references to “harmonization” or 
“rationalization” in cases such as production, transportation, agriculture, or education, 
imply the existence, at the very least, of international agencies to collect and process the 
relevant information. What legal authority these agencies would have is not clear, but 
they would at least have to be paid for out of some central fund, as would any sort of 
defensive capability, a topic altogether absent from the program. These gaps are not 
surprising, of course; this document is simply a basis for discussion. Ultimately, “it is the 
workers, the peasants the technicians and youth who must be called upon to become the 
driving force,” in a campaign led by the Socialist parties of Europe. Finally, the program 
argues for “liberty of national traits and characteristics,” because “one of the great riches 
of Europe is the immense diversity of national characteristics.” 
Taken together, the MUSSE program of May-June 1947 has a foot in both worlds. 
While it argued for programs that would ultimately come to pass, it remained dragged 
down by its oppositional revolutionary roots. Ridley and Edwards had cut their 
philosophical teeth in the interwar period, where the international Left consisted of 
small ideological groups buffeted by variations in Marxist doctrine. Fundamentally, each 
sought to get the revolution right, which was predicated on there being a revolution in 
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the first place: finding accommodation with the inevitable losing side was nonsensical, 
and for that reason, the MUSSE’s default position was that there was little use in 
engaging with the equivocations of what it considered outdated national governments. 
The program itself, reasonable and actionable as it was, remained couched in boilerplate 
Marxist exhortations, and Kenneth Younger might be forgiven for calling it “depressing 
[…] abstract and doctrinaire.”110 
The MUSSE was still somewhat inchoate. Its founders believed that the only 
legitimate political structure was post-national socialism. The war had been proof 
positive that nationalism and capitalism contained contradictions that would destroy 
both: insofar as the political leaders of the future would surely abandon these 
structures, there was no harm in oppositional language and little incentive to adopt a 
collaborative posture. Such was the legacy of the Ridley-Edwards pamphlet: it 
denounced the old systems and predicted the new, and Marx’s assertion that such a 
transition was inevitable meant that little attention really needed to be paid to the 
precise mechanisms of this change. The Movement’s members all shared the vision of a 
new post-national organization, but it fell to Marceau Pivert and his SFIO colleagues – 
schooled in the ideology, but, crucially, better trained in national politics – to determine 
how best to produce this new system.   
The MUSSE record does not indicate any overt disputes at this stage between the 
Movement’s leaders, perhaps because their responsibilities were somewhat 
compartmentalized: the Brits provided the inspiration and the seeds of a network 
inherited from the London Bureau; the French provided a legitimizing international 
partner and the financial means to grow. The crucial factor in tipping the balance was 
that the French would increasingly also provide the Movement’s strategic direction, but 
at this stage there was no real conflict between the ends presented by the Brits, and the 
means proposed by the French.  
   
 Be that at it may, Marshall’s proposal was very promising, and attendees at 
Montrouge were greatly encouraged by the French and British announcement, just days 
before the conference, that they would begin talks with the Soviets. Debate at the 
conference concluded that it was a step towards joint economic planning, which would 
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undermine nationalism in general; second, that the involvement of the Soviets would 
limit the partition of Europe into two blocs; and third, that the allocation of funds to a 
common European organism would preempt the kinds of bilateral financial agreements 
with the US that, in their view, both brought the specter of capitalist influence and might 
draw Labour Britain away from a European economic paradigm. To that extent, and 
despite the assumption of ulterior American motives, this initial stage of the ERP’s 
development process was cautiously endorsed at the conference.  
That Friday, the Big Three met in person. The following Wednesday, Molotov 
withdrew.111 
 It was a turning point for the MUSSE. In its July edition, Between Ourselves 
published the MUSSE’s updated, official position. First and foremost: “Make known the 
grave responsibility incurred by the USSR, in, on the one hand, provoking the dividing of 
Europe in two, and, on the other, prolonging the misery of the Eastern European 
peoples.” 112 Second, this is the moment that they concluded European and American 
interests were “exactly complementary,"113 though not without some conditions: public 
negotiations managed exclusively via an international organization, a European-staffed 
logistic chain, and no military equipment.” This last item highlighted another legacy of 
the of interwar Socialism: the complete absence of any reference to the military. Anti-
militarism was a longtime staple of Socialist internationalism; the Pivert side of the old 
London Bureau had been rabidly anti-war (Pivert would remain so), and the MUSSE still 
consistently held that socialism was the only way to avoid another one. And yet, 
considering the violence to which the Movement’s members had been witness since the 
mid 1930s, the ongoing conflicts in southern Europe, and the increasing tensions 
between the US and the Soviets, it was beginning to seem naïve that basic defense 
contingencies were entirely absent from their plans for Europe: one of the markers of 
the MUSSE’s move towards the center, beginning in 1949, would be a concerted 
campaign for the European Defense Community. 
Ultimately, the Franco-British agreement to, and Soviet rejection of, Marshall aid 
forced the MUSSE to abandon an equal position between the East and West, but it also 
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suggested that the Movement’s plans for European economic integration were 
increasingly feasible. 
 
 As it settled on an actionable program, the Montrouge conference also brought 
two major institutional developments. There had previously been an international 
committee, essentially tasked with communication, but now that a plan of action had 
been ratified, its role shifted to an executive one, with the official title “International 
Committee of Study and Action for the United Socialist States of Europe.” Its work would 
be complemented at the national level by a series of national sections in (at least) Italy, 
Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The exiled parties would 
remain represented, though they could not carry out the basic functions of a national 
section.  These functions were, first, to unite the isolated national forces interested in the 
MUSSE’s work: political parties, trade unions and youth groups. Second, they were to 
target public opinion in support of the United Socialist States of Europe; concretely, this 
involved generating news coverage, printing and distributing speeches and general 
information pamphlets, and holding local gatherings. Third, they were to participate in 
any work determined by the International Committee. 
 The second major development was the continued shift in leadership from 
Britain to France. The International Committee remained headed by Bob Edwards, but 
Marceau Pivert became President of the movement in mid-1947 and the international 
secretariat went to the Paris-based Gironella. There are several possible reasons for this. 
Part of the decision likely had to do with finances: as seen above, the ILP had very 
limited means, and the comparatively better-off SFIO was beginning to shoulder some of 
the costs. Second, the MUSSE’s parties-in-exile (POUM, Polish Socialists, Greek Archeo-
Marxists) were all headquartered in Paris. But third and most important, the ILP was not 
up to it. The party continued to face significant internal conflict… Walter Padley, once of 
the ILP, found his way to Labour around this time, and Bob Edwards himself, intellectual 
founder of the Movement, would resign on August 4, 1947 over infighting and 
“unworthy maneuvers.”114 Edwards was reinstated some weeks later, but three top-
level defections in six months reveals a high level of dysfunction within the ILP, which 
would make taking on a major transnational political leadership role difficult to 
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contemplate. Ridley’s influence was already on the wane, there was tension between 
Edwards and his party, and the most valuable MUSSE member in the UK was a Labourite 
– the ILP ultimately had little to offer in terms of support or activism.  
 
 The MUSSE had already been engaged in debate over the Churchill conception of 
Europe, but in the early stages of Marshall plan development, a newly pertinent question 
was the details of the American vision: their attitude towards the Communist bloc was 
now clear, but their attitude towards European organization was less so. The attitude of 
the United States could be decisive for several reasons. As seen above, the distancing of 
European Socialist parties from their Communist counterparts coincided with the 
Truman Doctrine of 1947, which was ultimately defined along political lines; now the 
Marshall Plan promised untold economic bounty to those countries who would toe their 
line. Over the next several months, several Europeanist groups would attempt to 
influence that line. 
 
 The Americans never proposed any specifics about the actual form of this 
cooperation, so it isn’t possible to directly contrast an American vision to European 
proposals, but we can assess the degree of support for the Europeans’ likely orientation. 
The short version is that the American government never articulated, or overtly 
supported, any particular vision of Europe, though it would find ad hoc ways to support 
integrationists there.  
The primary reason the US could not formulate any overt plans is reflected in the 
Congressional debates, which represented prevailing public attitudes and produced 
government budgets. With very few exceptions, members of Congress were vociferously 
opposed to any form of Socialism. During the debates on the Marshall Plan, Senator 
William Fulbright argued that a federated Europe was imperative, notably because a 
Marshall plan without political federation and economic alignment would be a “futile 
gesture bound to result in disaster for Europe.”115 He found support in principle, but 
when he argued that the US should extend support to socialist parties,116 he met with 
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significant resistance. “Communism and Socialism are first cousins,” argued one 
Congressman; “twin brothers,” or “the same thing,” rejoined others; “experiments in 
Socialism have always paid off in despotism […] Christianity and Communism do not and 
can not mix.” 117  
The US Congress had reservations even about Labour and its comparatively 
moderate socialism. A number of American congressmen spoke against the ERP on the 
grounds that it would, for example, support a “new British Socialist Empire.”118 An 
editorial from the Daily Express was entered into the Congressional Record in mid-April, 
arguing that British Socialist policy would effectively squander ERP aid; as was a letter 
by British Conservative MP Waldron Smithers asserting that “the main obstacle to 
recovery is the economic policy of [Britain’s] Socialist government.” Illinois 
Representative Brooks campaigned against subsidizing “Socialist governments that […] 
stifle individual initiative and retard production.”119  
At the same time, the French SFIO fired broadsides at Labour over incomplete 
nationalizations, while both the ILP and some Labourites pressured the party to “Keep 
Left.” Labour thus found itself between a rock and a hard place. Ultimately, according to 
British Ambassador to France Duff Cooper, Labour decided that economic 
considerations trumped ideological ones: in addition to placating Congressional 
bellyaching, pooling resources with the US would be more advantageous than with 
Europe. The new Bretton Woods system, which had made US dollars the only fixed 
(read: reliable) currency and given the US significant influence over the International 
Monetary Fund and the European Bank for Reconstructions and Development, further 
made positive relations with the US a strategic imperative.120 
In the years to come, broad-stroke propaganda efforts would reinforce the 
American public’s shallow understanding of Socialism The Red Scare did nothing to 
nuance the picture: by 1954, as the SMUSE was at its most productive, even military 
officials were being interrogated by congress before national television cameras on the 
mere suspicion of “Communist sympathies.” Communism was further identified as 
opposed to Christian values. Congress would be moved to add “under God” to the pledge 
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of allegiance, and “In God we trust” to US currency. All this hampered the US 
government’s ability to subsidize or even endorse European socialists.  
 There was some American support for integrative efforts in academic circles. In 
early 1948, Austrian Count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi succeeded in the creation 
of an American Committee for a Free and United Europe, with Fulbright as its president 
and former ambassador to France William Bullitt as vice-president.121 It was 
inaugurated at the NYU faculty club – not quite Ivy League, but close – and its National 
Board was a diverse group of public officials and educators: the Chancellor of New York 
University, New-Dealer Robert Moses, former Republican president Herbert Hoover, and 
conservative congresswoman Clare Booth Luce among others. The political spectrum 
here was wide, but the Committee came together in support of the upcoming Churchill-
led conference at The Hague in 1948, which aimed at the creation of a United States of 
Europe. What that conference would reveal, however, was the vast chasm between the 
intergovernmental and supranational conceptions of an integrated Europe, a distinction 
that would also cleave the unity displayed in New York. The group would exist only 
briefly, and largely on paper.122 
Meanwhile, the Labour-run SILO network reported discouraging things about the 
wider American public’s general attitude: “Even intelligent people [in America] are 
unbelievably naïve […] either we are regarded as Communists or disguised capitalists. 
There is no sympathy I’ve met so far for us.”123 American labor unions did respond 
positively, but they had little political weight. There also existed a Socialist Party and a 
Social-Democratic Federation in the United States and both sought admission to SILO in 
1945-46 but they were very much fringe parties and we have the British reactions: 
according to Kenneth Rathbone, the American left was “a mess,”124 and Hugh Dalton 
sniffed that it seemed “futile to take any official notice of these people unless they can be 
shown to play a real part in American politics.”125  
There was little comprehension in the United States of the distinction between 
Stalinist Communism and the evolving position of European Socialist parties. Socialism 
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was not accepted in mainstream American politics, and the American legislature, with 
its hands on the financial levers, could apply significant pressure against Europe’s latent 
political alignment. In the circles where it was accepted, understanding was superficial; 
and those that did understand it had little representation and even less political agency. 
The result was that there would be essentially no overt support for the European Left.  
Covertly, on the other hand, certain inroads were being explored despite the 
vociferous anti-Socialism of the legislature. Within a few years of its establishment in 
1947, the CIA was finding creative ways to finance – and influence – left-leaning 
organizations in Europe. Hugh Wilford has described a multifaceted effort by the CIA to 
counter Communist tendencies in the UK, ranging from personal contacts between 
American diplomats and British trades-unionists to the creation of the Congress of 
Cultural Freedoms and the bankrolling of its influential magazine Encounter.126 In the 
same period, OSS veteran and future CIA chief Allen Dulles would exploit a relationship 
with leading Belgian industrialist René Boël. The two had met during the war, when Boël 
had retained the services of the Dulles brother’s law firm Sullivan and Cromwell;127 
Boël’s position within the European Movement would help bring much-needed support  
to the European federalist cause.  
 
The Keep Left faction of the Labour Party was short-lived, and, as Brockway put 
it, “innocuous,”128 but its Europeanist advocacy nevertheless warrants its appearance in 
histories of Franco-British engagement.129 In the second half of 1947, what had begun as 
a passing relationship deepened. In early August, in the wake of the June Montrouge 
conference, Brockway was invited to join the group officially, and he found its leaders 
highly receptive to the MUSSE. Their interests converged over the belief that “the long-
term economic prospects for Britain must be as a part of a United European Socialist 
Economy.” The nonaligned positioning established at Montrouge in June appealed to 
them, as did the eventual resolution on the Marshall Plan. Parliament would be on hiatus 
over the summer, but Keep Left planned a Fall meeting with Pivert, and were “very 
ready to cooperate with the USSE.”130 Pivert followed up on 15 October proposing closer 
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contacts between Labour and the SFIO, and a meeting would take place on the 25th, the 
day before an MUSSE International Committee meeting in Paris.131  
The Keep Left pamphlet’s authors saw eye-to-eye with the MUSSE on a number of 
important points. First, they argued that Britain could no longer rely on the appearance 
of being a great power, and should not delude itself that it was safe from invasion or 
atomic war. “Britain and France [were] now partners in a common fate,” and separating 
from France would “destroy […] chances of recovery.”132 This partnership in itself would 
imply some thorough bilateral planning, and it did not exclude a larger, multilateral 
framework of the sort the MUSSE hoped for on the Continent. Second, they agreed on the 
need to combat the threat of Communism. Like the MUSSE, Keep Left generally 
disagreed with the Truman Doctrine framework, and like the MUSSE they suggested 
instead a platform of solidarity that included Colonial peoples (maintaining the existing 
regimes, they argued, would only lead to revolt and an opening for the Soviets). Third, 
the Conservative policy consisting of “defending the British Empire by making it useful 
to the Americans”133 was unacceptable and would engender economically unfeasible 
concessions, to America’s advantage. These last two points functionally constituted a 
non-aligned position, though the pamphlet didn’t use the term. 
 There were also some significant divergences, however. For one, the mission of 
Keep Left was to recast Labour’s conception of Britain in the world and to reorient its 
geopolitical strategy; it was not working on a transnational program, beyond 
collaboration with the French. Both groups sought to align Britain with the continent, 
but Keep Left’s rhetoric was less ideological than the MUSSE’s: Ridley and Edwards 
wrote of a global integration of all peoples on equal footing, while Keep Left argued in 
the context of British supremacy and the risks of trying to go it alone at a time of vastly 
reduced means. Both were opposed to American sponsorship and influence but while 
the MUSSE generally opposed capitalism, Keep Left wanted to avoid being drawn into 
American conflicts. Their respective attitudes towards the colonies illustrate the 
distinction most starkly: the MUSSE’s upcoming congress of Asian and African countries 
meant to end imperialism and establish egalitarian relations. Keep Left, on the other 
hand, promoted the Commonwealth (and its socio-economic stratification), and 
 
131 “Résumé des questions à soulever…24 Octobre 1947 entre ...Comité International des USS d’E et la 
delegation du groupe “Keep Left”… Paris: CHS, Pivert 559 AP 41 
132 Crossman et al. 38 
133 Crossman et al. 35 
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advocated colonial union not on a co-equal basis but as a source of wealth for Europe.134 
Imperial Preference, far from being anachronistic and dangerous, was to Keep Left “a 
most valuable bargaining counter which we dare not sacrifice” without trade 
concessions to ensure British competitiveness in the global marketplace. Despite 
appearances, Keep Left’s adherence to the European orientation was only superficially 
aligned with the MUSSE’s. 
 
 Nevertheless, Keep left’s engagement with the MUSSE saw some early results. On 
28 October 1947, two days after the International Committee meeting in Paris, the 
British House of Commons held a debate on the economy. The Minister for Economic 
Affairs,135 Sir Stafford Cripps, had made a rather pessimistic appraisal of Britain’s 
economic future on the 23rd.136 Labour MPs R.W. Mackay and Christopher Shawcross, 
both members of Keep Left, weighed in to advocate integration with the Continent as a 
solution to Britain’s economic difficulties. 
 Pointing out that the US was outstripping Britain in production and economic 
power, Mackay argued that only a European free trade zone, with British leadership, 
could reverse the declining fortunes. “We should go full tilt for a federation of Western 
Europe. Instead of our Ministers spending their time at Lake Success in demagogic 
harangues, which are sheer futility today, they should be in Paris working out the 
structure of a European Federation. There is not one world. There is an American 
section of the world, a Russian section of the world, but there is also a British and 
European section too…” Britain could recover its position of leadership by leading the 
integration of the Continent. 
A little later, Shawcross rose in support of Mackay’s European integration 
argument, pointing to the MUSSE’s recent efforts. “Quite recently, I have been at a 
Socialist conference at which representatives attended from almost every free  country 
in Europe, including Poland, Greece and Germany,” he began. Faced with the threat of 
total collapse, and “not prepared to sit back and hope for the best and for dollars from 
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America, they intend to do something about it. […] there should be formed some 
federation of those countries in Western Europe which are still under a democratic form 
of Government […] called the United Socialist States of Europe or the United Democratic 
States of Europe…”137 He further pointed out that “the only solution of the German 
problem is one which incorporated Germany as a part of a federated state in Europe.” 
 Shawcross went on to advocate the inclusion of the Colonies in this European 
Federation, effectively fusing the USSE idea with Keep Left’s valued “imperial privilege” 
economic structure: “Together with the Commonwealth of Nations of the Empire if they 
would join with a federated Europe, not only should we not need more dollars from 
America but we should be able to produce in time and properly organized on a Socialist 
basis a far greater mass of wealth than was ever dreamed of in the U.S.A.”  
 He closed with what amounted to an extended explanation of the MUSSE’s 
geopolitical orientation:  
"I want to make clear that this project of United Socialist States of Europe is 
nothing like what has been called the Churchill Plan. I found that the opinion of most 
people on the Continent was that that was a horse that would never run. It could hardly 
stand up under the weight of its jockey, the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the 
Opposition. This United Socialist States is not intended as a military alliance to counter 
Soviet expansion or Communist infiltration. It is not something to be set up in order to 
help American Imperialism. It is, on the contrary, to be a third force which will stand 
between those two and which, if conflict ever comes between them will either stand 
aside secure in itself or, what is more hopeful, provide a bridge of peace between them. I 
want to make it clear that this conception which, I hope will be officially adopted in a 
short time by most of the Socialist Parties of Europe, including the French Socialist 
Party, is not something which will take the place of what is called the Marshall Plan.” [In 
fact, while some in the Movement conserved that early idealism, it had effectively 
already abandoned an open attitude towards the Soviets]. Despite the protests of some, 
the Americans “have no idea of enslaving Europe or exploiting European workers for the 
benefit of American capitalists. On the contrary, they want to secure liberty in Europe. 
That view of  the Marshall Plan I find also very largely held by the Socialists I met who 
 
137 The term “democratic” here is likely a French proposal: the French MUSSE section would soon change 
its name from “Mouvement Socialiste Français pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe” to “Mouvement 
Démocratique et Socialiste…” to attract a broader coalition. 
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support this project for a United Socialist States of Europe. […] Indeed, the Marshall Plan 
would be essential for the establishment of any initial stages of any such federation as 
has been proposed by the hon. Member for North-West Hull [Mackay].” 
Michael Foot weighed in in support, but discussion on the issue ended there for 
the day. This was the highest-level discussion of the MUSSE’s program thus far, and a 
good place to end this chapter.  
 
In a year and a half, the little-known MUSSE graduated from the offices of the ILP 
to the House of Commons. Despite the initial dismissal – and obstructionism – of the 
MUSSE by Labour, by the end of 1947, the MUSSE had “a number of good friends in the 
Labour Party,” according to McNair; “Fenner, Padley and Shawcross and others.”138 The 
British section of the Movement, known as MUSE, still included Edwards, Ridley and 
McNair of the ILP, but also Brockway and Walter Padley, both former ILPers now in 
Labour.139 The Movement had also succeeded in enlisting the endorsement and material 
support of the SFIO under the leadership of Guy Mollet. In doing so, it had secured a 
much-needed source of funding, but had also swung the movement’s center of gravity 
from London to Paris. 
Despite the dislocation and animosities of the war, the Movement had maintained 
a network of participants that included Germans, Italians, Greeks, and Poles. Despite its 
hardline ideological roots, it was proving able to adapt to practical realities. Lambasting 
political partners (the European Allies) and denouncing the hand that feeds (the US) 
would no longer do, though for the moment, the non-aligned positioning was hard to 
abandon.  
Also very promising was the fact that their program aligned, at least superficially, 
with British and American priorities, both important players in the recovery period. So 
far, it had helped the movement get some visibility and traction in the political 
mainstream. For all its successes, however, the areas of alignment were all about means, 
not ends. Labour sought to empower the Colonies – but not for the sake of democratic 
freedom. The United States wanted Europe strong and internally cooperative – but not 
 
138 McNair to Gironella, Jan 25, 1948. Paris: CHS, Pivert 559 AP 43 
139 Here we have the first of many national variations on the Movement’s name – in this case “Movement 
for the United States of Europe” - each of which played with the nomenclature for both pith and 
palatability.  
 73 
Socialist. In the years to come, the Movement would face stark choices between means 








 The first few years of the MUSSE were, on the whole, encouraging but 
unremarkable. Two leftist ideologues had published a short political pamphlet as the 
war drew to a close, which might best be qualified as the position paper for a Fifth 
International. An intellectual heir of the interwar Left, it was doctrinaire, idealistic, 
oppositional and revolutionary in the Marxist sense, in that it presumed an upheaval of 
the political system and therefore did not seek accommodation within it (the 
relationship with national parties like the SFIO constituted a paradox that would resolve 
itself only later). In the first year of its existence, the group had assembled a rather loose 
team of somewhat marginal political characters from the struggling ILP, a few 
peripheral members of the SFIO, and a handful of exiled academics and politicians from 
Eastern Europe, most of them members of the pre-war London Bureau. They held some 
encouraging conferences and made an effort to apply their policies to the situation at 
hand, buying into the then-popular “Third Force” concept as a vehicle for establishing a 
form of bridge-Socialism purportedly (perhaps naïvely) acceptable and open to both the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Initially, the notion was enough to garner positive 
attention. 
As a political organization, they lacked some basic elements. The movement was 
very small, had virtually no sources of funding, no widely recognizable personalities, and 
no popular base to speak of. At the time, it was essentially a branch of the ILP, a pointed 
rival of Labour which actively opposed it, largely precluding any real agency in Britain. 
Their initial ideological platform also proved unfeasible as post-war US policy towards 
the Soviet Union – more or less open antagonism – emerged haltingly over the first half 
of 1947. All-important American political and economic support would be contingent on 
a fairly clear anti-Soviet orientation. Consequently, the movement was forced to 
rhetorically moderate its Third Force position almost to the point of irrelevance.  
The result of these two dynamics was a transfer of the movement’s financial base 
from London to Paris during the summer of 1947. The SFIO could provide funding and 
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real access to government and would soon also bring a measure of realism to the 
movement’s platform, turning its revolutionary doctrine into a set of practical policy 
proposals. No longer exclusively a branch of the ILP, it would also become far more 
palatable to Labour. 
 
 The French SFIO and the British Labour Party had a default kinship, a 
combination of their common socialist outlook, wartime solidarity, a shared sense of 
vulnerability as a result of the war and the emergent Soviet threat perhaps best 
symbolized by the Treaty of Dunkirk, and a joint sense of purpose with respect to 
stewardship of the European Continent. During the period of this chapter (1948-1949), 
both parties looked at each other across the Channel with some sense of expectancy, and 
the MUSSE was able to parley its Franco-British constituency to act as liaison between 
the two. The actual agency of the MUSSE – a purported Socialist international pushing a 
vision of joint planning under supranational control – would remain mitigated by two 
main factors in this period: first, the MUSSE’s intermediary in London belonged to 
Labour’s Keep Left faction, which led to the dilution of its message; and second, Labour 
was jealously stewarding a burgeoning rival International to which both Labour and the 
SFIO nominally belonged.  
 The MUSSE was then, and remains today, dogged by a lack of visibility and 
recognition. This can be excused in the context of the above discussion, when it operated 
from within established political parties, but its inability to properly represent itself was 
brought into sharp focus elsewhere as well, as when a well-attended congress on post-
colonial relations revealed a misunderstanding of the Movement’s most basic premises. 
The experience brought the MUSSE face-to-face with political reality. They 
learned the hard way that the philosophical purism inherited from the movement’s 
founders would get them nowhere, either in Parliament or in the wider world, and the 
period of this chapter is marked by a rapid maturing of the Movement. The early portion 
of this chapter covers the initially successful attempts to develop a relationship with 
Labour, but as this relationship unraveled, the Movement’s French section consolidated 
its leadership, and the group began gingerly to develop a relationship with other 
European integrationists, a process which culminated in two important steps: a simple 
but significant name change, signaling that this Movement no longer saw itself as a 
righteous bulwark of democratic Marxism, but rather as a principled but collaborative 
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force for European integration; and a concrete program elaborated largely by a new 





The MUSSE had, over the course of 1947, meshed into line with some of the 
foreign policy positions advocated by the American and British governments. The 
MUSSE’s overriding concern – bringing some degree of unification to Europe – was a 
priority shared by both Anglo powers, though the variations in reasoning and details 
would remain an important obstacle as the group squeezed its way into the 
conversation. Britain’s first salvo in terms of European policy took place on 22 January, 
1948, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ernest Bevin addressed the House of 
Commons and proposed his new “Western Union”140 foreign policy initiative. It was only 
superficially promising. 
The viability of the MUSSE program, which involved transnational alignment and 
planning, depended fundamentally on the buy-in of France and the UK, and on the assent 
of the US. Without the two major European powers, Europe’s capacity as an effective 
force – both in terms of internal cohesion and of counterbalancing the growing Russo-
American hegemony - was all but nil. American assent, meanwhile would ensure that 
America’s economic and strategic largesse could continue to complement European 
recovery efforts. In France, the SFIO was on board. Labour, however, debating an 
European or Atlantic orientation, had remained an open question.  
At its core, Bevin’s Western Union did constitute a European orientation. Two 
pertinent questions remained with respect to the MUSSE program at this point: Labour’s 
attitude towards the Soviet Union, and whether the European alliance would be 
intergovernmental, as conservatives advocated, or supranational, as the Socialists and 
some Christian-Democratic progressives wanted. On the first point, while the Movement 
had abandoned any notion of being a “bridge,” it still sought to present itself as at least 
neutral towards the Soviet bloc. On the second point, the Movement had been 
advocating a decentralized system whose decisions were guided by the needs of the 
 
140 Bevin, Ernest. Address to House of Commons, 22 January, 1948. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-
hansard/commons/1948/jan/22/foreign-affairs 
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continent as a whole: a supranational structure at the very least, though they had yet to 
articulate specific organs and competences. 
 
In his introductory speech, Bevin went to some length to portray Western Union 
as one that would be acceptable to all sides, but he opened with an extended review of 
Soviet-Western relations since Potsdam, warning that “the Communist process goes 
ruthlessly on in each country,” and that Europe was at risk from an enemy who “thought 
they could wreck or intimidate Western Europe.” He argued that the “Four Powers”141 
structure, where the victorious allies, including the Soviet Union, held an erstwhile joint 
stewardship in Europe, should be abandoned because the Soviets were being 
consistently obstructionist and disingenuous, all the while imposing their system on the 
occupied countries of eastern Europe. In other words, it was now the position of the 
Labour government that the Soviet Union was a threat to be counteracted. This was 
more in line with the American viewpoint, rather than the MUSSE’s where the Soviet 
Union was still seen by some as an almost benign bloc with understandable motives, 
which could be dealt with on a nonthreatening and egalitarian basis.  
Bevin’s argument leaned heavily on the fallout of the meeting between France, 
the UK, and the Soviet Union on the Marshall Plan, notably the withdrawal of the Soviets 
and their clients, and the establishment of the Cominform.142 “The object of that body 
and of Soviet and Communist policy is to prevent the European recovery programme 
succeeding.”143 The MUSSE had not commented on the latter development, but had 
condemned the Soviet withdrawal from Marshall Plan talks as entrenching a division of 
Europe. The Movement had yet to declare outright opposition to the Soviet Union, but it 
was likely that a neutral formulation could be found to reconcile the two positions. 
With respect to the second question, the form of the proposed union, Bevin’s 
answer was far more problematic. He described arrangements hinging primarily on a 
series of bilateral treaties on the model of the 1947 Treaty of Dunkirk. Dunkirk had been 
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a promising harbinger of Franco-British collaboration, but bilateralism was very much 
the opposite of what the MUSSE had in mind. 
A secondary aspect of Bevin’s strategy involved the development of Europe’s 
colonies, so that they might better contribute to Europe’s economy. The Movement had, 
since early 1947, had the colonial issue on their radar: John McNair had floated the idea 
of a conference that would bring together representatives of the colonized world in an 
effort to throw off the yoke of imperialism and position themselves as a unified, 
independent, but complementary force in organizing the global economy. Alas, while the 
complementarity dimension was a central feature of Bevin’s approach, the Foreign 
Secretary had no intention of allowing Britain’s colonies the independence to determine 
for themselves the best path forward. Even as he argued that there was “no conflict 
between the social and economic development of those overseas territories to the 
advantage of their people, and their development as a source of supplies for Western 
Europe,” Bevin explicitly cited London, Paris and Brussels as the centers of decision-
making.  
A third prong of Bevin’s strategy proposed that efforts also be made in the Middle 
East to “build up […] cooperation in the economic and social fields.” Britain was just then 
preparing to relinquish control of Mandate Palestine, and France had recently turned 
over control of Syria and Lebanon: a privileged relationship with those regions was up 
for grabs, as it were. Aside from the reasonable assumption that such “cooperation” 
would be British-led, this had little impact on the MUSSE, which had never made the 
slightest reference to the Middle East – it simply never figured into their calculus or 
their model of an independent socialist Europe. 
 
There were thus some incompatibilities between the existing MUSSE program 
and Western Union. However, there was some hope that these might be resolved, or, at 
worst, papered over. After all Bevin’s proposal was just that: a proposal to open what 
was scheduled to be a two-day debate. The MUSSE had a representative in the chamber 
who might plausibly have swayed opinion towards a different approach to the colonies, 
or a different structure for international agreements. The MUSSE did get some air-time 
that day, courtesy of Fenner Brockway and some Keep-Lefters. A close reading bodes 
poorly for the possibility of a closer partnership between the MUSSE and Labour, 
although evidence suggests that the MUSSE did not see it that way.  
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To complicate the picture, a clear understanding of the Movement’s objectives 
was obscured by the confused relationship between Keep Left, the MUSSE and the 
Labour Party. The MUSSE’s conduit into British politics was Fenner Brockway, recently 
of the marginalized ILP, now a junior member of Keep Left; since he was effectively 
speaking through the group, his message was to some extent coopted. Keep Left’s 
positions, in turn, were compromised by the latter’s junior relationship within Labour, 
wherein they were mindful not to upset the Party executive. Labour itself, finally, faced 
off against an opposition Conservative party with both political and ideological 
incentives to exploit any contradictions and to discredit Labour’s policies. All these 
factors would play out in the extended debate that followed Bevin’s speech. 
Conservative MP Anthony Nutting spoke first for his party.144 He admitted having 
spent the first part of the speech attending to other business outside the chamber, 
unaware that he would be called upon to respond. After a few negative generalities on 
Labour’s foreign policy thus far, Nutting latched onto a letter from Keep Left, which he 
had read in that morning’s Daily Herald, promoting their ideas for United Socialist States 
of Europe.145 Conflating Keep Left’s arguments and Bevin’s, he launched into a tirade 
against a Third Force position that did not take Communism for an avowed enemy, and 
he argued forcefully to align with the United States against such an enemy. A European 
orientation was now under direct fire. The criticism here was not properly aimed at 
Bevin, who had been clear in the first part of his speech (which Nutting had missed) on 
the anti-Soviet dimension of his program. Nevertheless, it led several other Members, on 
both sides, to join in. Labour MP Gordon Lang, for example, professed that while he was 
“an unrepentant Socialist,” he would defend Christianity against Communism above all; 
he further opined that the cold war had, in fact, already begun, and that there was 
simply no time to build up any kind of United Socialist States, or indeed United 
Conservative States. He too advocated alignment with the United States.146 
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Anthony Eden, Conservative, agreed with the general premise of Bevin’s 
proposal, but also explained that United Socialist States were not feasible. Though the 
Socialists were a part of most governments, they were almost never a majority: “it 
would be impracticable, indeed fantastic, to attempt to build the unity of Western 
Europe solely on a basis of united Western European Socialism.” This argument was not 
properly aimed at Western Union either. Bevin’s only allusion to a plan for a united 
Europe had been that “it is easy enough to draw up a blueprint for a united Western 
Europe and to construct neat-looking plans on paper. While I do not wish to discourage 
the work done by voluntary political organizations in advocating ambitious schemes of 
European unity, I must say that it is a much slower and harder job to carry out a 
practical program which takes into account the realities which face us, and I am afraid 
that it will have to be done a step at a time.” He did believe that “the time [was] ripe for a 
consolidation of Western Europe,”147 but far from referring to or endorsing an existing 
program, the only the only guiding principle for his union was that it “primarily be a 
fusion derived from the basic freedoms and ethical principles for which we all stand.”148 
The criticism leveled in the Commons made a straw man of Western Union, but it was 
effectively also an indictment of the MUSSE/Keep Left platform.  
 Keep Left’s Christopher Shawcross muddied things further by taking the bait and 
coming to the defense of a European orientation. It did nothing to clarify the issue, since 
his arguments implied that Bevin’s was in fact a European Socialist project. They were 
also somewhat unrealistic. He acknowledged that the conditions in Europe were not 
perfect, but countered that the Socialist vision of Europe was “an ideal to which all 
Socialists can with a clear conscience and wholeheartedly devote their work.”149 The 
prospect of implementing the Socialist project, he continued, was less remote than the 
Conservative one. The European integration debate at that time was partly framed by 
Churchill’s nascent (and conservative) European Movement, and Eden was closely 
associated with its founder… Shawcross pointedly reminded his peers that the kind of 
European program espoused by Keep Left and the MUSSE predated Churchill’s, which he 
characterized as a mere military alliance. Considering the existing ideologies in Europe, 
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he concluded, “no degree of effective political union in Europe is possible unless it is 
based on essential Socialist principles.”150  
The tenor of the conversation until then had been a realistic one: members on 
both sides expressed both urgency and ideological flexibility in light of an undeniable 
Soviet threat, and yet here was Shawcross arguing that an integrated socialist Europe 
should be pursued anyway, as a matter of “conscience.” Overall, the debate was a blow 
to the notion of an integrated Europe: Bevin’s policy, on behalf of the Labour Party, 
called for strict anti-Communism and bilateral agreements; Nutting, for the opposition, 
ridiculed the Third Force; Lang and Eden both argued that it was impossible to build a 
continental Socialist consensus in time; and Shawcross’ defense did little to bolster 
either Bevin’s position or the desirability of a transnational Socialist program.  
Perhaps frustrated by the muddled nature of the ruling party’s message, 
Conservative MP Tufton Beamish pointed to failed Socialist International conferences as 
evidence that the Socialist vision itself was a failure (confusingly, Labour was officially 
affiliated with the COMISCO, not the MUSSE); he asked rhetorically whether there was a 
difference between Socialism and Marxism, and whether there was even such a thing as 
Socialist foreign policy. Here were three pointed indications that Labour, never mind 
Keep Left and the MUSSE, had failed to define themselves with enough exposure and 
clarity.  
By 10pm that night, a succinct realpolitik argument was being made: there could 
properly be only one foreign policy proposed by any Foreign Secretary, regardless of 
party: a British one. Socialist conscience and Europe in general should not figure into it.  
The final word of the night, just short of 11pm, was from Labour’s own Hector McNeil: 
Shawcross, who had valiantly defended the basic principles of transnational socialism 
over the course of the preceding several hours, was wrong; an essentially bilateral 
approach composed of small agreements was the best course of action. 
 
It would seem, upon analysis, that the possibility of a British-led MUSSE-style 
program should have been laid to rest in January, 1948. But the wider debate here had 
been about Bevin’s proposal, and had lasted some seven hours, with only intermittent 
and often oblique references to the MUSSE or its program. It was not perceived as a 
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referendum on – or a rejection of – the MUSSE; undeterred, they and Keep Left would 
continue to coordinate on plans for a Socialist Europe in spite of what should have been 
a clear signal that there was little potential for it.  
Bevin, in fact, was very far from endorsing the kind of Soviet-neutral outlook 
espoused by the MUSSE and some Keep Lefters.151 He had spent his early career 
struggling against Communist influence in trade unions; he considered that Soviet 
totalitarianism was politically imperialist, and that it must be resisted, not 
accommodated.152 He had described Western Union quite explicitly in a memo to the 
Cabinet some weeks before the Commons debate: it was to be a “Western democratic 
system” with “the backing of the Americas and the Dominions,” mobilizing “political and 
spiritual forces” against the “Russian threat.”153 The Commons debate had evinced some 
marginal support for a more genteel approach towards the Soviet Union, but the median 
position in the British legislature, including Bevin’s, hewed strongly to the right.  
Another memo to his cabinet, a few days after the Czech coup of February,154 
while leaving no doubt about the primacy of the anti-Soviet dimension, nevertheless 
recommended to “pursue on as broad a basis as possible in co-operation with our 
French allies, the conclusion of a treaty or treaties with the Benelux countries. We 
should aim as a matter of great urgency at negotiating multilateral economic, cultural 
and defensive pacts between the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries, 
which would be left open for accession by other European democracies.” This suggests 
the kinds of intergovernmental agreements proposed in January, but it did mean that 
the lines of communication between Labour and the French would remain open.  
As it happened, and despite the policy misalignment, much of that 
communication would be mediated by MUSSE and Keep Left. A number of meetings 
were held in February and March, on the subjects of a federalist framework, of Labour’s 
“Europe Group,” and of the Ruhr.155 “This is the time to pursue these contacts seriously,” 
Mollet insisted to the SFIO Comité Directeur. The SFIO’s executive committee was eager; 
Mollet made efforts to woo Labour General Secretary Morgan Phillips and International 
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Committee head Denis Healey, dispatching high-ranking members to meetings in an 
effort to show the seriousness of his intentions.156 Phillips in particular was resistant. 
Aside from Shawcross, another primary interlocutor on Labour’s side was Harold Laski, 
a devoted Socialist intellectual and lecturer who was nonetheless fading in importance 
within the Labour ranks. The relationship was cordial, if hesitant. Perhaps due to the 
disconnect between Labour’s official position and the more left-leaning agenda of the 
mediators, these contacts ultimately yielded little of consequence. Yet there was never a 
clean break, and the MUSSE continued to meet and hope for a Socialist Europe that 
included Great Britain. 
 
 
The Congress of Europe 
 
Rapprochement with Labour was only one of several institutional issues the 
MUSSE faced as it moved from its original Ridleyite anti-establishmentarianism to more 
proactive engagement with political vehicles and geopolitical realities in 1948-49. High 
on the list of potential vehicles a new “Movement for European Unity” (later simply the 
European Movement), which was planning a major conference in The Hague in the first 
half of May, 1948. It presented serious issues, and provoked much hand-wringing among 
European socialists. 
The central impetus for the European Movement had come from the 
Conservative, intergovernmentalist Winston Churchill, and the group’s flagship party 
was his United Europe Movement, headed by his son-in-law, Duncan Sandys.  The 
MUSSE’s initial attitude towards Churchill’s idea, in late 1947, had been entirely 
uncompromising, drawing from the radical anti-capitalism of the movement’s early 
days. They saw very starkly the conflicting conceptions of how to unite Europe: 
“capitalist” alignment predicated on full sovereignty, an activist private sector and an 
intergovernmental approach, as advocated by Churchill; versus their own vision of 
socialist alignment predicated on international harmonization and rational planning, 
with a vastly diminished role for the private sector. This was the kind of distinction lost 
on casual observers in Europe and the United States, but absolutely central to the 
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MUSSE, who had warned that “it is by using catch-all terms like “federalism” that you 
end up in bed with Churchill and Sandys, who want to perpetuate the imperial system 
on a European scale.”157 Initially, there was no question of participating in the project. 
But the idea gathered momentum and high-profile adherents, and the MUSSE 
soon potentially stood to gain exposure and legitimacy by participating in the 
conference. One downside was that by diluting its message through collaboration, the 
MUSSE risked harming the chances of building a properly socialist consensus. In a group 
for whom ideological purity and anti-establishmentarianism still remained guiding 
principles, this was troubling. Through early 1948, the MUSSE, the ILP and Keep Left 
took great pains to emphasize their differences with Churchill’s general outlook. In early 
January, McNair typed a letter to the French arguing against getting too close to 
Churchill and Sandys, physically underlining in red ink that the two groups were fighting 
for different things.158  
In mid-February, Brockway, Edwards and McNair traveled to Paris. Recognizing 
the moment as “crucial…in the development of our campaign,” McNair had asked for a 
meeting of the full International Bureau to address their relationship to the European 
Movement conference. The MUSSE did have friends associated to the project: Henri 
Frenay and Hendrik Brugmans, both once-and-future participants in the Movement, had 
helped found the Union of European Federalists (UEF), a group that drew support from 
both liberals and socialists. The UEF had in fact been trying to develop a more formal 
relationship with the MUSSE, and Frenay had explained to Pivert that while he refused 
to work with Churchill, he did not object to sitting with him “on some committee.”159 The 
Christian Democratic Nouvelles Equipes Internationales, including the MUSSE-friendly 
Robert Bichet, were also on board. Count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, head of the 
Paneuropean Union, also working actively on integration, was ambivalent, but would 
formally join a month before the Hague congress.  
The Labour party’s response to the conference, which would circumscribe Keep 
Left’s position, was also informed by its relationship with Churchill. There had been 
early interest in the idea from several Labourites, and some mixed messaging as to 
Labour’s official position. Perhaps too late – two weeks before the conference – Morgan 
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Phillips drew a strict line: “the national Executive Committee is unconditionally opposed 
to any action which might appear to associate the prestige of the governing majority 
party in Great Britain, however indirectly, with an organization calculated to serve the 
interests of the British Conservative Party.”160 Labour itself would thus not endorse or 
engage with the European Movement, though the Executive Committee injunction did 
not prevent a number of sympathetic Labourites – Keep Left and others – from attending 
in a personal capacity.161  
In surveying the European socialist landscape, the MUSSE suddenly saw a lot of 
common interest as well as shared concerns about Churchill. The group ultimately 
concluded that the number of bona fide socialists could tip the scales towards a 
consensus they might find acceptable. They still hedged, however: the MUSSE would 
participate in the Congress of Europe as observers, withholding any endorsement.162  
 
 The European Movement conference report features only two interventions 
from the MUSSE, both from Bob Edwards. He argued, as he and Ridley had in Unite or 
Perish! and would again at their colonial congress (below), that only by organizing and 
pooling resources could anyone hope to rival the United States in productivity and 
efficiency. Appealing to conscience, as the Movement often did, he argued that anybody 
still on the fence about Socialist planning ought to make the “starving and ill-clad people 
of Europe their first consideration.”163  
The final resolutions of the Congress of Europe were encouraging for the MUSSE, 
though not entirely satisfactory. It was certainly reassuring that the Political Committee 
had resolved that “the European nations must transfer and merge some portion of their 
sovereign rights so as to secure common political and economic action for the 
integration and proper development of their common resources.”164 Here was, 
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apparently, an endorsement of their most central practical policy demand, as opposed to 
the positions evinced by both Churchill and Bevin. The modalities of this merger of 
sovereign rights was left vague, however, and the resolution remained noncommittal on 
the eventual political system, referring to a “Union or Federation” throughout. A Charter 
of Human Rights, also called for in the Political Resolution, had been part of the MUSSE 
platform since May, 1947.165 The proposed parliamentary assembly, on the other hand, 
conflicted with the MUSSE’s idea, which was that direct elections were the only 
acceptably democratic possibility: the Hague committee called for Assemblymen to be 
appointed by national parliaments. 
The Economic and Social resolution was similarly mitigated: echoing Bevin’s 
policy, article 2 declared that the economic ties linking the countries of Europe to their 
colonies should be “maintain[ed] and progressively adjust[ed].”166 There were no 
further details, timeline, or statements of principle, and no hint of colonial autonomy. 
There was better hope in the articles on economic “union,” which cited lowering tariffs 
and facilitating currency exchange. The articles on production called for common 
programs in agriculture and an “overall production program” involving all of Europe. 
That said, frequent references elsewhere to “co-ordination” suggest a basis of 
intergovernmental agreement, not supranational control. 
The Cultural resolution had more to recommend it, with a concerted focus on 
creating a European consciousness among the youth, which the MUSSE was already 
doing, at least in theory. It also contained the only overt reference to “supra-state 
jurisdiction,” to be conferred on the body charged with enforcing the human rights 
charter. A very restricted purview, to be sure, but certainly a step in the right direction 
suggesting the subsequent possibility of a functionalist expansion of the executive 
branch. 
Overall, the Hague congress produced a consensus that was not antagonistic to 
the MUSSE’s platform, but fell short of reflecting the spirit of the socialist vision. The 
MUSSE would remain noncommittal for the time being. 
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The weekend following the European Movement conference, the Labour party 
held a retreat in Scarborough, Yorkshire. It was now several months since the 
contentious debate over Western Union, but in a validation of continued efforts by the 
MUSSE, Labour made a surprising commitment to European integration in endorsing a 
proposal by Fenner Brockway.167  
The resolution opened relatively innocuously, but with language that effectively 
papered over the differences outlined above between Keep Left’s program and Labour’s 
policy as outlined by Bevin in January. There was a call for the promotion of closer 
integration between the countries of Europe and the liberated peoples of Asia and 
Africa, which obfuscated the differences between Bevin’s imperialist outlook on the 
colonial problem and the MUSSE’s notion of an independent post-colonial coalition. 
Finding more common ground, the resolution went on to deplore the consolidation of 
Eastern and Western blocs. Here, the debate over whether the Soviet Union was 
fundamentally antagonistic was sidestepped and subsumed in more general concerns 
about hegemonic buildup. Finally, it stated that the “conservative” conception of 
Western Union - military alliance with the USA against the USSR – would not solve 
Europe’s economic problems, and could only lead to a third world war. Both sides could 
agree that Churchill had the wrong idea.  
The final paragraph, however, constituted a diametric shift from the general 
consensus that had emerged during the January debate, when members on both sides 
had belittled the possibility of international policy alignment: the resolution “urge[d] the 
Labour Party to cooperate with the European Socialist Parties in taking practical steps to 
achieve the United Socialist States of Europe,” and it specifically demanded the 
establishment of “supranational agencies to take over from each nation powers to 
allocate and distribute coal, steel,”168 and other resources. Labour had thus far been 
content with implementing controls on industrial corporations, and had certainly never 
advocated giving up sovereignty over these resources. Keep Left had never advocated 
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any kind of supranationality; the closest they had come was in the May, 1947, booklet, 
which had proposed resolving the German problem by “integrating” its reconstruction 
into the national plans of its neighbors.169 Even the Hague Congress had left vague the 
competences of a supranational structure except in the context of the Human Rights 
Charter. Supranational control had, however, long been part of the MUSSE program. 
Brockway had come to Keep Left from the ILP, in part because the MUSSE’s 
notions on the organization of Europe had a better chance to come to pass with Labour 
than the ILP; his gamble seemed to have paid off. The MUSSE was delighted, and 
reprinted the resolution in its entirety in the report for the next European Congress.  
Rather than suggesting that Brockway had somehow singlehandedly brought the 
Labour ship about, it is worth noting that this atypical resolution served a more prosaic 
political goal as well, capitalizing on the divergences between the intergovernmentalist 
views espoused by Churchill and the Conservative party, and the more thoroughly 
federalist ideas of many Europeans present at The Hague. Party Secretary Morgan 
Phillips had forbidden Labourites from attending the conference explicitly because it 
would legitimize Churchill.170 Considering the continent-wide federalist consensus that 
had since emerged, doubling down now on a commitment to Europe could in fact 
contribute to marginalizing the leader of the Opposition. 
Brockway reported enthusiastically that it would enable the MUSSE to campaign 
unreservedly in Britain (though he acknowledged that the ILP’s still-acrimonious 
relationship with Labour might make collaboration “a little awkward”171). In late May, 
1948, then, a concrete call for placing the raw materials of Europe’s heavy industry 
under supranational control had been launched, at a Labour conference, in a resolution 
penned by a founding member of the MUSSE.  
At that moment, with the United Kingdom a key lynchpin in the viability of a 
unified Europe, and with the SFIO only waiting for their counterparts to engage, 
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The Colonial Congress 
 
As far as the ILP were concerned, the MUSSE remained “the most important 
international work in which [they had] been engaged.”172 Aside from salaries, the MUSSE 
campaign constituted the majority of its annual expenditures, and in June, the ILP finally 
held the ambitious anti-imperialism conference first proposed by John McNair in April, 
1947. Like so many of the MUSSE’s projects, the idea had some broad appeal, but faced 
competition from the more established political center. In fact, the idea of incorporating 
French and British colonies into a European economic program, a scheme known as 
“Eurafrica,” had been batted around at the cabinet level at least since 1946. It never 
really got off the ground, but John Kent details a process that lasted through 1956173 
(Sean Greenwood gives the idea only two months174). With some variations, the general 
idea was to jointly coordinate the exploitation of colonial resources to complement 
Europe’s production, a project in line with Bevin’s Western Union proposal. 
The initial impetus to this joint project had been an effort to dissipate tensions 
surrounding the Levant Crisis of 1945, when France and Britain had traded fire over the 
administration of Syria.175 Discussions evolved slowly, and according to Kent, 
exploration of the colonial option in Britain was somewhat half-hearted. There were a 
few technical conferences at the colonial level designed to assess needs and potential, 
but resolutions were poorly implemented. The Foreign Office demanded oversight of 
any concrete measures but frustrated the Colonial Office by not providing concrete 
directions.176 The French, meanwhile, planned a significant but ultimately truncated 
exploratory research trip intended to include both French and British colonies headed 
by Senegalese Assemblyman Amadou Lamine-Gueye. The delegation left in March 1947, 
a week late, and returned to France a week early. It was not coordinated with the 
British: French Ambassador René Massigli telegrammed from London, warning that the 
British would certainly be surprised that they had not been consulted on the matter. A 
week later, the Quai d’Orsay was informed that the British Secretary to the Colonies was 
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very busy and that he did not attach much importance to the trip, which he dismissed as 
too short to be very productive.177 Upon study, the Foreign Office eventually determined 
that France did not in fact possess many resources that the British could not themselves 
obtain, obviating the need for collaboration.178 
The only concrete dimension of this colonial program was that it would be 
administered by European governments, and it was during its early stages that the 
MUSSE had proposed their own conference on the subject, attempting to head off these 
imperialist tendencies and to create a relationship on a voluntary and egalitarian basis. 
Bevin’s “Western Union” address in January lent McNair’s idea new urgency: as noted 
above, Bevin’s conception was almost nakedly exploitative. The Marshall Plan was a 
factor as well: a principal raison d’être of the scheme was to compensate for weak 
European production, and the US initially supported the use of some Marshall Plan 
allocations for Colonial development, keeping the scheme alive among French and 
British governments and further stimulating a Socialist response. On the other hand, 
emerging nationalism in the Colonies themselves mitigated the possibility of centralized 
planning, and Bevin’s project encountered pushback from the British Board of Trade and 
from the Treasury. The Americans would ultimately cease to underwrite African 
development in early 1949.179 
   
 Against this backdrop, the MUSSE organized the World Congress Against 
Imperialism in Paris from 19 to 21 June, 1948. It was the largest assembly gathered to 
date by the MUSSE: 325 people, representing some 37 countries in Asia, Africa and 
Europe met to attempt to formulate a joint political and economic trajectory for the 
future. The ILP helpfully produced a comprehensive report.180 There were 
representatives from a fairly wide spectrum of political parties, which had pros and 
cons: on the upside, attendance was high; on the downside, the commonalities between 
these parties and the MUSSE were superficial, and the general transnational framework 
proposed by the Movement was not yet feasible. The general premise of the conference 
was that, given egalitarian relations, shared information, and low trade restrictions, a 
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mutually-advantageous, rational and voluntary trade organization might be created, that 
would optimize the distribution of resources across the former Colonial world. On its 
face, this was an attractive project, but it would prove entirely unfeasible. 
 The first day of the conference was devoted to committee work, developing 
resolutions to be debated in a general assembly the following day. The political 
committee’s working resolution focused primarily on ending colonial control. Anti-
imperialism was the indispensable first step towards world democracy, they argued: all 
imperialist euphemisms like Protectorates and Dominions should be done away with, as 
should all racial notions of cultural “unfitness;” and it was the duty of all overseas 
Socialists not only to work towards their own independence but also to abolish class 
oppression. This resolution effectively codified the general objectives around which the 
conference had been called; its content was uncontroversial and its passage almost a 
formality. 
Elsewhere, things were more complicated. The economic committee, led by the 
UEF’s Henri Frenay, recommended the development of agriculture and the coordination 
of industry in support of it, and called for the involvement of the rural masses in the 
administration of publicly-owned industries. In the same spirit as the Marshall Plan, the 
economic resolution included the notion of providing agricultural machinery and 
finished goods to under-developed countries (the Americans were then still open to 
contributing to colonial economies). This prompted protest from the French 
Independent Communist Party, however, that it constituted a simple extension of the 
Marshall Plan – with all the imperialist strings that would come with it. (Communist 
opposition to the Marshall Plan would include some fantastical fear-mongering, alleging 
for instance that Coca-Cola was highly addictive, quite possibly a poison, and the 
nefarious harbinger of “Coca-colonization.”181).  
 The resolutions were progressive by comparison with the way colonial 
territories had been administered by the metropolitan powers. A number of them were 
transplanted directly from the MUSSE handbook for Europe: the development of 
transportation, the coordination of industry, a commitment to full employment... Had 
they been accepted, it would have constituted a significant validation of the principles 
and universal applicability of the MUSSE, a step closer perhaps to the United Socialist 
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States of the World, but the reactions of attendees when the resolutions were presented 
and discussed revealed both poor messaging about the conference and the limits of the 
MUSSE’s ability to address the needs of the world beyond Europe. 
 The very first speaker at the debate on that Sunday morning, a representative 
from Ceylon, protested that the prescriptions for lifting his country out of poverty were 
simply “not based in reality;” the second speaker, representing the British West African 
Students’ Union, argued that there was nothing new in these recommendations and 
asked for a “more realistic report.” (Under fire, Economic Committee chairman Bob 
Edwards replied defensively that the committee could not be expected to “produce a 
miracle in seven hours.”) Treating the colonial world as ready and capable of adopting a 
modern Socialist policy was egalitarian and generous, but hopelessly optimistic about 
the immediate capacity of these polities. Ridley betrayed a lack of understanding of 
immediate realities, writing dejectedly in the ILP’s magazine that delegates “were 
concerned only with gaining the independence of their countries.”182   
 Even the political committee’s resolution drew fire, revealing a significant 
miscommunication with respect to the conference’s objective. The conference had been 
called and organized by the ILP as part of the MUSSE campaign, but its title, and much of 
its literature, focused only on ending imperialism… the link between the topics and the 
MUSSE’s core values was evidently lost on at least some of those invited.  The Movement 
for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties, for one, raised objection to the constant 
reference to Socialists in resolution texts: in their estimation, Socialists ought to be 
considered participants in the conference rather than its whole constituency.  
 The MUSSE had been able to organize a congress of near-global reach, reflecting a 
world-socialist ideology that dated back to the Edwards-Ridley manifesto of 1944; but 
when these general principles had to be turned into practical resolutions, they 
discovered that the colonial world was simply not ready for it. Its basic prescriptions, 
elaborated over the previous two years in a European context, did not apply to countries 
whose history and socio-economic profiles were so different from those of Europe, and 
for whom the basic conditions of resource-sharing, from simple extraction to the 
competences of respective executive branches, were not developed. Even those political 
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groups who could agree on the first step towards the MUSSE’s global socialist 
orientation – the end of imperial relationships – did not necessarily see eye to eye on the 
visions which they aimed to implement.  
 The MUSSE’s “Third Force” complicated matters further.183 The concept now 
leaned towards independence from the two blocs, rather than the initial “friendship.” 
This was a difficult proposition for colonial representatives since it would at best cut off 
sources of economic or political support, and at worst be interpreted as adversarial. It 
also seemed counter-intuitive, at a time when these parties were working towards 
independence, for them to reject (purportedly-)anti-imperialist powers while joining a 
structure organized by the very nations which had subjugated their peoples in the first 
place. It bears remembering that the French, British and Dutch governments, were all at 
war in the Colonies. As the head of the Vietnamese delegation pointed out:  
“You speak of imperialism, both of the American and the Soviet bloc. However, do 
not forget that the Americans allowed far-reaching independence and that the Russians 
never colonised us. The only thing we know from experience is European 
subjugation.”184 
 The conference did not officially end in defeat, but the misalignment between the 
ideological prescriptions of the Europeans and the practical considerations of the 
colonial representatives was simply too great. Once again, the MUSSE had been overly 
optimistic about the immediate feasibility of their plans. The congress nevertheless 
resolved to establish a Permanent Committee for the for the Congress of the Peoples 
Against Imperialism (COPAI), including 10-man Permanent Committees, one for each 
continent, to carry on the anti-imperialist struggle pending the next congress. The 
European Committee included the usual true believers: Edwards, Brockway, Pivert and 
Gironella among them. They kept a seat open for a German delegate, though none had 
attended the conference. Although they dropped out of sight in the MUSSE/SMUSE 
record, the network launched at Puteaux would have some far-reaching implication. The 
COPAI network has been credited with facilitating the Bandung Conference of 1955, by 
which time the peoples represented at Puteaux had overcome the immediate task of 
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obtaining independence and establishing diplomatic relations, and the Third Force could 





In Kenneth Morgan’s telling, Keep Left began to lose focus after the Czech Coup of 
February, 1948.186 The pacifist approach so valiantly defended in the Keep Left 
pamphlet, and by Shawcross the previous month in the House of Lords, was given the lie 
by what amounted to the seizure of Czechoslovakia by Moscow, and it became hard to 
defend either the cautious wait-and-see approach or indeed some kind of live-and-let-
live arrangement. And yet, though both Keep Left and the MUSSE had initially adopted a 
Third Force orientation, they were not ready to throw in the towel. The Brockway 
resolution adopted in May had called for a rapprochement between European Socialist 
parties, and a focus on sharing coal and steel. In an effort to regain momentum, a handful 
of Keep Lefters including three MUSSE participants (Mackay, Warbey, and Shawcross), 
petitioned Labour’s International Committee to organize a Congress of European 
Socialists, “to discuss the major issues of Western Union.”187 
The conference would be open to all Marshall Plan countries (though not, 
curiously, Turkey or Greece). The discussion topics were in fact rather appropriate: a 
debate between the functionalist and political approaches to integration was important 
to the MUSSE and relevant to a Labour executive trying to differentiate itself from the 
Conservatives. A discussion of respective foreign policy objectives already seemed 
rather overdue; and the means and methods of economic integration on the continent 
needed to be explored if even the most rudimentary economic alignment was to be 
implemented. And yet, Labour’s International sub-committee ultimately “agreed to 
decline the suggestion.”188 Part of the reason had to do with the fact that Labourites – 
most notably International sub-committee chairman Denis Healey – headed the 
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COMISCO, and continued to prioritize it as the official vehicle of Socialist cooperation. 
Rather than follow the initiative of Keep Left and the MUSSE, the sub-committee decided 
that Morgan Phillips would “sound the views of other Socialist parties.”189 
Just at that moment, COMISCO was also following up on an SFIO proposal very 
much in the same spirit as the Keep Left proposal (both had traceable MUSSE influence 
at the time) to create a Socialist Centre for Documentation and Propaganda. It would 
function as an information center, disseminating the latest projects and ideas; it would 
support the lobbying efforts of Socialist parties with respect to their governments, and it 
would consult on the application and effectiveness of the Marshall Plan. In October, 
Phillips circulated the proposal internationally, but he was met with a lot of passive 
resistance, especially Scandinavians. Variously: COMISCO ought to be more efficient 
before embarking on a new project;190 the Socialist Information and Liaison Office 
(SILO), established as a preliminary to reconstituting the International, could just take 
on this new political coordination role;191 the new mission would be too expensive and 
have a lot of complicated overlap with the existing offices.192 
It is worth pausing here to parse the several overlapping interest groups on what 
is, for the purposes of this chapter, the “MUSSE side.” First was the MUSSE itself, which, 
in mid-1948, was a somewhat opaque organization. Founded in London by ILP 
members, it was increasingly organized by SFIO-affiliated members in France. Second 
came the SFIO, part of the French coalition government which had taken the MUSSE 
under its financial wing. Third would be Keep Left, a faction of the British governing 
party which operated as something akin to a Trojan Horse for the MUSSE through 
Fenner Brockway and the participation in the MUSSE of at least three of its other 
members. The MUSSE was not explicitly the protagonist here: the primary agents of the 
present push for European Socialist alignment was the SFIO, which, while borrowing the 
institutional goals of the MUSSE, were also members of COMISCO, which had more 
legitimacy simply by its association with Labour. Outside observers, notably the 
Scandinavians whose objections are noted above, could be forgiven for responding 
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skeptically to this inchoate merging of the two rather different approaches to Socialist 
internationalism.    
 
The central, irreconcilable difference between the MUSSE and COMISCO was that 
one sought a centralized European program, while the other conception was effectively 
intergovernmental, and it allowed national parties to have free rein in their domestic 
programs. The same distinction that had riven the anti-Stalinist Left in the 1920s and 
30s – to wit, whether there would be a centralized control organism or a more loosely 
federated arrangement – remained salient: Labour had picked one side, the MUSSE 
another, and the SFIO was on the fence. 
The SFIO participated in COMISCO even though the Labour-led organization had 
thus far done very little beyond establish a liaison office. Perhaps in an effort to inject 
some life into the project, the French were proposing a more proactive approach. As 
detailed above, the group, already rather behind in fostering any real Socialist dialogue 
or action, was not particularly enthusiastic in facilitating it, even when prompted.  
This left the MUSSE high on the list of promising transnational institutions, but 
the Labour connection now seemed dead in the water. Labour had picked their vehicle 
for socialist integration. Despite Brockway, and despite Keep Left, the MUSSE were 
stymied by Labour’s commitment to the COMISCO.  
There did remain a generalized unity of purpose between all the interest groups. 
Much of the disorder could be overcome if the underlying premise of European Socialist 
cohesion was valid. From a strategic perspective, a successful effort along the lines of the 
Brockway-penned resolution would depend primarily on the ability of the SFIO to 
actually enact the program. With that, it would be reasonable to hope that like-minded 
Socialists on the continent would be encouraged to throw in their lot; but without it, the 
project might founder, and Labour would have embarked on a contested and ultimately 
futile project at the expense of a more politically rewarding domestically-focused 
program. Hedging their bets, Labour carried out some research into the SFIO’s prospects 
in the Fall of 1948 in conjunction with British trade unions. There were no absolute 
deal-breakers but they found some important weaknesses.193 
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 On the subject of its electoral base, they noted that the SFIO still held a reliable 
17% of the French electorate (implying a continued role in the coalition governments of 
the Fourth Republic), but that its leaders were “middle-class intellectuals” supported 
largely by “the petit bourgeoisie and white collar workers.” Worse, they had a poor 
connection to organized labor: French labor unions were increasingly teetering towards 
the Communists, Labour found, and those that were non-Communist were “mostly 
disgusted with French politics;” and seemed to have given up on the French Third Force 
coalitions.194 The ability of the SFIO to develop a relationship with the trade unions, 
organically or alone, was given “no chance whatever.” It was resolved that “giving some 
working-class meaning to the SFIO” would require lobbying by British trade unionists to 
push their French counterparts to join the SFIO’s ranks. If that didn’t work though, 
Labour decided, it might “reconsider its attitude” towards working with the SFIO. 
 The SFIO’s electoral base aside, the French political landscape offered its own 
obstacles.195 Labour’s perception was that the Gaullists and Communists were so strong 
as to force compromise in the centrist coalition cabinets within which the SFIO exerted 
power. The SFIO alone simply did not have the leverage to push the Socialist agenda… 
“compared with this central political problem,” Labour concluded, “the SFIO’s 
weaknesses of organization are secondary.” In the immediate term, Labour would not 
overtly turn its back on the SFIO or on internationalism, but the scales had tipped in 
favor of an independent, US-aligned orientation.196 
 The impact on the MUSSE was indirect but important: Labour’s strategy was 
based on its own constraints and on the projected feasibility of a European program; the 
fact that the MUSSE was pushing this program was essentially incidental, one of 
convenience and circumstance: there was no sense of loyalty or common purpose 
towards the MUSSE and no evidence that Labour was wittingly influenced by the MUSSE. 
A distancing between Labour and the SFIO, however, did harm a strategy that the 
MUSSE had fallen into rather by default recently: relying on the activism of those two 
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parties. In its early years, the MUSSE had effectively labored alone, adapting the purist 
ideological Edwards-Ridley platform into something concrete; even as late as the Hague 
Conference in May, 1948, the group jealously guarded its legitimacy by refusing to 
engage with anyone who might be tempted to compromise with the Capitalists and the 
Imperialists. Around the time of that congress, however, seeing a fair number of like-
minded groups, and likely encouraged by the broad Socialist representation that they 
drew at their own conferences, they fell into fostering dialogue among European 
Socialists. They had sought to have this dialogue supported, and later organized, by 
Labour and the SFIO, but it had not worked. By November, André Philip of the SFIO’s 
Comité Directeur (and soon of the MUSSE) was calling Labour’s position “selfish,” though 
the SFIO determined not to publicly reveal any rift in the socialist consensus.197 As far as 
the MUSSE was concerned, then the Labour connection was not working, and the MUSSE 
would have to find another avenue to produce a Socialist consensus. 
  
In late November, the MUSSE held a meeting of its International Committee. The 
committee in question still included Bob Edwards and John McNair of the ILP, though 
not Ridley, who perhaps felt that his revolutionary outlook no longer meshed with the 
Movement he had spawned. French and Spaniards comprised the largest national 
groupings. For the French: Marceau Pivert, Gérard Jaquet and Jacques Robin, all 
founding members, as well as the UEF’s Henri Frenay and three others. For the Spanish: 
General Secretary Gironella, naturally, along with fellow POUMistas Julian Gorkin and 
Wilebaldo Solano; the party’s General Secretary, Rodolpho Llopis, was on the committee 
as well, though absent that day.  Four other Spaniards of varying affiliation rounded out 
the contingent. Also present: Raphael Ryba, of the Polish Jewish Workers’ Party,198 and 
founding member Giotopoulos, aka Witte. A handful of other personalities were on the 
committee, though absent: Yugoslavian socialist Zivko Topalovitch, and Heinz Braun, 
Minister of Justice in the Saarland government (both of whom would remain associated 
to the Movement); finally, Italians Tristano Codignola and Enzo Agnoletti, of the Italian 
Socialist Democratic Party (PSDI). 
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As a result of that meeting, the MUSSE published a new program in December, 
1948,199 which would mark a final, definitive break with the early, problematic 
underpinnings inherited from the London Bureau and the Edwards-Ridley manifesto. 
First, they finally acknowledged the writing on the wall with respect to Moscow: the 
Soviets had taken Prague in February and had been attempting to blockade western 
Berlin into submission since June: only the most willfully idealistic could continue to 
advocate neutrality or pacifism, and the Third-Force-bridge notion was now entirely 
discredited. Second: until recently, the Movement had wanted to supersede national 
political structures, while at the same time effectively relying on establishment parties 
for financial support, agency and legitimacy. It would now fall back on activism at the 
national level. A third issue was the insistence on strict Socialism: ironically, this was 
based on a flawed premise similar to that of the Russian Revolution of 1917; to wit, that 
the revolution would spread, bringing Socialist governments into power across 
Europe.200 The MUSSE had recently been counting on a Labour-SFIO axis to anchor that 
process, but it was clear by November, 1948, that it would not materialize.  
From now on, intellectual and political leadership of the Movement would be 
French: first Pivert and the SFIO, and soon largely André Philip. The MUSSE had been 
aware of the crises threatening a European socialist consensus: whether it be what they 
regarded as Labour’s short-term outlook; the relative weakness of French Socialists in 
their respective coalitions; the growing ties between the main Italian Socialist party 
(PSI) and the Communists; or the German and Austrian Socialist parties fighting to 
retain their independence.  
The December program’s preamble opened with a call to all European socialist 
parties to enact domestic programs “in the perspective of a European program.” At the 
risk of drawing comparison with Stalin’s “Socialism in one country,” it signals the 
abandonment of any pretense of develop a European Socialist program with Labour. 
(The Movement’s attempt to apply its principles beyond the borders of Europe had also 
been less than successful.) Absent a transnational Labour-SFIO anchor, the Socialist 
parties of Europe were to do what they could within a national framework. From now 
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on, there would be constituted national sections of the Movement (with myriad 
acronyms that I will introduce as they become relevant). 
The second significant shift of the 1948 program was away from the insistence on 
socialist purism that had mitigated the MUSSE’s engagement with the European 
Movement: strict socialism was no longer the qualifying criterion for membership in, or 
indeed collaboration with, the Movement.201 The French committee of the MUSSE had 
already worried that their current branding as a “socialist movement” drove away some 
prospective adherents. Now the group declared that the political entities capable of 
preserving parliamentary democracy in the face of capitalist encroachment included the 
Socialists, the Christian Democrats, and non-communist labor unions, even if the latter 
could potentially be coopted by the ongoing economic crisis. For some time now, certain 
Christian Democrats, most notably the MRP’s Robert Bichet, had been participating in 
MUSSE conferences. Bichet also headed the Christian-Democratic Nouvelles Equipes 
Internationales (NEI) which figured among the kindred members of the European 
Movement (the NEI were also, in this period, organizing secretive meetings in Geneva 
which included German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and French minister Robert 
Schuman, and which have been credited with enabling the passage of the ECSC;202 it’s 
not clear if the MUSSE knew of this). In other words, the MUSSE and Christian 
Democrats were in the same fight and could work effectively together; rather than 
diluting the Socialist message, joining forces might help forge a better one.  
To reflect its new orientation, the movement adopted a new name. What was 
previously a “Movement for the United Socialist States of Europe” now became a 
“Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe.” Still led by Socialists, it would no 
longer campaign for an exclusively “socialist” Europe, allowing it to collaborate with 
Federalists and Christian Democrats who sought what might be termed a “non-
denominational” Europe. Hereafter, the group will be referred to by the acronym with 
SMUSE, except in references to events prior to December, 1948. 
 The new SMUSE program in question was rather tame by their standards, but 
consistent with earlier resolutions and broadly acceptable. Again, the Movement was 
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adapting to politically realistic goals. It gave pride of place to a minimum wage, fixed, 
and adjustable, according to costs of living in each country. Alongside this measure, the 
Movement advocated following the example of Labour Britain in terms of social security; 
and imposing - on everyone, not just the proletariat - the “inevitable sacrifices” required 
in the reconstruction phase. The second major plank of the program was on the 
collective organization of the European economy. Here they evoked the Marshall Plan, 
warning against wasting those funds on simply “re-plastering” national economies.  
 Article three touched on the Ruhr valley, in a direct response to the efforts 
underway since the London conference of April, 1948, wherein the occupying powers 
decided to establish joint control of the area.203 Rather than private property coveted by 
the “forces of imperialism,”204 the Movement argued, it should be collectively owned by 
the German people, and developed as part of a Europe-wide development strategy.  
Article four recalls the London Bureau’s central preoccupation: the plight of those 
under oppressive regimes, namely the Spanish – who had mobilized the interwar 
Bureau – Greeks and eastern Europeans.  
 Finally, one of the Movement’s central policy goals: a European Parliament 
elected directly and democratically (as noted above, the Hague resolution had proposed 
that representatives be appointed by national assemblies). This would remain a central 
goal, pursued actively as long as the Movement was able. Direct elections would become 
reality only full 30 years later, long after the Movement ceased to exercise any real 
agency, but in the late 1950s, SMUSErs Fernand Dehousse, Maurice Faure and Marinus 
van der Goes van Naters led the European Parliament’s Political Committee, charged 
with addressing the electoral system,205 submitting a report that, while prescient, would 
sit on the shelf for two decades. 
 
The European Movement 
 
There was one more important decision taken as part of the new program: to join 
the European Movement. It had been formally inaugurated only that month, some six 
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months after the conference at The Hague. Coudenhove-Kalergi had stuck with the 
organization, as had the UEF; the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales, were also formal 
members. As discussed, these groups had some ideological kinship with the MUSSE, 
suggesting that a consensus might be reached in that forum. In June, the 
uncompromising Marxist outlook of the MUSSE had been reassessed as leading 
members Jacques Piette and Gérard Jacquet argued that the outright rejection of the 
European Movement as “bourgeois” was untenable, and that to avoid fading into 
irrelevance, the movement had to adopt a more conciliatory approach. Some 
engagement was agreed upon, but Henri Frenay still advised that the Movement only 
participate as observers.206  
The International Committee debated the issue again in November and concluded 
that there were a number of areas in which the European Movement and their own 
program were compatible. One of those was a push for a European constitution, though 
this was not evoked in Gironella’s application. The rest of them were included in an 
application letter written by Gironella. He laid out the then-MUSSE’s evolving position. 
Gone were the exhortations to strict Socialist participation in the project; the Movement 
settled for a role of furthering “socialist solutions” from within an undefined European 
union. It did, however, still argue in late 1948 that any union should be open to Eastern 
Europe. Gironella also posited in his letter that there ought to be a European military-
political unit to buttress a “third force”207 positioning between the US and the USSR, 
even though such a position would not figure in the Movement’s official literature until 
the following congress, and despite the opposition of leading SMUSEr Marceau Pivert. 
Gironella called for an end to colonial exploitation, and for a minimum of economic 
planning in the areas of coal, steel, transport, and “key industries.” The general secretary 
of the European Movement replied that the SMUSE’s goals were “compatible” with those 
of the European Movement, especially given that member groups could maintain their 
entire autonomy in political tendencies.208 In other words, the SMUSE was free to pursue 
its agenda, though it would not necessarily get support from the European Movement. 
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Reservations about the European Movement would remain though. The MUSSE 
had initially rejected it outright before participating almost reticently, and had then 
tergiversated for a further six months before requesting admission. Even now, the 
International Committee agreed that they would not consider themselves bound by any 
European Movement resolutions they did not agree with. Within two weeks of formal 
admission, they moved against two structural resolutions that had been proposed.209 
The first was to unify the group under a single message. This was precisely what the 
Movement had initially feared: the dissolution of their message into some vague and 
mutually agreeable platitudes. Insisting that the European Movement was for them a 
“marriage of convenience, designed to establish a basic economic and political 
framework,” they were opposed. The second question was about the European 
Movement presidency: Duncan Sandys had been evoked as permanent president of the 
organization. But Sandys – and his relationship to Churchill – had been a bête noire of 
the European Movement from the beginning, and the central reason for which they had 
held off for so long. They were implacably opposed. Doing so, they argued for the record, 
would give the illusion of a unified message. Perhaps incongruously, they countered that 
the presidency should reflect the different elements in the movement – and proposed 
André Philip. 
They were only partially successful. On the first point, the movement did remain 
federated; on the second, Duncan Sandys was elected president, but there were four 
honorary presidents as well: Winston Churchill, disappointingly; but also confirmed 
Italian integrationist Alcide de Gasperi; former French president and bona fide Socialist 
Léon Blum; and Belgian Prime Minister and socialist Paul-Henri Spaak.210 Spaak and 
André Philip knew each other had a good working relationship. The two would 
eventually lead the SMUSE.  
The relationship, then, was less than a match made in heaven, and less than a 
year after joining, Gironella would suggest that they leave the European Movement. And 
yet they stuck with it through the end of the following decade… One thing that might 
have contributed to their continued participation, was a recent, and unadvertised, 
change of policy within the murkier echelons of the United States government; Richard 
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Aldrich’s 1997 essay “OSS, CIA and European unity: The American committee on United 
Europe, 1948- 60”211 tells the story. In early 1948, as the European Movement was 
getting off the ground, Winston Churchill and Count Coudenhove-Kalergi separately and 
privately petitioned the American government for support for European integration 
efforts.212 The United States was just then in the process of forming the Central 
Intelligence Agency, successor to the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), an 
organism with very little oversight by design. The two most senior officials involved in 
developing the new intelligence apparatus, former OSS chief William Donovan and 
National Security Council member Allen Dulles, had both been part of Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s Committee for a Free and United Europe. As noted in the previous chapter 
however, the members’ grasp of the issue was somewhat superficial, and the group was 
not very effective.  
When Churchill visited the US after the Hague conference to drum up support for 
the European Movement, the Coudenhove-Kalergi group was effectively replaced by the 
American Committee for United Europe (ACUE), a new organization run by Donovan 
and Dulles as part of the CIA’s anti-Soviet operations. The ACUE’s official goal was to 
publicize and advocate European integration efforts through lobbying congress and 
sponsoring research on federalism. These public objectives gave cover for the ACUE’s 
real mission: doing what could not be done publicly and supporting the largely left-
leaning European groups working towards uniting Europe.  
The ACUE used government funds controlled by the CIA, complemented by 
private sources such as the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. The qualifications for 
receiving ACUE funds, once codified, were as follows: groups’ “program[s] had to be 
'concrete' and [they] had to believe in a rapid rather than a gradual approach to western 
European integration; including support for: (a) the strengthening of the Council of 
Europe by gaining greater political authority, (b) the early realization of the basic aims 
of the Marshall Plan, the Mutual Security Act and the North Atlantic Security 
Organization. They also had to favor the inclusion of Western Germany within a unified 
Europe and have the potential to influence a substantial segment of opinion in 
Europe.”213 The European Movement certainly fit the bill; Churchill spoke at the official 
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launch of the ACUE in New York, and Duncan Sandys would initially control the funds. As 
it happened, they would be sidelined within about a year: both the European 
Movement’s constituent groups and its American backers wanted to move more quickly 
and more thoroughly than Churchill had ever intended.  
Over the next decade, ACUE funds accounted for at least half of the European 
Movement’s annual budget.214 These funds were thence distributed among the 
European Movement’s constituent groups: upon joining the European Movement, 
around the time the ACUE was officially incorporated, the SMUSE would be on the 
receiving end of these American contributions, a windfall well worth some feelings of 
ambivalence. There is no evidence that the Movement knew of any American financial 
contributions at the time it decided to apply for membership: the ACUE only began to 
operate several months after their application, and the first direct evidence that the 
SMUSE knew of the US role in financing the European Movement came a decade later. 
Nevertheless, it is certain that the Movement simply could not have financed the 
considerable expansion it undertook in the 1950s without the stipend it received from 
the European Movement. 




 As Gironella waited impatiently215 for a response to their application, a new face 
appeared at SMUSE gatherings. January, 1949, marks the first recorded appearance of 
André Philip, SFIO heavyweight and former cabinet minister courted by the MUSSE from 
its earliest days. His membership, and later his leadership, would reinvigorate the 
Movement and underpin its greatest successes. Philip had helped found the Fourth 
Republic, had held cabinet positions, knew some of the major players on the European 
scene (most notably Spaak), and was an indefatigable advocate of Socialist policy and 
European integration. He would head the Movement through 1964, during its most 
active and effective period.  
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Philip was born in 1902 to a protestant family and joined the SFIO in 1920. After 
his baccalaureate, he studied economics in Paris and London before a stint in the US, 
where he studied theology at Columbia and economics at the University of Wisconsin. 
He became professor of economics at the university of Lyon in 1926,216 and 
subsequently served as député of the Rhone département from 1936 to 1940.217 
Christian and socialist, Philip co-founded the anti-Fascist “Revolutionary Christian 
Front,” a relatively short-lived and Communist-leaning organization that petered out 
after the war.218 A confirmed pacifist, he fought repeatedly during the 1930s for the 
rights of conscientious objectors. There is no evidence that he was a member of the 
London Bureau, but his anti-fascism, pacifism, and early flirtation with Communism 
were well in line with the prevailing tendencies in that organization, and it is perhaps 
not surprising that John McNair sought him out in the early days of the MUSSE. He also 
had connections with French industry, notably through Christian-Front co-founder and 
trades-unionist Maurice Laudrain. He would be described as a “bridgehead” for those 
interests within the SFIO.219 
After France’s defeat in May, 1940, he refused to recognize Pétain as the 
legitimate Head of State in non-occupied France. He joined the résistance and, starting in 
1942, worked to rebuild the French state alongside Charles de Gaulle from London and 
Algiers. As with many in the Free French Forces, his activities during the war granted 
him some capital in post-war French politics, and he served three terms as French 
Economic Minister in 1946 and ‘47.  
In terms of European integration, his most important role in the immediate 
postwar period may have been his contribution to the Constitution of the Fourth 
Republic, the preamble of which enshrines a French commitment to international 
cooperation through a limited abrogation of sovereign rights. French constitutions and 
statutes dating back to the revolution of 1789 had alternated between an authoritarian 
approach giving primacy to the executive with little concern for the legal conventions of 
international relations, and a republican one viewing the state as an embodiment of its 
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population and emphasizing the existence of an international community of peoples.220 
By the end of World War II, the rejection of authoritarianism and the concept of mutual 
aid and security – and the left-leaning composition of the French Constituent Assemblies 
- had placed the emphasis squarely on a republican structure. Nevertheless, the precise 
formulation of the state’s place within the framework of international law was the 
subject of divergent interpretations by the parties involved in the framing of the 
constitution of 1946. Communists, Socialists and the Mouvement Républicain Populaire 
(MRP) would elaborate distinct positions.  
The Communists demanded absolute control by the elected assembly, in both 
domestic and international matters. The Socialists also supported the overall superiority 
of the Assemblée, but they envisaged limits to national authority, notably the 
Constitution itself and the conventions of international relations. Most importantly, 
however, they were amenable to a mutual curtailment of sovereignty in order to 
facilitate international integration. The Christian-Democratic MRP did not announce an 
official position; the next best thing was elaborated in François de Menthon’s 1946 Vers 
la Quatrième République.221 He mentioned little about international law, but though he 
felt that the French government had a duty to maintain salutary international relations, 
he argued that a strong executive was necessary to ensure France’s rights and to regain 
its international prestige. His reference to creating a “real society of nations” is unclear, 
but from the League of Nations context (Société des Nations in French), it has been 
argued that he envisaged an intergovernmental rather than supranational 
organization.222 
Philip sat on the Second Constituent Assembly (the first draft of the Constitution 
having been rejected); its task was to establish the preamble and general principles of 
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On condition of reciprocity, France consents to the 
limitations on sovereignty necessary for the organization 
of defense and peace.223 
 
 Philip had savvily insisted on the insertion of this text in the preamble, rather 
than in the section concerning institutions, specifically to protect it from the whims of 
the Constitutional Committee which would flesh out the more granular details.224 It 
faced opposition from both the Communists and the MRP – the former sought on the 
contrary to reaffirm France’s sovereignty and independence from international norms, 
while the latter, though more open to internationalism, tried unsuccessfully to 
reformulate the principle to protect France’s national prerogatives. Philip would lead a 
protracted debate on the issue before it was adopted (a further Philip proposal – that 
France submit its international disputes to arbitration by international bodies – did not 
make the cut).  
The preamble to the Fourth Republic Constitution was not explicitly given 
judicial force, but French legal doctrine has historically given it value as principle, and 
used it as a basis for deciding cases. The Socialist Party of the early Fourth Republic 
were, as we have seen, certainly the most overt advocates of supranationalism, but the 
enshrinement in France of the constitutional principle that sovereignty is limited by 
international solidarity and can be mutually curtailed for the sake of international 
harmony and security – the bedrock of European integration – can be credited to André 
Philip.  
He served as economic minister in three early Fourth Republic governments. In 
May, 1948, he attended Congress of Europe and thereafter sat on both the European 
Movement’s Executive Committee and the constituent committee of the Council of 
Europe. The Council of Europe, launched at The Hague, had been a cause célèbre in the 
MUSSE: a representative European governing body had seemed the embodiment of the 
supranational outlook advocated since the end of the war. André Philip had joined the 
project immediately and witnessed its development with dejection. There was a 
parliamentary assembly, but its members were appointed from within national 
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assemblies – without the universal suffrage central to both Philip’s and the MUSSE’s 
position - and in the case of the United Kingdom, directly by the executive branch.  225 
This Assembly, perceived as mere representatives of the ruling class, passed resolutions 
to a Council of Ministers. Each minister had an effective veto, and even unanimous 
decisions were not binding on the national governments.  
 Philip had also been one of the original drivers of the International Authority for 
the Ruhr,226 an international consortium charged with supervising the extraction and 
pricing of the region’s industrial resources. Here again, the organization lacked the kind 
of supranational outlook and structure envisioned by the more progressive voices in the 
room, including, again, the MUSSE. Nevertheless, Philip had a finger in many pies, and 
was centrally focused on producing an integrated Europe.  
Philip had in fact been courted from the very earliest days of the MUSSE: in 
preparation for the first international meeting of the Movement for the United Socialist 
States of Europe, in February 1947, John McNair had written Marceau Pivert specifically 
asking about the possibility of his attendance. Philip was National Economic Minister in 
the Léon Blum government at the time, however, and Pivert had advised McNair not to 
count on it. 227 When the SFIO launched their aborted effort to establish a European 
propaganda center in the Spring, Philip – a member of the Comité Directeur – had been 
named the French liaison.228 He’d been the one to qualify Labour as “selfish” when they 
refused to commit to the project. 
In December 1948, the SFIO’s opaque relationship to the MUSSE was clarified. To 
summarize: Marceau Pivert had begun managing MUSSE events in mid-1947, with 
financial support from the SFIO. The latter had substituted itself for the ILP in the 
organization of at least one conference, and later made use of the MUSSE connections in 
London to court Labour. A clear distinction between the two may have been 
unnecessary, since at least up to 1953, the SFIO and the MUSSE never held any 
contradictory positions.229 However, on 1 December, the SFIO’s Comité Directeur made it 
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plain that there was no official adhesion to the Movement, though it did have four 
representatives there.230 The SMUSE was assured that the SFIO would support it as 
much as it possibly could,231 and by January, André Philip, member  of the Comité, was 
added as a member of the French MUSSE section’s executive committee.  
This coincided with the increasing alienation of Marceau Pivert from the 
Movement, though he remained peripheral for several years thereafter. Pivert had 
embodied the principled attitude of the earlier MUSSE, pacifist and anti-Stalinist but 
convinced of the possibility of accommodation with Communism.232 He was committed 
to the Third Force, and the developments over the course of 1948-1949 had implications 
for his attachment to both the Movement and the SFIO. Increasingly disillusioned by 
what he perceived as the SFIO’s ideological compromises, he was vocal in his criticism 
and became increasingly marginalized therein. He was equally dissatisfied with the 
evolution of the SMUSE towards a more moderated and functionally western-oriented 
attitude, and André Philip replaced him as head of the French section in early 1949. A 
consummate pacifist, he would categorically oppose the European Defense Community, 
in conflict with the Movement’s decision to pursue a defense institution in the context of 
a political authority; and he would move into the SFIO’s internal opposition when the 
latter endorsed the Pleven Plan in 1950. Although he remained involved in both, his 
convictions as well as increasing health issues would make him an increasingly marginal 
figure. He would break definitively with the Movement only in June, 1954.233 
 
In the perspective of the Movement’s history, as we shall see, André Philip was a 
natural fit: dogmatic, somewhat supercilious, and a little out of touch; lots of good ideas, 
without necessarily the patience to be truly effective. Capable and devoted, he was 
nevertheless not above professionally-damaging outbursts over political doctrine.234 But 
Philip had experience, connections and commitment. Effectively a free agent now that he 
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no longer had a ministerial portfolio, he could – and would – devote considerable time 
and energy to leading the Movement. He also had two advantages over the movement’s 
previous leaders. In the first instance, he was a well-established and internationally 
recognized member of the political class, especially by comparison to Marceau Pivert or 
Fenner Brockway; and in the second, he understood from his years in coalition cabinets 
the nuanced and compromising nature of government – and had the techniques to 
navigate them. Finally, he had developed personal connections that would prove highly 
beneficial. For the SMUSE, he was the man for the job, and for the time. 
Within a month of its founding, the executive committee of the French section of 
the SMUSE (for now dubbed the Mouvement socialiste français pour les Etats-Unis 
d’Europe, or MSFEUE235), composed of Pivert, Gironella, Jacques Robin, and Henri 
Frenay, had nominated him leader. Later that year, on September 3rd, 1949,236 Philip 
was named Chairman of the SMUSE. He would lead their 3rd Congress in Paris in 
November and remain in the top spot until the Movement’s initial dissolution in 1964. 
 
It is tempting, based on these factors, to conceive of the SMUSE of the 1950s as 
André Philip’s Movement, but the truth is more nuanced. On one hand, there is no 
question that Philip had a significant impact on its development: he largely determined 
the movement’s policy objectives between late 1949 and mid 1954; he directly 
contributed to the marginalization of the British section in late 1950; he likely brought 
Spaak on board; and he was a well-known public figure who could draw a crowd and 
campaign effectively. On the other hand, the Movement predated him by some years: by 
the time he was elected head of the Movement in November, 1949, it had been in 
operation for some three and a half years. A few of its existing members had worked 
together since the early 1930s, and the existing leadership (Pivert, McNair, Edwards, 
Ridley and Gironella), had been collaborating for a half-decade before Philip first joined. 
The move towards the political center reflected in the name change is not entirely coeval 
with Philip’s involvement, taking place two months before Philip’s first recorded 
meeting and some ten months before he became President: he cannot be credited with 
joining forces with other integrationist movements, or involvement in the European 
Movement. Nor did he set policy singlehandedly: during the early 1950s, when Philip 
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and the SMUSE are most closely linked, very public policy debates between Philip and 
other members were hashed out in Gauche Européenne (see next chapter). The SFIO did 
not consider Philip and the SMUSE to be one and the same either: as far as the Comité 
Directeur was concerned, Philip’s personal disagreements with SFIO policy did not 
equate to a policy conflict between the SMUSE and the SFIO.237 Enrique Gironella, the 
“institutional memory” of the movement if there ever was one, did not defer entirely to 
Philip either, seeking to moderate certain positions and notably recruiting Rifflet to help 
manage Philip in the context of the European Workers’ Movement.238 After the rejection 
of the EDC, finally, the Movement struggled to find footing again, and the organizational 
leadership would increasingly be taken over by the Belgians: after 1954, Philip was no 
longer driving the Movement’s activities.  
It would be reductive to describe the SMUSE as an André Philip project, despite 
his profile. Philip was steered towards the SMUSE by the SFIO Comité Directeur. At a 
time when the British section’s importance was waning for lack of domestic influence, 
Philip was able to provide much-needed direction, but he did not control the Movement, 
whose existing adherents had long-established ties. Conversely, Philip was somewhat 
adrift in early 1949. He had been seeking the creation of supranational structures 
without much success: neither the IAR nor the Council of Europe had come out the way 
he had hoped. He had not held a cabinet position for two years and future prospects 
were not promising: the last Socialist in the Economic ministry had been Christian 
Pineau, who had lasted six days in September, 1948. In January, 1949, he somewhat 
serendipitously came into contact with a group of like-minded socialist activists from 
across Europe who already held positions very much in line with his own thinking: they 
had ties to his own party, offices in Paris, a robust European network, and links to the 
European Movement. Whether the SMUSE saved Philip or Philip saved the SMUSE is not 
entirely clear, but there is little question that the relationship was symbiotic, mutually 
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 The Spring of 1949 saw the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, a mutual 
defense agreement intended to dissuade the Soviet Union from any adventurism in 
Western Europe.  In March, the SMUSE’s Executive Committee released a communiqué 
outlining their position.239 As noted above, the group was already privately committed 
to collective defense, but one designed to ensure independence from the two blocs: in 
six months, this would appear on the official platform, and a year later, they would 
throw the whole weight of the organization behind Pleven’s proposal for a European 
Defense Community. This new treaty threatened to render a “European” defense 
unnecessary, subsumed under an American military umbrella that would effectively 
align Europe with the United States. Once again, as during the first half of 1947, official 
American policy threatened to undermine the group’s policy objectives. 
 The response did not overtly categorize NATO as negative. The rationale for 
NATO was unimpeachable: the Soviets had demonstrated varying degrees of 
intransigence, violence and obstructionism, and held questionable interpretations of 
their treaty obligations240 (they were also unquestionably consolidating a sphere of 
influence in the east, though the SMUSE was equating this with America’s economic and 
cultural expansion in the west). Germany was divided, most of Europe was weak, and 
the French military, such as it was, was bogged down in colonies like Indochina, where it 
was futilely trying to maintain some semblance of control over a few cities on the 
eastern seaboard of their former dominion. In other words, even the SMUSE could no 
longer argue that there was nothing to worry about: some form of joint military capacity 
was necessary. 
 The response only implicitly accepted NATO, but argued that “any military pact 
carries certain dangers, because it prioritizes strategic and military considerations over 
the social and political dimensions which alone can bring lasting security and peace.”241 
The tensions that existed in Europe could not properly be resolved with a simple 
security agreement, especially one that would certainly be interpreted as antagonistic by 
the Soviets. European nations needed defense against attempted aggression, but should 
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also to work towards “endowing the world with a stable and peaceful structure.”242 It 
might be resumed as a grudging acceptance of the basic premise of collective defense 
while characterizing NATO itself as dangerous and insufficient.  
  
 
The Third Congress 
 
 The SMUSE left little record in the second half of 1949 save a flurry of invitations 
and position papers centered on their third major congress, scheduled for the first week 
of November. It was presided by André Philip in his first high-profile turn as leader of 
the Movement. It came at a delicate moment.  
The group’s promising relationship with Labour had come to an end and showed 
no sign of revival. Despite some socialist advances in Europe, the group felt that Britain 
(along with Scandinavia) had purposefully insulated themselves and their programs 
from the rest of Europe lest cooperation prove too costly.243 Labour’s encouraging 
victory in 1945 was manifesting itself in a purely domestic program that had little 
potential for extension to the rest of the continent. Keep Left, the SMUSE’s Trojan Horse, 
was no longer an effective ally either, despite the publication of a new pamphlet titled 
“Keeping Left” in 1950.244 Aneurin Bevan joined the group in 1951, and Brockway 
describes a gradual drift from the Keep Left group into the Bevan camp, which sought to 
promote and conserve the (domestic) Socialist achievements of the early Labour 
administration, notably Bevan’s signature healthcare project.245 
The SMUSE had so far been mere observers in Europe’s nascent institutional 
advances. NATO, the Council of Europe, and the International Authority for the Ruhr had 
been developed with little to no involvement from the group, though as noted, André 
Philip had been instrumental in the latter two. As the 1940s drew to a close, their 
competitors in the Nouvelles Equipes had established high-level contacts in Geneva that 
helped tackle the thorny Franco-German question.246 The SMUSE were no longer an 
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oppositional group, nor were they exactly passive, but they did remain reactive rather 
than proactive. 
Finally, the Movement was somewhat ideologically inchoate. They had 
abandoned their original Marxist characterization of the world, wherein Capitalism was 
something to be actively combatted, and where the precept of ideological purity 
precluded negotiation or compromise with other groups. Gone too was the principle of 
neutrality with respect to the Soviet Union, and they had more-or-less begrudgingly 
acquiesced to the US-led NATO military alliance. Each of these steps constituted 
something of a retreat from the Movement’s initial core principles, but these principles 
had not yet been repackaged into something coherent – the five-point program of 
December, 1948 was rather simplistic. To avoid the fate of Keep Left, they would have to 
formulate a realistic, coherent, and actionable program. The resolutions ultimately 
adopted at the 3rd Congress were coherent and actionable. They were also prescient, 
constituting something of a road map to the modern European Union, even if they were 
not yet entirely realistic. 
 
The congress was reasonably well-attended: 137 participants from 18 countries 
(a thorough collection of relevant materials exists in Marceau Pivert’s papers).247 The 
latter figure is instructive: only a year prior, the International committee had been 
dominated by the French and Spanish with only five other nations represented. The 
1949 congress included some notable new faces: Anna Siemsen, of the German SPD, 
would remain with the SMUSE until her death in 1951; Altiero Spinelli, well-known 
Italian anti-fascist imprisoned during the war and best known for writing the federalist 
Ventotene Manifesto attended, as did Paul Finet, Belgian politician and future head of 
the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, joining his compatriot 
Raymond Rifflet, future head of the Movement. The British contingent numbered 16, 
including a handful of ILP members and at least three Labour MPs. It did not include 
Frank Ridley.  
 
Philip’s opening speech signaled a much-needed change from the statements of 
principle that had generally characterized the MUSSE, and laid out a comprehensive plan 
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for the economic development of Europe. Europe needed, above all a continental 
economy. It would involve a common market, and harmonization and planning in all 
basic industries. Philip called for the establishment of a “veritable European Political 
Authority with real, though limited, powers.” He also, somewhat disingenuously, 
acknowledged and excused the internal focus of the UK and applauded the creation of 
the Council of Europe. Both of these in fact pained him. But publicly berating Labour – 
with Labourites in the room – would do no good; rather his approach left the door open 
to a change of heart while lending some urgency to the establishment of European unity. 
As far as the Council of Europe was concerned, it had been a pyrrhic victory but a 
symbolically important one: concrete evidence that integration was possible.  
Philip in fact preempted the concerns of some who had already prepared 
speeches. Italian anti-fascist activist and veteran of the pre-war anti-Stalinist Left 
Ignazio Silone, of the PSI, pleaded for concrete measures instead of the “prophetic and 
idealistic” measures often proffered by the group. Spinelli also demanded the 
development of a plan of action rather than visions of a future Europe. On the British 
question: William Warbey, Labour MP for Luton, followed up on Philip’s gentle appraisal 
of his party. He acknowledged some faults in the party leadership, but encouraged the 
SMUSE to redouble its efforts. Bob Edwards similarly emphasized Labour’s ability to 
expand nationalizations and promote European integration. Finally, Brockway had 
submitted a paper for the conference, arguing that the Commonwealth system was no 
longer the appropriate vehicle for Britain’s economic assets, and that time would push 
Britain towards Europe.  
Another topic of discussion was the European Movement. Enrique Gironella, in 
his introductory summary, which detailed the abandonment of the Third Force position 
and the rebranding from MUSSE to SMUSE, argued that the European Movement was not 
the best partner in the Movement’s quest. He was contradicted, notably by Spinelli, who 
felt that the Socialist vision could be implemented more easily once the European 
Movement had established the institutional framework upon which to hang it. Philip, 
meanwhile had touted the Council of Europe launched at The Hague, implying that the 
European Movement had produced some positive achievements upon which to build. 
The next topic of note was raised by Paul Finet, asking whether enough had been 
done to create public opinion in favor of the MUSSE, to which the then-president of the 
Movement’s French section Georges Izard added that it was time to develop a real public 
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relations program. The group had in fact meant to develop such a grass-roots base of 
support, but thus far its financial situation had effectively precluded it. The lack of 
visibility had had some negative consequences, as in the House of Commons debate and 
at the Anti-Imperialism conference, where many had been essentially ignorant of the 
Movement’s basic principles. It was also somewhat embarrassing that a movement 
focused on the European working class had no popular base of support.  
Formalizing the shift that had begun a year previously, the Movement was now 
publicly “ready to examine with the other movements working for European Unity the 
implications of this resolution.” The principled purism that had characterized – and 
hindered – the movement was thus officially abandoned. The process had begun with 
the admission of MRP members, a tentative dialogue with the UEF, and the name change. 
In the context of the European Movement, despite the misgivings of certain members 
like Gironella, it was essentially a formality to announce that the political direction of the 
Movement would no longer be an exercise in applied philosophy but rather a 
collaborative process including the European Movement and its adherents. 
 
But the most important aspects of the Third Conference were the political and 
economic resolutions, which laid out a prescient road map for the future EU under an 
umbrella European Political Authority (EPA).248 It would circumscribe the Movement’s 
efforts for most of the next decade. 
The conference formally resolved to pursue a “popular campaign for a … 
supranational Political Authority.” “All members of the SMUSE are called upon to use 
every effort to stimulate a vast popular campaign in support of this Federation.” “The 
conception of European federation must have … the maximum support of the masses of 
the various European countries which alone can prevail against the hesitations of the 
Governments.” It would take a few months to get this campaign under way, but the 
Movement would devote significant resources in the ensuing years not only to a broad 
campaign of publications, local conferences, and speaking tours, but also to a public 
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discourse on the application of Socialist principles in the new SMUSE magazine Gauche 
Européenne (see next chapter). 
Structurally, the proposal prescribed a bicameral legislature with an executive 
drawing power from an Assembly of the People, proportionally elected by universal 
suffrage, and an Assembly of States; the two would have equal powers, the latter 
ensuring equal representation for smaller nations. Any disputes would be resolved by an 
independent judicial branch. The precise structure of the SMUSE’s EPA thus constituted 
a supranational organization fairly similar to the eventual Communities.249 
The political resolution laid out some of the EPA’s potential competences. 
Primarily, there were several references to control of primary resources enunciated in 
the Economic resolution, including the coal and steel that had been on the table since 
1946. This goal would become reality within six months, though there is little evidence 
of direct SMUSE influence on the process aside from their contributing to a wider 
consensus supportive of the project.  
Projecting only slightly further into the future, the resolution called for the 
creation of European armed forces under the umbrella EPA. In this case, as we shall see 
in the next chapter, there is some evidence that the SMUSE policy did in fact have a 
tangible effect on the proposal and early endorsements of the European Defense 
Community. The Economic resolution also called for an atomic branch for the EPA: 
“Europe's atomic energy research and production should be coordinated under 
centralized controlled and exploited only for peaceful purposes.” Here again, the 
movement would work behind the scenes to support the eventual Euratom. While the 
Euratom project’s launch itself did not feature the intercession of the SMUSE, we shall 
see in chapter 4 that they did influence the application of Euratom’s supranational 
executive powers to the coeval European Economic Community. 
Projecting a little father into the future, the lowering of trade tariffs between 
member nations was a priority as well. Projecting much farther, at the risk of teleology, 
the resolution called for a department of foreign affairs and a common foreign policy. 
Also prescient but optimistic was a call for the establishment of dual national and 
European citizenship. The Economic resolution called for a common currency and a 
European bank  
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implemented, and direct elections to the European parliament, which would happen only in 1979. 
 119 
Taken in its entirety, this program was out of reach; the Political Resolution 
freely admitted that “the actual balance of the political forces in Europe will probably 
not allow of this aim being attained immediately.” For now, it was functionally a general 
platform upon which to campaign. In the immediate term, the Movement released a 
three-point enjoinder to its adherents: “Move on Towards Action.”250 The third point 
was boilerplate rhetoric about uniting “men and women of good will,” but the first two 
would be enacted almost immediately. First, launch a popular campaign in support of a 
“Federal Pact.” The SMUSE would begin campaigning publicly, first in a few Socialist 
strongholds, and eventually more broadly across respective countries. The second called 
for “an offensive within the European Assembly of Strasbourg, in order to strengthen it 
against the inertia and hesitations of the Council of Ministers.” Again, André Philip was 
the man for the job. 
 
The foregoing program is important one for three main reasons. First, it is a 
virtual road map to the modern European Union. The argument here is not that the 
SMUSE somehow laid the foundations of Europe – elements of this program had been 
evoked individually elsewhere, and there is no evidence of SMUSE pulling the strings in 
any systematic way. However, history shows that it was a coherent and ultimately 
feasible program, a feat in itself, especially considering the false starts and wrong turns 
that the Movement had made thus far. If nothing else, the SMUSE finally had the right 
idea. 
The second – but related – reason, is that very soon, European and American251 
political currents would begin to move in the same direction: the basic outlines of the 
ECSC, the EDC, and the Treaties of Rome were all exactly in line with the Movement’s 
objectives. When these latter were proposed (and the SMUSE were partly responsible 
for at least one such proposal), the Movement was already willing and able to respond 
supportively. More importantly, having established a transnational network that 
included notable members of the Franco-Belgian political elite in particular, they were 
also in a position to contribute to the elaboration of the programs, whether or not they 
eventually made the cut. These objectives, in other words, frame the Movement’s actions 
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in the following decade, and they will also guide the following chapters of this 
examination. 
The final reason that this program is important is that it reveals the influence of 
André Philip, which is absent from the limited historiography on this Movement. Pre-
conference materials about coal and/or steel communities referred frequently to the 
International Authority for the Ruhr, which Philip had worked on during his time as 
cabinet minister. The focus on the Assembly of Strasbourg (and the injunction to work 
within it specifically), could only have come with Philip, as he had been closely involved 
in the elaboration of the institution after The Hague Congress, and was the closest 





 November, 1949, saw the Movement finally achieve maturity. It had existed for 
just under three years, if one dates its origin to the first proper conference in February, 
1947. By the start of the present chapter, at the very end of 1947, it had already 
abandoned one of its foundational principles: the revolutionary Marxist anti-
establishmentarianism of its founders Francis Ridley and Bob Edwards. As fate would 
have it, its most effective supporters at the time – Pivert and Brockway – were 
ultimately professional politicians. A second central tenet – the Third Force - was on the 
ropes as well, but the Franco-British axis represented by those two figures gave some 
hope that that the third major tenet – European Socialist unity – might become a reality. 
If, in this first phase, the Movement can be characterized as dipping its feet into 
the fast-moving currents of post-war political reconstruction, the two years since turned 
out to be very turbulent indeed. The Movement’s first foray into national politics in the 
first part of 1948 was rather shambolic, essentially expecting Brockway and Pivert – one 
a junior associate of a smallish faction of the Labour Party, and the other a local chapter 
president of one of the parties in a coalition government – to introduce a vision to be 
espoused by both nations. The program was almost completely submerged: the SFIO 
never committed to the program, and neither Labour nor Keep Left ever fully grasped its 
principles. 
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The Movement’s Third Force position was scuttled by Soviet maneuverings in the 
first half of 1948. They had attempted, since the previous year, to recast the term as 
meaning neutrality rather than friendship, but ultimately had to admit that the Soviet 
Union was manifestly hostile to the democratic forces the Movement stood for. Ridley 
was out, and while Bob Edwards would remain in the Movement (largely absent from 
debate or policymaking), his continued participation was likely at least partially 
informed by his KGB connections.252  
What remained of the original MUSSE principles in late 1949 was a commitment 
to supranational European integration (the anti-colonial program was still on the table 
as of late October, but no notable conferences or campaigns would follow). There is 
some long-term consistency here dating back to the first conference, notably a call to 
harmonize transportation and to delegate resource extraction to a common, 
supranational authority. Now, under the leadership of André Philip, the most 
experienced member of the Movement, they elaborated a highly comprehensive and 
eerily prescient program. Ironically, as history would have it, this group which had been 
essentially been playing catch-up for several years was now rather too far ahead of the 
curve. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Movement also loosened its commitment to 
centralism inherited from the London Bureau. This was another concession to 
pragmatism, acknowledging the heterogeneity of the European political landscape, but it 
would give a certain autonomy and flexibility to the national sections now existing in the 
UK, France, Germany, Italy and Belgium. As we shall see in the following chapters, the 
French and Belgian sections would be responsible for the SMUSE’s most notable 
successes. On the other hand, numerous “exile” sections (Poles, Spaniards, Greeks, and 
Yugoslavs) remained involved for the time being, but would be rather superfluous to the 
Movement’s campaigns. 
The final obstacle to success was overcome with another compromise: in joining 
the European Movement, the SMUSE would find itself on the receiving end of secret 
monies from the CIA. It was ready for a significant expansion, and some significant 
success.  
 








European Defense and the European Political Authority 
 
 
By the end of 1949, the SMUSE was poised for its greatest achievements, notably 
an active involvement in the politics of the European project in the 1950s. After a rocky 
start, the Movement achieved a level of stability that would carry it through the 1950s 
and into the early 1960s. The eve of 1950 constitutes something of a reset, however, and 
this chapter will start by answering two questions begged by that reset. The first is 
whether the evolution of the Movement’s philosophy, described in the first two 
chapters, warrants the treatment of the new SMUSE as essentially a different movement 
altogether. The second question is about the supposedly transnational Movement’s 
leadership, and how to explain the fact that it was concentrated in France rather than 
anywhere else. 
The second part of the chapter will cover the SMUSE’s activities in the first half of 
the 1950s. The Movement threw considerable energy and resources into the Pleven Plan 
– indeed André Philip was a featured player in its genesis – which they conceived as a 
functionalist ingredient of their real goal, a supranational European Political Authority 
(EPA). Once the EDC process was under way, they would work towards launching the 




Between 1946 and 1949, the underlying principles of the original Movement of 
the United Socialist States of Europe had changed significantly. The anti-Capitalism, 
bridge-socialism and ideological purity that had been the pillars of the original 
manifesto had proven to be non-starters in the fast-moving and heavily US-influenced 
development of post-war European politics. Such positions had become untenable 
almost immediately: several original MUSSE members were members of national 
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governments, and they naturally sought to recruit colleagues. The SFIO sponsored the 
June, 1947, conference in Montrouge, and Labour’s Keep Left became the conduit for 
MUSSE policies in the UK by January, 1948. Both the French and British were soon 
beneficiaries of American strategic and economic support, contingent to some degree on 
adopting positions compatible with US foreign policy. The MUSSE was forced to 
moderate its philosophy markedly – though ruefully – to align with the American 
position on the Soviet Union.  
These original principles had been a continuation of the oppositional interwar 
Left and had brought the original members back together in 1946, and it might be asked 
whether their abandonment – and the renaming of the Movement – constitutes enough 
of a break to write off the “MUSSE” entirely. Two factors suggest otherwise. First, the 
political program discussed at the first meeting (as opposed to its philosophical 
underpinnings) was more or less continuous. Since its origins, the Movement had sought 
the rational planning of Europe’s economic assets under a democratic, supranational 
executive. This end goal had been elaborated in considerable detail in the years since, 
but remained entirely consistent throughout.  
The second factor is the continuity in membership. New members associated 
themselves to the evolving movement over the years, but the fact that so many original 
members remained suggests that its appeal was more in the practical goals it pursued 
than in the revolutionary spirit it embodied. A central core of members from across 
Europe would remain devoted throughout the Movement’s existence: John McNair (UK), 
Enrique Gironella (Spain), Jacques Robin (France), Witte (Greece) and Jef Last (Holland) 
had all attended the preliminary gathering in 1946. By mid-1948, while the Movement 
was still the MUSSE, Robert Bichet and Henri Frenay (France), Heinz Braun (Saarland), 
Raymond Rifflet (Belgium), and Mario Zagari (Italy) had all joined. Each would remain 
involved through movement’s initial dissolution in 1964, and Rifflet and Zagari in fact 
continued to publish, hold conferences, and communicate with the network until 
1993.253 
If the Movement’s program and the politicians drawn to it remained consistent, 
however, the same cannot be said of the manifesto’s authors. The pamphlet had been 
Marxist and revolutionary and took the term “United States of Europe” from Lenin.254 
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One central precept of the Movement’s initial philosophy was that it could engage with 
both systems while retaining some semblance of independence; that philosophical 
dimension was rendered untenable very early, as described in chapter 1, and Frank 
Ridley abandoned the movement by late 1948. While Bob Edwards remained a fixture, 
his later identification as a Soviet agent255 goes some way to explaining why he 
continued to attend even as the Movement abandoned the principles he and Ridley had 
articulated, and as the British section’s influence waned significantly. What remained, 
then, was a Movement true to its goals, but open to the formerly demonized Capitalist 





One other aspect of the Movement that must be addressed is the fact that, like the 
London Bureau, it had purported to constitute a pan-European “Left.” If opposition to 
the emerging capitalist-led system was abandoned, it did not necessarily imply that 
MUSSE policies could not continue to be articulated and lobbied for on a pan-European 
basis. A question therefore remains about why, despite participation from the four 
corners of Europe: from Yugoslavia and Poland to Spain and the UK, the movement 
ended up being functionally led largely by French individuals. The answer likely 
originates in the logistical restrictions of the early postwar period.  
The years following the war were marked by a serious absence of the resources 
and infrastructure necessary to mounting an effective movement. One stark piece of 
evidence is the difficulty Pivert and McNair had in obtaining enough paper to share 
articles for their respective publications, as mentioned in chapter 1. Meanwhile, the 
June, 1948, conference had a number of absences attributed to the inability of 
international delegates to obtain visas or arrange travel.256 The result of this was that in 
the first year or so of the Movement’s existence, it fell to local representatives to 
organize events and produce the literature: the French as in the case of Montrouge, and 
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the ILP in the case of the Anti-Colonial congress. As the logistical situation improved in 
the late 1940s, the trend was already in motion.  
The second factor that scuttled true pan-Europeanism in the Movement’s 
structure is the fact that whereas the original participants had largely been independent 
and oppositional figures – avoiding the compromises, but lacking the advantages, of 
direct political agency – the Movement was soon operating via the intermediary of 
national governments. Consequently, those on the ground (i.e. Fenner Brockway, André 
Philip and Guy Mollet) were disproportionately qualified to constructively shape the 
Movement’s strategies and objectives. This begs a final question: why the French rather 
than any of the other constituent national contingents, which, in late 1949, counted 
Spaniards, Belgians, Italians, Dutch, Germans, Greeks, Saarlanders and several exiled 
Eastern Europeans? The answer requires a brief tour d’horizon of the Socialist-leaning 
parties of the late 1940s with membership in the MUSSE and SMUSE. 
 
First off the list of viable leaders were the Eastern European parties: Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Ukraine and Yugoslavia all 
had political representatives at SMUSE conferences at various times. Two Slavs 
representing “Eastern Europe” sat on the International Committee established in 
November 1949, and Polish activist Zygmunt Zaremba served on the board of directors 
of the movement’s magazine (see next chapter). With their home countries under Soviet 
control, however, these parties freely admitted that they had no domestic authority, and 
that there was nothing anybody could do about it.257 Even in Yugoslavia, where Tito was 
carving out an independent position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, purported small-scale 
domestic propaganda efforts turned out to be illusory.258 The movement, initially 
promoting a non-threatening openness to the Soviet Union, and later maintaining a 
more-or-less overt policy of non-alignment, offered a promising opening to these exiles, 
but they had neither resources nor domestic agency. As such, they could neither 
contribute to campaigning or effect any actual change.  
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The southern European parties with members in the SMUSE – from Greece, Spain 
and Italy –  each suffered from prohibitive political discord either on a national scale or 
within Socialist politics. Greece was, in the late 1940s, in the midst of a civil war pitting 
the established monarchy against the Soviet-backed Greek Communist Party. The 
conflict erected significant logistical and financial obstacles to any kind of reliable 
leadership on the part of Greek Socialists, to the point of occasionally preventing travel 
to conferences. In addition, the Truman Doctrine had elevated the civil unrest from a 
fundamentally national issue to a Cold War issue, which further polarized the domestic 
environment and forced other nations – and national parties – to take clear sides. 
Witte’s Archeo-Marxists would run in the 1951 election, garnering a paltry 1,148 
votes.259  
The Spanish political landscape, meanwhile was controlled by Francisco Franco, 
who had defeated a coalition of Republican and Socialist forces during the Civil War, and 
whose regime continued to harass, arrest and in some cases torture the political 
opposition at home. As noted previously, large numbers of expatriate representatives 
from both Catalan and Spanish parties attended SMUSE conferences, a relationship 
attributable to the kinship with the London Bureau, which had been an ally in the Civil 
War (see chapter 1). Two big names would remain affiliated: the best known was 
Rodolpho Llopis, head of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), who would 
eventually sit on the International Committee.260 The other was POUMista Gironella, 
unquestionably the most devoted and effective Iberian in the SMUSE. Yet neither had 
any agency in Spain, and the latter spent the entirety of Franco’s tenure in France, 
returning to Spain only after Franco’s death in 1976. 
Italy was a different case. Neither an active civil war zone nor a Fascist 
dictatorship, it tends to feature prominently in the historiography of the European Coal 
and Steel Community, with Alcide de Gasperi often cited in the same breath as fellow 
Christian Democrats Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer.261 Like France, the Italian 
government went through numerous incarnations in the late 1940s with consistent 
Socialist representation; like France, the potentially friendly Christian Democrats 
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loomed large in the legislature and cabinets… unlike France, however, the Italian 
Socialist Party split very soon after placing second in the elections of 1946 with a 20% 
share of the vote. A rift appeared in November of that year, when PSI member Giuseppe 
Saragat publicly attacked the pro-communist wing of his party. At the party congress of 
January, 1947, a number of PSI members, notably an anti-Stalinist faction led by Mario 
Zagari, joined Saragat and split off from the party to form what would later become the 
Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI). Zagari hoped that the split would enable the 
creation of a unified democratic left,262 but this union did not materialize, and the new 
faction never did particularly well electorally (it peaked at 7.7% of the vote in its first 
run in 1948). It did, however, deprive the PSI of the kind of plurality it would have 
otherwise enjoyed. According to Paul Ginsborg, the PSI was left subordinate to the 
Italian Communist Party, and the PSDI to the Christian Democrats.263  
PSDI member Ignazio Silone attended the congresses of 1949 and 1952, though 
his concrete contributions (or indeed agency) are unclear from the archival record. 
Mario Zagari, on the other hand, was elected to the Italian legislature in 1948, became 
deputy Secretary of the PSDI in 1949, then went on to hold Cabinet posts in the early 
1970s. He was a regular fixture of the SMUSE from at least 1953 and remained affiliated 
for some 40 years, during which time he edited the Italian variant of the party’s 
publication – Sinistra Europea. Despite his position, however, the PSDI’s relative lack of 
importance in the Italian balance of power and the fact that Silone and Zagari were 
largely alone in their engagement with the SMUSE explain why Italian leadership was 
hardly on the cards either. Federalist heavyweight Altiero Spinelli, head of the 
Movimento Federalista Europeo, worked frequently with the SMUSE, though he does not 
appear to have had much political power. 
 
The Benelux countries had marginally more potential, if only because of the 
customs union and the joint policy apparatus that supported it. Cabinet member and 
Head of the Luxembourg Socialist Party Michel Rasquin attended SMUSE conferences 
beginning in 1948. Jef Last, of the Dutch Socialist movement, was a founding member of 
the Movement and sat on both the international committee and the board of the SMUSE 
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magazine Gauche Européenne. The Belgian section, meanwhile boasted some 76 
members by November of 1951,264 including several senators. Notable among them was 
Fernand Dehousse, who would later be of some consequence as President of the 
Socialist Group in the European Parliament, and head of its Political Committee. Lifelong 
Europeanist Raymond Rifflet had been an early adherent to the Movement, and headed 
the Belgian section from its foundation in 1948, but he was very much a junior political 
actor during the period of this chapter, and was eclipsed beginning in 1952 by the 
adherence of Paul-Henri Spaak, whose agency will be a focus of chapter 4. Nonetheless, 
Rifflet would be active as member of the fraternal Union of European Federalists and of 
the European Movement, and was advisor to European Commission President Jacques 
Delors in the late 1980s. Rifflet and Zagari, as noted, would ultimately prove the 
Movement’s longest-standing members: the Movement’s last archival record dates to 
late 1993, describing an administrative reorganization naming the two men co-
presidents.265 
Yet for the time being, the Belgians and their neighbors would take a back seat to 
French leadership. There seems to be no particular reason why none of these countries – 
namely Belgium, or indeed some “Benelux” combination - took a more active role in the 
late 1940s aside from their small size and limited resources, an argument made 
explicitly by Luxembourg in the context of supporting the EPA project.266 
 
One major European party, with broad support and political representation that 
might have carried some administrative burden of the SMUSE or contributing to 
enacting its program was the German Socialist Party (SPD). In the first elections of the 
Federal Republic, in August, 1949, the SPD garnered 29.2% of the vote to the Christian 
Democrats’ 31%: Adenauer’s very slim electoral majority made him unusually 
vulnerable to the SPD’s criticism. He would, for instance, reject the initial proposal of the 
European Defense Community, endorsing the SPD position that Germany could not 
accept an inferior judicial status.267  
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SPD MP Heinz-Joachim Heydorn had been a founding member of the Movement, 
present at the very first preliminary meeting of 1946,268 and he was joined by an 
increasing number of his colleagues through the late 1940s and early 1950s. But there 
were a number of major obstacles to German leadership in the early years. The first and 
most glaring one was that  until late 1949, Germany was under Allied tutelage and was 
not empowered to work independently on the international stage.269 The Petersberg 
Agreement of November, 1949, went some way to restoring German sovereignty, 
increasing German authority in military matters, virtually ending the industrial 
dismantling imposed by the Allies, and offering the western Federal Republic of 
Germany membership in the International Authority for the Ruhr.270  
In the early years of the Movement, there had been good reason to think that an 
SPD-SFIO agreement on integration could be brokered. As Brian Shaev recently showed, 
there was a central point of agreement on internationalizing heavy industry in both 
countries, and while the notion did eventually see the light with the ECSC, a split 
between the parties occurred starting in 1948 in the context of the International 
Authority for the Ruhr (IAR).271 Essentially, the SPD and the then Pivert-led majority in 
the SFIO had agreed on a mutual internationalization of the sort that would only emerge 
a few years later. The IAR, however, only concerned German resources and industry. As 
such, it was opposed by the SPD, who, had no interest in internationalizing “before the 
others.”272 Schumacher further objected to the measure on the grounds that it would 
reawaken German nationalism. The official SPD position would be that “an international 
supervision of production and distribution must […] be applied to all heavy industry in 
the economic territories of Germany and Western Europe.”273 On the French side, 
meanwhile, the overly-idealistic Pivert faction found opposition from within the SFIO: 
party leader Guy Mollet determined that they did not have enough clout within the 
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French government to enact the more doctrinal version of their positions.274 In other 
words, as was typical of the Movement’s early years, realpolitik prevented the 
enactment of an overly principled project despite some demonstrable potential. 
A second reason was that the SPD prioritized independence, and reunification 
with the Soviet-controlled eastern part of the country. Several SPD leaders had been 
imprisoned by the Nazis and considered themselves innocent of the blame implicit in 
allied influence in the country. They could not bring themselves to reconcile dependence 
on the US, Europe, or anyone else, with national independence: the SPD’s 1948 strategic 
goals called for full and equal participation in any European scheme, and the cessation of 
any interference in Germany’s internal affairs.275 In 1949, the SPD pursued a wider 
electorate by campaigning on a more nationalistic platform, appealing to the widespread 
desire to see the country reunified – in this context, Soviet control of the Eastern zone 
meant avoiding alignment, or even overt sympathy, with the West.276 The net result was 
that despite a nominal adherence to the ideal of European solidarity and collaboration, 
the SPD resisted in practice schemes that involved shared responsibility, diluted 
national prerogatives, or risked antagonizing the Soviet Union. The Petersberg 
Agreement was viewed as effectively institutionalizing western authority over the 
country and prompted a heated argument in the Bundestag, at the end of which SPD 
chairman Kurt Schumacher accused Adenauer of representing the Allies rather than the 
Germans. The chamber erupted, and Schumacher was suspended from the Bundestag 
for injury to order.277 A year later, when Adenauer proposed that the French invest in a 
40% stake in the Ruhr as a way to improve relations between the countries,278 
Schumacher accused him of treason and almost assaulted him in the halls of the German 
parliament.279 
A third obstacle to German leadership was that the very notion of taking cues 
from Germany was so politically toxic in that period, particularly in France, that it would 
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likely never have been tolerated. Three German wars against France in the foregoing 75 
years, and the raw wounds of the most recent one, made the average French person 
justifiably wary of consorting with the enemy. The “Geneva Circle,” a forum in which 
European leaders, notably Konrad Adenauer and Robert Schuman, met to discuss their 
respective domestic positions and potential paths forward, was shrouded in the utmost 
secrecy, involving innocent weekend trips to the Swiss border, unmarked cars and 
anonymous hotel reservations.280 This began to change with the launch of the European 
Coal and Steel Community, but Franco-German rapprochement was punctuated by 
several false starts, and even the ultimately successful ECSC elaboration process had 
been kept very low-key. When the French cabinet approved Schuman’s project in May, 
1950, it was without fully comprehending the implications.281 
By the end of 1949, the policy alignment between the SPD and the SFIO was 
fractured, and although productive back-channel communications would continue,282 
the SPD moved publicly into a posture that was effectively oppositional to the 
contemporary trends in European integration. At the same moment, the SMUSE was 
finally, and after much hand-wringing, finally moving much closer to those trends. Some 
members of the SPD continued to attend SMUSE conferences, including Anna Siemsen 
who remained head of the German section until her death in 1951, but the SPD never 
officially recognized the SMUSE or contributed its program. 
 
The final candidate for leadership in the SMUSE was of course Britain. The 
Independent Labour Party had after all been the birthplace of the Movement. In the first 
years, two issues had made them ill-equipped to exert much leadership. First, the ILP 
had very limited means: the budget allocated to the MUSSE in 1947 had been about 300 
pounds (equivalent to about 10,000 pounds today), far too little to pay for publications, 
administration and conferences on a European scale.283 Second, the party had a highly 
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contentious relationship to Labour which, as described in chapter 1, actively obstructed 
engagement between Labour and the SFIO. This was overcome only when the latter 
sponsored the MUSSE itself and obscured the ILP. Soon, a fruitful bilateral relationship 
was established directly between the SFIO and Labour by the intermediary of Marceau 
Pivert and Fenner Brockway, somewhat sidelining the ILP. 
The “big illusion”284 with Labour began to crack in early 1950. Labour had 
abstained from a joint European program in 1948-49, but they had not overtly rejected 
Europe, leaving some on the continent hopeful that an arrangement was still possible. In 
the run-up to the general elections of February, 1950, however, Labour published Let us 
win through together, which constituted a break from the lip service theretofore paid to 
a Europeanist orientation:285 the very first policy statement is that “the nation's greatest 
need is to export more, especially to North America.” It continues: 
“Exports must be sold in the right markets at the right price, and imports 
arranged according to our needs. Only by price control and rationing can fair 
shares of scarce goods be ensured. Only control over capital investment, distribution 
of industry, industrial building and foreign exchange can enable us to overcome the 
dollar shortage and build up a permanently thriving national economy.”286 
The program goes on to place the economic health of Britain itself – not the 
European people in general – at the very core of policy. The maintenance of full 
employment in Britain, rather than the collective economic development of Europe, 
would determine import-export, monetary, and fiscal policy. The nationalization of the 
coal industry was held up as a great achievement for the British working man, and the 
manifesto elsewhere predicted the upcoming nationalization of the steel and concrete 
industries as well. “Labour will not be content until each public enterprise is a model of 
efficiency and of social responsibility. The Government must be free to take all necessary 
steps to that end,”287 and Labour would “stand firm against any attempt to intimidate us 
or to undermine our position in the world.”288  In doubling down on British government 
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control, Labour was effectively removing itself from the ongoing European discussions  - 
and SMUSE policy - concerning international management structures for European 
heavy industry. It implicitly eliminated any notion that Britain would be willing to 
curtail its own sovereignty in order to better align with the Continent, a basic premise of 
the SMUSE – and indeed any European integrationist – project.  
There were also negative signals with respect to the SMUSE’s (admittedly 
inchoate) position vis-à-vis the colonial world, which had been to bring it into the 
European planning structure on an egalitarian basis (McNair’s underwhelming colonial 
conference notwithstanding, the basic principle had not been revised). Bevin’s Western 
Union, as noted in the previous chapter, had already envisioned something less than full 
equality with Britain’s Commonwealth partners, and Labour now elaborated a policy 
rather reminiscent of Imperial privilege: bulk purchase agreements and long-term 
contracts, and a search for further sources of raw materials supported by British 
investment.289 Rather than looking to its continental partners for long-term stability, 
and sharing that access with its former possessions, Labour would reinforce the 
preferential ties it had developed in earlier times. Such an outlook would almost 
necessarily be detrimental to Britain’s other trade partners, especially Continental ones, 
and it flew in the face of the open market policies advocated by the SMUSE and others.  
There is one paragraph in the 1950 platform on the question of European unity: 
“In Europe, great strides have been taken towards the creation of a new economic and 
political unity.” Perhaps questionably, considering its pointed abstention from the 
Congress of Europe, it continues: “no country [had] given more leadership to this great 
movement than Labour Britain.” However, “Britain is part of a vast Commonwealth 
extending far beyond the boundaries of Europe…”290 If there had been any doubt as to 
whether Britain would opt for an investment in the fraught, tentative European project, 
it was thoroughly laid to rest in the run-up to the election of 1950. There would be no 
risk-taking or experimentation, no collaboration with former rivals, no mutual 
curtailment of sovereignty, no grand adventures with France, the Netherlands or 
Germany. Labour would, in its own words “Put the Nation First.”291 
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Essentially, as of February, 1950, Labour policy openly rejected participation in a 
supranational European project. André Philip published a long response soon thereafter, 
in which he called Labour’s position “a hard very blow to all the Socialist parties of the 
continent” and laid out a litany of grievances.292 The piece was published under SMUSE 
letterhead, though Philip noted that it was only a personal opinion pending the 
Movement’s next international congress. Nevertheless, it was a somewhat 
presumptuous move that betrayed either a disproportionate sense of his importance in 
the movement (he had only been involved for a year or so), or a dejection with Labour 
so potent that he did not think it necessary to consult his colleagues. In either case, there 
was to be some significant pushback from the British section. He accused Labour of 
hypocrisy in insisting that only fully-empowered Socialist parties should be partnered 
with, pointing out that Labour itself held a very slim majority in Britain, and that they 
had declared solidarity with the Conservative party and with the decidedly anti-Socialist 
United States. He reprimanded it for the unannounced currency devaluation of the 
previous September, engendering economic shocks he asserted were primarily felt by 
organized labor. He pointed out certain contradictions and logical fallacies, and 
belabored the fact that Labour’s arguments could and had already been used by anti-
Socialist forces in Europe. Britain’s ties to the Commonwealth also came under fire – 
France, Philip pointed out, also had overseas territories, which didn’t prevent her from 
being committed to the European idea. The central British position that Europe should 
function through “voluntary co-operation of sovereign states,” he railed, was what had 
made the League of Nations no more than a “debating society,” and it bore “a heavy part 
of the responsibility for the catastrophe which we have lived through." Finally, he 
ridiculed the British-led “COMISCO,” tasked with reconstituting the Socialist 
International. It was, he charged, simply a forum for the exposition of Government 
policy, manned by salaried bureaucrats, and whose resolutions Labour ignored anyway. 
Labour’s arguments, he concluded, were mere “pretext.”  
The function of the Philip’s response was purportedly to discourage other 
Socialists from following the British model, and he made an effort to be pragmatic: in the 
midst of his deconstruction of Labour’s position, he “reject[ed] any notion of a neutral 
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Europe,” and argued that whatever the integration status of Western Europe, it must 
operate “in narrow solidarity with all democracies, in the context of the Atlantic 
community.” This was an uncharacteristically frank admission of Atlanticism (a personal 
position that did not reflect the consensus within the SMUSE) and an olive branch of 
sorts to Labour’s leanings; in pursuing European integration, he continued, “we will 
always seek the participation of the British […] but we will no longer let ourselves be 
delayed by their hesitations and reservations, and will no longer seek impossible 
compromises with them.”  
A corollary to this exasperation with Labour was that there was less incentive for 
SMUSE coordination with the British, reducing the strategic importance of the British 
connection or the SMUSE British Centre’s priorities. By the autumn of 1950, tensions ran 
high between the French and British sections. Things were laid out in an October 12 
letter from the British to Gironella: “The British Centre [were] unanimously opposed to 
the decision to embark on a purely federalist approach to the problem of European 
unity. […] To support the principles of European federalism would completely destroy 
the whole of the work of the British Center within the Labour movement where there is 
very little support for the federalist conception.”293 The British Center were evidently 
still somewhat more dogmatic than their French counterparts, so that while they had 
signed off on the Movement’s reorientation of late 1949, they had remained uneasy with 
the move away from a properly Socialist vision towards federalism and engagement 
with the UEF and the Nouvelles Equipes. One can safely assume that the aggressive 
indictment which Philip had published in February, contributed to a feeling of 
marginalization and frustration. Since then, Labour has openly rejected participation in 
the nascent ECSC: Zagari would describe a disappointing meeting at Transport House in 
mid-1950, where the Labour argument boiled down to “we have got the coal and we are 
keeping it.”294 The loss of Labour as a viable ally – signaled in February and confirmed 
after the Schuman announcement, left little incentive to compromise in favor of the 
Movement’s British connections. The Fourth Congress had been scheduled – by the 
French – for  Strasbourg in November 1950, to coincide with a meeting of the 
Consultative Assembly at which the political dimensions of European defense would be 
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discussed.295 Edwards broke openly with the French in his October letter: the British 
Center would not be ready by then and “will not recognize or attend a conference.”  
If the British section could claim to have founded the Movement, and if they 
could, in late 1950, still allude to work being done within the Labour party, it should be 
noted that concretely, this consisted of contacts with Keep Left. The following months 
would sound the death knell of those British contribution to the SMUSE’s goals. By late 
October, letters from Marceau Pivert to Brockway and Keep Left were going 
unanswered, and contributions to French publications was limited to reprints of articles 
from the New Statesman and summaries of debates from the House of Lords.296 In April, 
1951, the Keep Left group was officially disbanded. It was replaced by the “Bevan 
Group,” focused on consolidating domestic achievements until proper Socialism took 
hold elsewhere – a British variant, perhaps, of “Socialism in One Country.”297 The 
Bevanites were “extremely chary about anything like formal contact with groups of 
individuals on the continent.”298 Though there would be some sporadic communication 
between the French and the Bevanites, little came of it, and it left the French SMUSErs 
very little incentive to mend fences with their British counterparts. They had a 
promising program which was by late 1950 well on the way to actualization, influence in 
the French legislature, productive connections with other members of the European 
Movement, and a steady new income stream courtesy of the ACUE.299 
The sum total of the foregoing examination is twofold. First, the Movement 
embraced a realpolitik approach to the question of European integration, which 
prioritized substantive progress via established parties at the expense of its initial 
principled ideological fervor. In most cases, this was an uncontentious and organic 
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development: conference documents reveal few objections from the exile parties, for 
instance, which seemed content, from their continued engagement, to contribute 
morally to any constructive project. Relations were somewhat more contentious with 
certain sections, however, none more so than the British, who resisted compromise even 
as hopes evaporated that their own national connections would prove fruitful. 
Second, but by the same token, by the time the movement was on its feet in 1949, 
the French SFIO emerged as having both the political will and agency to be a productive 
avenue for the SMUSE’s objectives. From the beginning of 1950, the Movement was 
largely a French one, and by mid-1951, wholly so. In the same period, the SMUSE began 
to receive an income stream from the European Movement, which allowed it to act 
independently, and avoid becoming the transnational wing of the SFIO. It would 
continue to campaign for a supranational Europe, maintain an international Socialist 
network, and manage a pan-European dialogue on Socialist approaches to contemporary 
problems but it was now independently funded, and it was led and administered from 
Paris under the leadership of André Philip, in partnership with the SFIO.  
 
 
Moving on: The European Political Authority 
 
 As far as the SMUSE were concerned, a European defensive organization (EDC) 
was inseparable from a political one (EPA), and by the time the EDC draft treaty was 
completed, it included provisions for the elaboration of the EPA.300 However, if the two 
institutions are essentially part of the same story for our purposes, the historiography 
has tended to treat them separately. Two monographs will feature importantly here: 
Fursdon’s The European Defence Community,301 and Griffith’s Europe’s First 
Constitution.302 Without disagreeing with the main arguments of either work, this 
discussion will add a layer to the story on three fronts. First, while it is often held that 
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Jean Monnet303 and René Pleven were the fathers of the EDC proposal, I will show that 
the idea predated public pronouncements from either man, and that a direct link can be 
traced back to the Socialist Movement. Second, though this has so far been 
unacknowledged, the SMUSE was centrally instrumental in the article triggering the EPA 
component of the EDC treaty, and in endowing the proposed EPA itself with 
supranational powers. Finally, the EDC’s rejection by the French parliament has 
variously been attributed to a combination of external factors, including opposition from 
the Communists and the Gaullists, a general popular revulsion at German rearmament, 
and the mealy-mouthed rhetoric of French Président du Conseil Pierre Mendès France. 
However, a very important internal factor gets rather little press, and it is central to the 
SMUSE story: the SFIO, the Movement’s most important political ally and one of the 
EDC’s biggest cheerleaders, was unable to maintain the party unity that could make or 
break the project. 
 
The SMUSE program published in November, 1949, included two major schemes 
that would soon come to fruition: the first was the project of integrating heavy industry, 
which would see the light in the form of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
This was largely the work of the Schuman foreign ministry and hinged on a relationship 
established between Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer in a context that owes 
much to Christian Democracy.304 The other was a formulation for a European defensive 
organization. Both, in the SMUSE conception proposed in late 1949, were relatively 
modest but attainable functionalist elements that were necessary in their own right, but 
would exist under a far more important supranational political umbrella. They were also 
ideas that had circulated in various forms for some time, so that there was some reason 
to think they had some chance of succeeding. As regards the ECSC, there is no evidence 
that Philip or the SMUSE had any direct role in its elaboration. However, the SMUSE’s 
role in promoting the European Defense Community was significant, and has been 
largely unacknowledged.305 
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Fursdon306 states that Monnet’s notions of supranationalism predated André 
Philip’s. While it may be somewhat pedantic to argue about the origin of an idea, it 
should be noted that the SMUSE had published a detailed blueprint for an EPA penned 
by André Philip - including an explicitly supranational executive - a year earlier. Richard 
Griffith directly credits the idea of putting a European army under the control of a 
supranational authority to Jean Monnet’s planning department, sometime between a 
Council of Europe debate in August, 1950 and Pleven’s announcement in October.307 
This fits into a pattern on Monnet which goes largely unchallenged (except by Milward 
and his dismissive appraisal of the “European Saints”): he is also credited with the 
European Coal and Steel Community, though the latter was commissioned by Schuman’s 
Chief of Staff Bernard Clappier308 and had been previewed in very similar terms by 
others, including the SMUSE, in the months prior to Monnet’s initial note to Schuman. 
Given the number of historians and personalities to have assigned credit to Monnet for 
the project,309 there has been little examination of the degree to which he is solely 
responsible. Monnet certainly had access to members of government and excellent 
timing, and his job as a civil servant put him in a position to participate in the 
elaboration of both projects; he also certainly deserves credit for the perhaps less 
grandiose task of subsequently implementing these fraught projects in such a delicate 
climate. Nevertheless, one should not conflate those skills with the political agency 
necessary to actually launch the projects. 
The second issue with the historiography is the lack of reference to the SMUSE, 
an omission attributable to the marked lack of visibility that the movement continues to 
suffer. Fursdon and Griffith, for example, discuss the agency of Frenay’s UEF and of 
Altiero Spinelli’s Movimento Federalista Europeo (MFE), and both note the intersection of 
those two movements in the context of the European Movement. As noted, both 
Griffiths310 and Fursdon311 acknowledge some involvement from André Philip. Both the 
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development of an EPA surrounding the EDC, provided for in Article 38, and the ultimate 
supranational character of that EPA, were, in Griffith’s telling, attributable to the 
intersection work of Paul-Henri Spaak and a number of others. Yet there is no 
acknowledgement of the single organization that brought these personalities together. It 
would be a bridge too far to argue that the movement was somehow directing the 
elaboration of the EPA – Spinelli’s and Philip’s notions certainly predated their 
involvement in the Movement – but it is worth trying to parse to what extent the 
SMUSE’s members contributed to the project and to what extent those contributions 
were coordinated.  
 
In its post-conference pamphlet of November 1949312 the SMUSE had defined the 
“supra-national Political Authority” outlined in Philip’s opening speech, which would 
supervise harmonization of industrial production, a common foreign policy institution, 
and international fiscal alignment. The executive power of the Political Authority was to 
be derived jointly from two chambers: the Assembly of the People formed by direct 
elections and universal suffrage, and the Assembly of States ensuring a balanced 
representation for small states. In other words, its executive would be accountable to 
the European electorate, as opposed to government representatives. The “Assembly of 
the States” (eventually the Council of Ministers) sought to counterbalance the 
demographic advantages of larger nations, but the SMUSE would insist that it operate by 
majority vote so as to avoid giving veto power to national governments.  
The foreign policy institution of this Political Authority was to include a military 
branch wherein “all high commands will be under the control of the European 
Authority.” And so, in November, 1949, eleven months before René Pleven’s proposal of 
the European Defense Community – and seven months before the North Korean action 
that spurred that proposal313 – the Third Congress advocated the creation of a European 
army under supranational control. They were in fact not out of line with the prevailing 
winds: the American Joint Chiefs of Staff had visited Europe in August and discussed 
various modalities for European defense;314 and a month after the congress, Konrad 
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Adenauer gave an interview to the Cleveland Plain Dealer in which he opined that 
Germany ought to contribute to a “European army under command of higher European 
headquarters.”315 Nevertheless, the SMUSE felt that the political situation in Europe 
would “probably not allow of this aim being attained immediately,” resolving to 
contribute towards building a European Federation until the balance of political forces 
allowed their objectives to be implemented. Capitalizing on the new connections, the 
method of implementation would be “an offensive within the European Assembly of 
Strasbourg.”316  
   
As seen from within the SMUSE, the rather quick success of the ECSC proposal in 
May, 1950, was a validation of the feasibility of the plan. Contemporary events also lent 
some urgency to a European defense arrangement: Russia’s successful nuclear test in 
late August, 1949; Chairman Mao’s victory in October and his transfer of military aid to 
anti-French forces in Indochina, and most recently the North Korean invasion of its 
southern neighbor provided an urgency to the SMUSE’s project of a supranational 
authority that would include a defense branch. The wider political dialogue, meanwhile, 
arrived at the idea through a reverse logic: the pressing need for European defense 
implied a political entity to run it.  
The invasion of South Korea by the North, in June, 1950 was widely (though 
incorrectly317) seen as a direct move by Stalin signaling his expansionist intentions.318 
The largely US-dependent North Atlantic Treaty, with a defensive line along the Rhine 
and Ijssel rivers, would be insufficient to properly secure Europe in the case of a Soviet 
invasion (Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker memorably called the defensive 
arrangements “sheer, unacceptable nonsense from start to finish.”319) Fears arose that 
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the American strategic realignment under NSC-68,320 with its more diffuse dispersal of 
US forces, would treat Europe as a buffer, slowing but not stopping a Soviet advance 
until the United States mobilized enough forces to counterattack. It was clear, however, 
that an upgraded defensive arrangement would necessarily involve German manpower 
(indeed, American Secretary of State Dean Acheson would demand it explicitly321). 
Several months before the Pleven plan was announced, the question of how to deal with 
a universally unappealing restoration of the German military reared its head.  
The Council of Europe took up the issue in August, presenting Philip with the 
opportunity to argue for his supranational conception of European defense. He argued 
that a European Political Authority under supranational control would provide the 
solution the German problem. Faced with the recent manifestation of Communist 
expansionism, Philip intoned, action had to be taken, and a collaboration of national 
armies – with their separate chains of command – was not an adequate option. The 
Council of Europe, he said, should create “a European army financed by a European fund 
fed by European taxes.” With a European Army, he continued in reference to Germany, 
there would be “no more problems of a national character.”322  
The French delegation submitted two proposals the following day advocating a 
European army run by a European Authority under Democratic control. Neither of those 
resolutions was endorsed by any British delegate. Despite its reticence to lead Europe, 
the abstention of Great Britain from such a scheme was a deal breaker, and the 
proposals almost died. The setback was temporary, however, as within a few days, the 
SMUSE-European Movement connection paid off when Winston Churchill brought the 
weight of his stature to the notion by appropriating the spirit of the French proposals. 
Philip later claimed credit for the reversal, telling French historian Georgette Elgey how 
he brought the statesman around: “There was a […] dinner with Churchill. He did not 
want to commit Britain to a European Army. But as I maintained that German 
rearmament would never be accepted in another context, he gave way.”323 The French 
withdrew their proposal and Churchill submitted a virtually identical one under his own 
name: 
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 “The Assembly, in order to express its devotion to 
the maintenance of peace and its resolve to sustain the 
action of the Security Council of the United Nations in 
defense of peaceful peoples against aggression, calls for 
the immediate creation of a unified European Army 
subject to proper European democratic control and 
acting in full co-operation with the United States and 
Canada." 
 
 It is worth noting here that while it may be surprising for Churchill to advocate 
the measure, he was not above lending weight to notions to which he did not personally 
subscribe. The Atlantic Charter was one such instance, wherein he agreed to language 
endorsing “the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they 
live,” while unequivocally supporting British imperialism. He would almost immediately 
disavow a universalist interpretation of the statement.324 In the context of the EPA, 
Churchill again spoke for what might be termed the greater good, later telling Anthony 
Nutting “I meant it for [the continent], not for us.”325 In other words, Philip’s assertion 
that he convinced Churchill of the need for a European Army though Churchill may not 
have believed so of his own accord, is plausible. 
 An objection from Labour MP Hugh Dalton, on the grounds that the phrase 
“under proper Democratic control” was unclear, was resolved in an hour by the addition 
of a clause proffering a European Minister of Defense – further implying a European 
political organism - and the proposal passed by a margin of 89 to 5. An international 
debate on the subject of the EDC had been launched.  
Two weeks later, in mid-September, Churchill lobbied before the House of 
Commons, defending the scheme by citing American impatience with Europe and the 
“horrible plight” Europe was currently in, defended as it was only by the American 
nuclear umbrella.326  Only a few days later did Jean Monnet write to Schuman, pitching a 
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unified army under supranational control.327 (At the time, Schuman was under 
instructions from his government not to agree to German military contributions,328 and 
a supranational command structure would render moot the notion of a “German” army.)  
Indeed, Pleven explained in his speech introducing the EDC on October 24, 1950, 
that the proposal was “directly inspired by the recommendations adopted on August 11, 
1950 by the assembly of the Council of Europe;”329 he proposed supranational “political 
institutions of a united Europe” and a “complete fusion” of military forces.330 This 
recommendation was ultimately attributable to Philip. The resolution of the Third 
Congress to act by the intermediary of the Council of Europe proved successful, and 
Philip’s familiarity with the players involved was a decisive factor in the path from the 
proposal to the actual launch of the EDC project. 
 
The SMUSE’s Fourth Congress went ahead, without British participation, in mid-
November, 1950. It attempted to sharpen the priorities that would guide the Movement 
over the next 15 months.331 It included committees and some ultimately ineffectual 
resolutions on recent events in Spain and Italy. The more important discussions 
centered on the mechanism of European construction spread over three sets of 
resolutions covering military, political and economic institutions. Taken together they 
amounted to a more modest, methodical, functionalist vision than before, though these 
were not entirely coherent.  
European integration, it was argued, has been thus far unsuccessful because of 
the lack of a political authority. The political resolution called for the establishment of a 
constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage, which would submit a proposal for 
an EPA to be approved and implemented by January 1952. This would prove optimistic. 
The military resolution, meanwhile, did not much diverge from the idea outlined in late 
1949 and announced by Philip before the Council of Europe in August: a unified army 
under a European defense minister accountable to a supranational EPA. It did, however, 
 
327 Monnet to Schuman, 16 September 1950. Lausanne: Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe. “Monnet 
correspondence, 1947-1953.” 
328 Fursdon, 1980. 85 
329 “Déclaration du Gouverneur français René Pleven le 24 octobre 1950,” Journal officiel de la République 
française. Débats Parlementaires, Assemblée nationale. 10.1950. Paris: Imprimerie nationale. p.7118-
7119. 
330 Fursdon, 1980. 89. 
331 Fourth Congress of the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe. Amsterdam: IISG MSEUE 7.  
 145 
call for the appointment of a new political office of European foreign minister, to 
represent a unified European foreign policy on the world stage. 
The “unanimously approved” resolution on economic institutions repeated the 
movement’s perennial calls for specialized authorities covering energy, transport and 
agriculture, but whereas the EPA resolution would have established an umbrella 
organization, these authorities were to be individually responsible to a European 
parliamentary assembly. The archival record does not contain a summary of debate, so it 
is impossible to trace how such an inconsistency could have been approved 
unanimously. Perhaps committees were operating entirely independently, perhaps the 
conference was rushed. Even so, an oversight of this magnitude on an issue of such 
central importance to the movement suggests that the Movement was still working out 
its positions.  
In the event, this would have little impact on the activities of the SMUSE over the 
following year for the simple reason that action in these areas were the purview of 
representatives of national governments, and as it happened, the direct political agency 
that had once undergirded the SMUSE fell apart in the same period. First, British 
contributions evaporated entirely. The Labour Party, an already increasingly unreliable 
ally, had won a very slim majority in 1950. They called a snap election in October, 1951, 
which they lost to the Conservatives. British participation was seen as vital to the 
viability of the European defense project, and despite Labour’s reticence (for an opaque 
combination of reasons including issues of sovereignty, economics and national pride), 
the US had exerted some pressure to participate. Churchill, Conservative leader, had 
been less than sanguine, and any remaining pressure was definitively relieved a month 
after the election when the new Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden met with US president 
Eisenhower on the margins of a North Atlantic Council Meeting in Rome: the latter 
intimated that the American position had shifted from wanting UK participation in the 
EDC to external support for it. At the close of the Rome Conference in November 1951, 
Eden stated plainly that the UK would not contribute any direct military assets to a 
European army.332  
On the French front, the SMUSE suffered a setback in the wake of the French 
elections of June, 1951. The SFIO performed poorly and decided on a self-imposed exile 
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from government. The previous cabinet had included a number of SMUSE-affiliated 
Socialists including Guy Mollet (Vice-Président and minister to the Council of Europe), 
Albert Gazier (Minister of Information), Gaston Defferre, and François Mitterrand 
(though the latter two would only later adhere to the SMUSE).333 The SMUSE thus lost 
much of its potential influence during the 18 months of inter-governmental 
deliberations on the modalities of the EDC treaty, a period in which France was left with 
a preponderant weight vis-à-vis the other nations involved. Nevertheless, the Mollet-led 
and Philip-influenced SFIO retained a significant presence in the legislative branch, 
where the acceptance of the treaty would ultimately be decided. 
The absence of agency within the executive branches was not as debilitating as it 
might have been: the French government had committed at the outset to SMUSE’s two 
principal components – supranationalism and the fusion of military forces – and the 
SMUSE remained centrally preoccupied with raising support among the public for those 
elements. Although Philip had helped drive the launch of the Pleven plan, the SMUSE’s 
central focus was on a political authority. The EDC was primarily a functionalist 
ingredient for that Authority, thus many of the delicate details of the EDC treaty 
revolved around issues which the SMUSE did not fundamentally care about. 
Intergovernmental negotiations touching on the size of military units, funding 
contributions and resource allocation were largely incidental to the Movement’s goals, 
though the command structure and the issue of (most notably German) military 
autonomy had seen a flurry of communication between Marceau Pivert and Brockway in 
late 1950 when the British position was still undetermined.  
In the face of this setback, two things saved the SMUSE. The first was a focus on 
grass-roots activism resolved at the Fourth Congress. The Movement founded a Youth 
branch which would involve recruitment and propaganda; it also passed a resolution 
concerning the European Movement. That resolution opened with a disappointed 
appraisal of the EM’s achievements: while it had notched a significant achievement with 
the establishment of the Consultative Assembly, it has since been struck with paralysis 
and was unable to reach resolutions acceptable to all the constituent movements. The 
SMUSE would thereafter consider the EM to effectively be little more than a liaison office 
and general propaganda center. At the same time, however, the Congress granted the 
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International Executive Committee the ability to pursue contacts directly with the 
Nouvelles Equipes, the UEF and the MFE to campaign for supranational institutions.  This 
would lead to the establishment of a sort of sub-committee of like-minded federalist 
groups within the European Movement (which was beginning to mirror the 
consequences of the distancing between the UK and the Continent), which would 
campaign together throughout Europe to raise awareness and public support 
particularly for the EDC. 
Over the course of 1951, the SMUSE’s efforts shifted largely to propaganda 
campaigns undertaken in collaboration with the activist members of the European 
Movement. Several hundred thousand leaflets were printed and distributed as part of a 
weeklong effort in March. A monthly bulletin named Nouvelles de l’Europe was published 
beginning in February,334 which would feature regular articles from André Philip, and 
several publications came out of the Belgian section of the SMUSE, managed by 
Raymond Rifflet. These were prompted by developments in the intergovernmental 
negotiations, but did not diverge appreciably from the central message that whatever 
the merits of the arguments of the day, a supranationally-controlled army was the 
solution to Europe’s problems both in terms of defense and political cohesion. 
The second source of salvation was the relationship between André Philip and 
Paul-Henri Spaak. It is not clear when the two originally met, but they interacted in the 
context of both the European Movement and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, and both would be disillusioned with the achievements of these early European 
institutions. Philip saw an ally in Spaak from the outset, writing him a five-page letter in 
May, 1950, in the familiar second-person-singular,335 pushing him to accept leadership 
of both the EM’s Executive Committee and International Council in order to streamline 
the unwieldy organization. When Spaak faced opposition to re-election in 1950, he 
would specifically credit André Philip and SMUSEr Marinus van der Goes van Naters for 
supporting his bid.336 The relationship was a two-way street: in his memoirs, Spaak also 
singles out SMUSErs Pierre-Henri Teitgen and Gérard Jaquet as being among the more 
talented speakers pushing for greater integration. In other words, while he does not 
mention the SMUSE by name, Spaak had, by late 1950, identified several of its leading 
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members as Europeanists with whom he saw eye-to-eye. The recognition of the SMUSE 
itself, which brought these personalities together, cannot have been far behind. 
(Biographer Michel Dumoulin characterized the result of his experience in the Assembly 
as a “conversion” to federalism,337 though if the analysis above is correct, Spaak began 
throwing his lot in with the federalists during, rather than after, his Assembly mandate.) 
In March, 1951, a letter from Georges Rebattet – then treasurer of the European 
Movement – enumerates the SMUSE representatives on the International Committee of 
the European Movement: Dehousse, Gironella, Gerard Jaquet and “Paul.”338 I have found 
no-one with the last name “Paul” associated to either the SMUSE or the European 
Movement around that time; the use of a first name, meanwhile, suggests someone of 
such stature that there could be no possible confusion as to who was being referenced. 
The two most likely candidates are Paul Finet, then high commissioner of the ECSC, and 
Spaak. In the latter case, it would date his membership in the SMUSE to early 1951.  
Spaak’s first recorded attendance at an SMUSE function is at the 5th Congress in 
February, 1952, shortly after he had resigned as president of the Consultative Assembly 
the previous December.339 He was duly elected president of the International 
Committee340 and remained with the movement for a decade. He and Philip would 
campaign actively for the EDC, he would collaborate closely with SMUSErs during the 
elaboration of the treaties of Rome (see next chapter), and would shortly join Philip as 
co-president of the Movement.341 
 
The next major congress was held in February, 1952, in Frankfurt, Germany, 
shortly before the signature of the EDC treaty. In the two and a half years after Philip’s 
accession to leadership of the SMUSE and its involvement in the European Movement, the 
group had seen an improvement in the political caliber of its membership. The attendees 
numbered 147, from 18 European countries, and counted a number of notable 
personalities.342 These included Otto Bach and Gerhard Neuenkirch, German senators 
from Berlin and Hamburg respectively, and the German Minister of Education Dr. 
Schenkel; Paul-Henri Spaak; Belgian senators Fernand Dehousse and Pierre Vermeylen, 
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and future President of the High Authority Paul Finet; former Spanish Prime Minister 
Rodolfo Llopis; André Philip and French député from Paris Gérard Jaquet; Dutch Senator 
Geert Ruygers and two parliamentary representatives of the Dutch Workers’ Party; as 
well as Altiero Spinelli, and Bob Edwards and John McNair (despite the British Center 
having been sidelined, both would continue to participate for some time). A dozen 
delegates from behind the Iron Curtain attended as well, representing Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, Poland and Romania. 
The conference would center on the EDC of course, and it also featured a renewed 
focus on the development of a European Socialist identity, a long-running issue for the 
Movement.343 The conference opened with a welcoming speech by the mayor of Hamburg 
and a reception hosted by the municipality. The members had their meals and lodgings 
paid for by the SMUSE – a significant improvement in its finances had accompanied 
membership in the European Movement and its underwriting by the CIA – and were 
invited to an evening presentation of Brecht’s Trial of Lucullus.344 (The European 
Movement was impressed; a congratulatory letter went out to Gironella the following 
week reporting word of an “excellent conference” and asking how the European 
Movement might get hold of the translation equipment employed there).345 
Gironella gave a summary of the group’s progress thus far in his introductory 
remarks that Friday morning: the SMUSE had committed to the federalist route, a decision 
formalized at its fourth conference, in November 1950; it had found Italy and West 
Germany most enthusiastic, and Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries most 
opposed: having survived the war relatively well, he posited, they had less need to 
sacrifice any national prerogative to restore themselves. The British-inspired European 
Movement, he noted, had recently been advocating union that did not involve any 
supranationality and had given only platonic support to the Schuman plan. Yet Schuman’s 
ECSC and the EDC, according to Gironella, were shining examples of limited, functional 
and effective integration and were the models to follow. Despite the friendly relationship 
he was personally building with the European Movement’s secretariat,346 Gironella again 
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posited that the SMUSE’s work could be pursued by leaving the European Movement aside 
and focusing on expanding the ECSC. 
André Philip spoke next on the principles of European Socialism. Perhaps aware of 
some of the early Marxist leanings of the SMUSE, he opened with a disavowal of Marxist 
principles: Marx had been proven wrong by the fact that the working class had not risen 
up but was in fact in decline, overtaken to some extent by a new middle class. There would 
not be an inevitable manifestation of worker solidarity in the form of Democratic 
Socialism; a moral base would instead have to be intentionally created to unite the 
working and middle classes (this was something of a jab at the conservative views among 
the SFIO, more on which later). The great danger facing Socialism, he argued, was that the 
working class would associate with the owners of production to maintain their own 
competitiveness, to the detriment of other sectors of the economy or of competing 
industries. The solution was a technical revolution, with a focus on maintaining the well-
being of the working class during the transition, and the expansion of markets to promote 
growth.  
One ultimate goal that he and the SMUSE would work on for the years to come was 
the establishment of something akin to the eventual European Economic Community: the 
congress would resolve to pursue a “unified European market organized under a network 
of supranational economic institutions under the authority of a democratically elected 
assembly.” Here again, the SMUSE committed to one of the European Union’s defining 
features, a half-decade before the Treaties of Rome.  
The SMUSE had initially proposed a political umbrella organization at its 3rd 
Congress in 1949, only second to which they felt further institutions should be developed. 
The fifth congress, in February 1952, repeated the proposal. Two weeks before the 
signature of the EDC in May, the International Committee expressed cautious optimism: 
“The SMUSE approves the rapid creation of a real European defense community. It 
considers, however, that such a community will be illusory [“un leurre”] if it is not 
supported from the outset by a supranational political organization…”347 The Resolution 
on Current Problems (“Problèmes d’Actualité”) demanded that a European Constituent 
Assembly be called as soon as possible to elaborate a supranational political authority, 
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the European Political Community. The Movement again suggested that this could be done 
by the intermediary of the Council of Europe. For what it’s worth, this was less than a sure 
strategy. As noted above, Spaak had abdicated leadership of the Council of Europe in 
frustration some months previously. Nevertheless, the Council of Europe remained at the 
time the only real forum for such a project. 
 
The EDC treaty which was completed three months later on May 27, 1952, was not 
all that the SMUSE had hoped: supranationalism was not explicit; the Common Assembly 
(the same as the ECSC’s) would have the power to remove the executive Board of 
Commissioners, but Board decisions, in turn, required the unanimous consent of the 
Council of Ministers “on all key matters affecting the EDC generally, modifications to any 
arrangement relative to the European Defense Forces and their associated common 
equipment programs, on financial arrangements and on the common budget.”348 Despite 
the effective veto this granted national governments over management of the armed 
forces themselves, the supranational determination of policies and directives – the 
ultimate goal anyway – might be salvaged by article 38 of the treaty, which enjoined its 
Assembly to “examine the problems arising from the co-existence of different agencies for 
European co-operation already established, or which might be established, with a view to 
ensuring co-ordination within the framework of the federal or confederal structure.”349 
In other words, it would trigger the establishment of some form of EPA, though it did not 
necessarily imply that this latter would be supranational. 
The inclusion of such an article had been the result of intergovernmental 
discussions between the Italians and French over the course of 1951, in which the SMUSE 
had little input for reasons discussed above. However, there had been some question 
before the signature of the EDC treaty of whether article 38 would be enacted immediately 
upon signature of the treaty, or only when the EDC institution was formally inaugurated. 
In the latter case, the EDC would function for some time before its umbrella organization 
was elaborated or enacted: during that period, an intergovernmental structure would 
govern any issues arising from wider foreign policy dimensions, and there would not 
necessarily be any institutional alignment with the ECSC – which did have some 
supranational potential – despite the inevitable intersection of coal, steel, and the military. 
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In the former case, however, there was better hope that the control structure for both the 
ECSC and the EDC might pull the intergovernmental tendencies of the EDC towards a more 
thorough multilateralism. Ultimately, Article 38 was triggered upon signature of the 
treaty. Griffiths350 found that the campaign to support that provision was launched by 
Spaak and Spinelli in February, 1952, then brought to the European Movement, which 
recruited the participation of the UEF. The gaping omission – again, likely the result of the 
SMUSE’s historiographical invisibility – is the fact that the SMUSE’s 5th conference took 
place on February 15-17, had been attended by Spaak, Spinelli, and the UEF’s Brugmans 
and Frenay, and that the same conference had resolved to work towards the convening of 
a European Constituent Assembly as soon as possible.351 It seems reasonable to assume 
that this bears some responsibility for the coordinated action undertaken by conference 
attendees. 
A few days after the signature of the EDC the Consultative Assembly of the Council 
of Europe met in Strasbourg. The debate pursuant to Article 38, on the form of a possible 
EPA, was led by Guy Mollet, the SFIO’s Sebastien Constant, and Paul-Henri Spaak – all 
SMUSErs. Despite the lack of faith in the Council evinced by Spaak and others, the 
resolution published on May 29th conveyed the SMUSE vision:352 “The Assembly […] 
considers that the provisions of the Treaty … relative to the determination of the future 
political structures of Europe [ie Article 38] should be addressed in a special accord, 
distinct from the treaty, but apt to enter immediately into force [and] suggests that the 
Governments of the Six […] mandate the elaboration of […] a political community of a 
supranational character…”353 Two notable SMUSErs set to work on drafting the treaty: 
Marinus van der Goes van Naters, and Gaston Defferre, described by Spaak as “one of the 
greatest jurists of the Six nations.”354 The Council of Europe gamble had paid off and 
managed not only to give the proposed Political Authority supranationality, but also to 
make it independent of the EDC. The latter was a not inconsequential victory in itself for 
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the Movement insofar as it had prioritized an EPA over its individual institutions, but it 
was also a hedge against the possibility that the EDC might fail.  
The Foreign Ministers of the six ECSC countries (or “Six Ministers”) obliged them a 
few months later, instructing the Common Assembly of the ECSC to draft an EPA treaty.355 
With SMUSErs Spaak, Vermeylen and Dehousse involved, Rifflet wrote to fellow SMUSEr 
and member of the newly minted ECSC High Authority Paul Finet that there was cause for 
optimism that a supranational solution might be found.356 On September 14th, 1952, an 
Ad Hoc Assembly constituted a Bureau – presided by Spaak – to coordinate and oversee 
the sub-committees in charge of drafting various sections of the treaty. The process would 
take 6 months. Spaak delivered the final draft to the Six Ministers in March 1953, 
reporting happily in the SMUSE’s Gauche Européenne that the “political monstrosity” of 
giving veto powers to national ministers had been unanimously rejected, and that the 
favored method of electing the parliament – another consistent concern of the SMUSE – 
was by direct secret ballot.357  
After that date, despite the fact that it did not tie the EPA to the EDC,358 the draft 





The form of the European Political Authority was a significant success for the 
SMUSE: it would have supranational authority; it would be accountable to a European 
Parliament elected by direct popular ballot, and it would regroup institutions touching on 
heavy industry and defense. Two more projects were being discussed on the margins as 
well: one covering agriculture (“Pool Vert”) and the other health (“Pool Blanc”), both of 
which might be subsumed within the EPA. The movement seemed on the brink of 
achieving goals it had set for itself in 1949, setting the stage for a comprehensive, 
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functionalist expansion of European federalism. The trick now was to get the treaty 
ratified. 
Hundreds of thousands of pamphlets had been printed and distributed by the 
SMUSE beginning of 1951, primarily advocating support for the EDC. In 1952, the annual 
colloquium of the SMUSE’s youth branch produced a wide-ranging booklet, published in 
Paris and disseminated on speaking tours and at European campuses.359 A separate 
publication, titled “Lettre aux militants,” - professing not to be a propaganda tool for any 
party or union but published at the SMUSE’s new headquarters at Rue de Lille, in Paris - 
was published throughout the early 50s. The entire November 1953 issue of the SMUSE 
magazine, distributed both independently and through the European Movement, was 
devoted to the EDC. In the first half of 1954, the SMUSE and their partners in the European 
Movement collaborated on a flurry of conferences and publications, in a concerted effort 
to “hammer” (“pilonner”) France, including a series of 93 public speeches throughout the 
country in January and February, (20% of which were organized exclusively by the 
SMUSE). Philip and Paul-Henri Spaak were the most active, speaking on behalf of several 
of the European Movement’s constituent groups.360  
In March, 1954, the SMUSE organized an event in central Paris at which Spaak 
and Mollet made major speeches in favor of the EDC. Mollet preached defense and 
warned that the failure of the EDC would certainly bring about a national German 
military. Spaak pointed to the shortcomings of the League of Nations and the UN as 
proof that supranationalism was required for success,361 and warned of a pro-Russia 
Germany and American disengagement if it failed. The speeches were reproduced in a 
pamphlet by the SMUSE and distributed at subsequent events.362 
 By June 1954, the Germans and Benelux had ratified the treaty by fairly wide 
margins,363 but the French (and Italians) were still equivocating. The European 
Movement working group on a supranational Europe solicited an open letter from 
European Parliamentarians to the French political establishment: “We need France;” 
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they wrote, “for both the hardiness of its initiatives and its perseverance in seeing them 
through.”364 
 
In France, the SMUSE’s greatest asset –and best hope for success – lay in its 
connections with the SFIO. Party leader Guy Mollet worked and campaigned with the 
Movement in favor of the project.  Gerard Jaquet and Marceau Pivert were members of 
the party directorate (Comité Directeur), and André Philip remained highly influential. A 
dozen other lower-tier representatives were also active members of the SMUSE as the 
EDC vote neared, including Jacques Robin, Georges Izard, Jacques Moreau, Jacques 
Enock-Levi, Sebastien Constant and SMUSE treasurer René L’Huillier. In spite of the self-
imposed exile from cabinet ministries, the significant share of seats it retained in the 
Assemblée Nationale, and the party’s official support for the EDC should have played the 
decisive role in the French legislature. 
Unfortunately, the SFIO was not a particularly homogeneous or disciplined group, 
and at the turn of the 1950s faced an identity crisis. During the Third Force years (1946-
1951), the SFIO had generally been the junior partner in the governments, and had 
found that its colleagues in the coalition were prone to making alliances with opposition 
parties when the SFIO was too intransigent.365 The forced compromises that resulted 
offended the electorate: from 1946 to 1951, it shrank from 4.5M to 2.75M, less than 13% 
of the population. Many of those lost were blue-collar workers who saw in the 
Communists a party more loyal to the working class. The decision to step out of 
government in 1951 was a bid to save the party: they would focus on the Assemblée 
where they could avoid governmental compromise and vote along more loyally socialist 
lines.366 The SFIO’s strong representation in the Assemblée (105 delegates, recently up 
from 99) should have afforded it considerable influence, but several factors, including 
France’s uneven development in the postwar years, infighting within the leadership, and 
a lack of party discipline would cripple its ability to vote as a bloc, especially in the 
context of the EDC.367 
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On the electoral side, France’s agricultural and industrial sectors were in rapid 
evolution. Prewar France had coupled protectionism with purchasing guarantees from 
its overseas territories, allowing these sectors to remain relatively backwards in terms 
of efficiency and production costs. Due to prewar economic frailties (attributable in part 
to its underdeveloped industries), the devastation of the war, France’s dwindling 
influence among its former colonies, and the new US-led free-market ideas for 
international trade, France was forced to engage in rapid modernization to keep pace in 
the global marketplace and match the military-technological level of its neighbors. This 
modernization plan,368 which entailed greater productivity and lower sale prices, was 
implemented in a geographically uneven way, so that many small-scale rural producers 
that had constituted the traditional backbone of the SFIO now found themselves 
competing with new, larger producers in other regions. Some agricultural and industrial 
workers therefore opposed modernization and economic engagement with more 
developed nations, instead demanding guarantees on prices and market access. The 
SFIO’s perceived complicity in this program contributed to further flight towards a 
Communist party now freed from any association with government.369  
This development resulted in a crisis within the SFIO leadership. By the early 
1950s, a doctrinal split had appeared: a conservative faction was led by Guy Mollet – 
they remained rather Marxist in outlook and opposed the compromises of the 
immediate postwar years, determined to salvage the party by stricter adherence to its 
traditional values. On the other side was a faction more indebted to the humanism of 
Léon Blum and more willing to adapt to the political landscape. Blum’s outlook had 
demonstrable merit: in 1947 he had initiated the Franco-British Treaty of Dunkirk 
through relations with a Labour leadership whose Socialist character had even then 
been under attack from many within the SFIO.370 Blum’s general approach, exemplified 
by the “Philip” wing of the party however, was also what had cost the SFIO part of its 
working class base to the benefit of the Communists. By 1950, the Molletistes enjoyed an 
overall majority within the SFIO Comité Directeur and had decreed the withdrawal from 
cabinet posts. André Philip and the SMUSE were squarely on the progressive side: they 
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advocated a working class conscious of its “responsibility towards all,” and had resolved 
to “oppose anything that maintain[ed] economic life at a technologically backwards level 
and fight any protectionism or outdated forms of production.”371 This faction held the 
majority among the Assemblée Nationale delegates.  
This had two contradictory but related consequences. First, the size of the overall 
Socialist delegation in the Assemblée meant that their position had to be heard. When the 
Pleven government prepared to hold a debate in the Assemblée, in February, 1952, on 
the modalities of French participation in the EDC, a total of six agendas were circulated, 
one each by the major political parties represented and one by the French government. 
The government ultimately fused their agenda with the Socialist one in order to favor 
passage, which, even then, happened by a margin of only 40 votes.372 Second, it also 
meant that for the EDC to ultimately pass, SFIO support was essential. But despite their 
numbers, the large size of the internal SFIO factions was the central source of instability 
within the party: small dissident groups had historically been marginalized and even 
expelled373 but the factions in this case were large enough to allow breaking ranks since 
severe sanctions or expulsion would cripple the party and its parliamentary power. By 
the time a first vote on the EDC came up in 1952, each faction – indeed each member – 
was emboldened to stick to its positions, even in contravention of repeated official 
directives from the Comité Directeur: the anti-EDC crowd in the Assemblée ignored the 
Comité’s directive. They received reprimands, and a few were suspended, but nothing 
much more drastic.374 
The EDC and the complex range of responses it elicited created a split along new, 
but no less deep, lines. Perhaps the central concern was the reconstitution of German 
military power, which evoked deeply personal and long-standing emotions among both 
the Assemblée members and their constituencies. There existed an ultimately false sense 
of unity in the SMUSE-SFIO: as SMUSE secretary Enrique Gironella explained to Altiero 
Spinelli in October 1950, endorsement of the EDC plan by the Pleven government had 
more or less forced Mollet, into line because he was then Ministre d’Etat. 375 Albeit for 
different reasons, then, Philip and Mollet ended up on the same side of the EDC debate; 
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though Mollet would be unable to bring the rest of his faction along. The EPA 
exacerbated the mixed feelings within the party. Mollet conceived of the EPA primarily 
as necessary to the proper supervision of German troops in the EDC, whereas Philip and 
the SMUSE considered it an imperative European structure that would, almost 
incidentally, include a military branch. Mollet’s focus on defense prompted him to value 
potential British participation, and he was consequently reticent to accept a 
supranational EPA. Philip and the SMUSE, meanwhile, had essentially washed their 
hands of the Brits in early 1950.  
There was some evident distance between the two positions within the Comité 
Directeur: already in February 1953, Jaquet, Pivert and Mollet had discussed the degrees 
of alignment between the SMUSE and SFIO. Though the SFIO had bankrolled the SMUSE 
in the late 1940s, the fact that they were now members of the European Movement 
meant that they were self-financed and therefore autonomous. This did not, in and of 
itself, have much impact on the relationship between the two, but divisive issues began 
to crop up in 1953. The French Section had been critical of an SFIO vote against 
federation, which caused some tensions, and some members of the Comité had opined 
that this would worsen the party schism. At the time, and over the objections of those 
members, the Comité had voted to allow a divergence of positions from joint SFIO-
SMUSE members in the two contexts.376 In January, and again in April, 1954, articles 
critical of the SFIO had appeared in the SMUSE magazine and been roundly condemned 
by the Comité; to mend fences Jaquet had promised that any further articles concerning 
the SFIO would be submitted to the Comité for review. Like the relationship between the 
SMUSE and its leaders, the relationship with national parties was also symbiotic. For 
several years, the SFIO had maintained potentially damaging back-channel contacts with 
the SPD despite significant public policy divergences, in the name of European 
integration.377 The relationship with the SMUSE was different in that there was little 
public awareness of the SMUSE (as opposed to awareness of the SPD), and therefore the 
relationship had less impact on public perceptions of the SFIO. Nevertheless, the party’s 
accommodation of frontal and potentially schismatic challenges from the SMUSE is part 
of a larger pattern, suggesting that as in the case of the SPD, Mollet and the Comité 
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Directeur valued the opportunities offered by the Movement enough to respectfully 
disagree while still maintaining the relationship. 
Ultimately, the SFIO officially came down in favor of the EDC treaty and its EPA 
component, and Mollet appeared with Spaak at the SMUSE event in March. Seeking to 
rally his faction, he argued that there was a Soviet threat, that defense against it required 
Germany, and that the EDC was the only way to ensure that German military power was 
manageable.378 The larger principle was that French national security trumped 
transnationalism, but he could not paper over all the spaces for disagreement on the 
grounds that the Soviets were a smaller threat than Mollet supposed, that any German 
military constituted a latent threat to France, or that the creation of a European pact that 
excluded Great Britain would ultimately be detrimental to French security.  
In the last week of May, 1954, as Assemblée Nationale debate on ratification of the 
EDC drew near, the situation was sufficiently delicate that the SFIO’s Comité Directeur 
called a special National Congress. After two days of debate, a 57% majority voted to 
support the EDC. All too aware of the disciplinary crisis, the SFIO published a 19-page, 
point-by-point defense of its decision in its internal bulletin. It featured a front-page 
article on the conference, a reprint of the resolution, an inset reminding members of the 
“absolute necessity of constantly maintaining voter unity,” and a pointed reminder of the 
Comité Directeur’s mandate to enforce discipline.379  
 
 On August 29th, 1954, the Assemblée Nationale held its debate. Supporters of the 
project, conscious of the complexities of supranationalism, argued for postponement of 
the debate to allow for further negotiations. Adversaries of the EDC countered with a 
technical maneuver known as “moving the previous question,” which, according to the 
rules of the Assemblée, implied rejection of the text under consideration.380 Despite a 
final plea by Socialist and newly-minted SMUSEr Christian Pineau,381 a vote was taken; 
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the motion passed by a margin of 319 to 264, with 53 Socialists in support. Absent the 
depth of the crisis in the SFIO and the impunity this afforded its members, all the 
Socialists would have voted against and the motion would have been rejected by a 
margin of 317 to 266. Other forces within France – notably the Gaullists’ strident 
denunciations and the Moscow-backed campaign against a remilitarized Germany382 – 
contributed to the opposition, but these are part of the fabric of politics and ordinarily 
would have been reflected in a simple split along party lines. 
The SMUSE had helped develop the European Defense Community and presented 
it to the European electorate through the Council of Europe, the House of Commons, and 
the Assemblée Nationale; it had shepherded the attendant supranational European 
Political Authority through the Council of Europe and the EDC’s consultative assembly, 
and helped dote it with supranational authority and a potential independent existence; 
and it had campaigned widely for years with the support of Paul-Henri Spaak and the 
SFIO. And yet the SMUSE failed in its flagship project for lack of discipline within the 





 The period between November, 1949, and August, 1954, marks the apex of 
French agency within the SMUSE. The Movement’s founding principles (though not its 
goals) had been abandoned largely as a result of US foreign policy. Subsequently a 
marriage of convenience between the SFIO and the SMUSE, coupled with the reluctance 
of Labour Britain to engage on the federalist road, drew political agency away from the 
ILP and into the hands of the French section.  
The relationship between the SMUSE and the SFIO was initially of significant 
mutual benefit, though major cracks appeared by the end of the present period. In the 
early years, the SMUSE had granted the SFIO access to European – notably British – 
socialists in a forum that was more activist and proactive than the COMISCO. The SFIO, 
in turn, provided the SMUSE with an early source of funding and an avenue for 
influencing French government policy. Those benefits broke down in the early 1950s: 
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Labour distanced itself from European solidarity and ultimately gave way entirely to a 
Conservative government, while the European Movement began to underwrite the 
SMUSE and the SFIO gave up access to the French executive branch. The balance of 
power shifted as well; while the SFIO had been the dominant partner, some determined 
that by early 1952, the SMUSE had stronger public support.383 The relationship 
continued based largely on both sides’ support for the EDC, and both sides made efforts 
to be conciliatory despite increasing tensions. It almost paid off. 
The Movement’s leading figure throughout this period was undoubtedly André 
Philip; in fact, one is left with the impression that he effectively co-opted the Movement 
and squeezed out the British in pursuit of his personal vision: the program of 1949 
reflected his ideas for the mechanisms of integration and there is little evidence of 
internal disagreement or compromise. That said, there is a sense of equality in the sense 
that neither could purse its goals without the other: while Philip gave the Movement 
heightened legitimacy and visibility, the Movement in turn offered Philip a large 
network through which to operate. Philip stepped into a network that already had 
independent contacts with the UEF, the NEI and the MFE, and it is unlikely that he alone 
could have produced the fusion of these groups’ efforts in the context of the European 
Movement. His efforts within the Consultative Assembly were also complemented by 
other SMUSE members and associates. 
Finally, in the wake of the failure of the EDC, Philip’s and the French section’s 
leadership in the SMUSE would wane, leaving the movement intact but its agency 
increasingly transferred to Belgium.  
The first half of the 1950s saw the SMUSE at the peak of its effectiveness in the 
European project. Philip, Spaak, Spinelli and several other well-placed members of the 
Movement were integral to the elaboration of the EDC treaty. Philip had a direct role in 
its proposal, and, in line with the Movement’s central preoccupation, there was a 
coordinated effort to secure the provision for a political authority. The story that has 
been told concerning these institutions is not inaccurate, but this network deserves a 
place in it. 
The SMUSE had increased in stature in the early 1950s and would maintain its 
popularity in the second half of the decade despite the failure to deliver the EPA. It was 
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sustained by the continued adherence of high-profile Belgians, Spaak foremost among 
them, who would take the lead on the project ending in the Treaties of Rome. And it 
would ensure a legacy stretching into the 1990s by the development of a pan-European 









Rome: Success and obsolescence 
 
 
“If the treaty is rejected … the very basis of European policy would have to be 
reconsidered.” 384  
- SMUSE, August 1954 
 
The SMUSE was crushed by the failure of the EDC, and in the immediate 
aftermath, it fell back on a publication launched in early 1953, which had sought to 
debate and articulate a homogenous Socialist Europeanism, and to raise awareness of 
the European project. Initially largely a forum for policy positions, it was reinvented in 
the aftermath of the EDC to target a more diverse audience. The magazine and its degree 
of success will constitute the first major part of this chapter. 
Some eight months after the failure of the EDC, in Spring 1955, the Movement 
found a new avenue with the launch of the “Messina Project,” which produced the 
Treaties of Rome. It ultimately comprised two functionalist expansions of the European 
political infrastructure, and though not the political umbrella the Movement had sought, 
it was in line with the SMUSE’s functionalist approach to integration. As we shall see, 
Paul-Henri Spaak and a number of well-placed SMUSErs in the French Mollet 
government of 1956-1957 participated in the development of the Treaties and 
strategized to deliver a supranational European Economic Community (EEC). The 
arguments in this second section do not contradict the established literature on the 
Treaties of Rome, but they will draw attention to, and assess the impact of, a number of 
well-positioned SMUSErs interacting at the top levels of the decision-making process. 
The passage of the Treaties ironically had a chilling effect on further SMUSE 
efforts for several reasons. One of them was loss of interest from the United States, 
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which translated to the drying up of the European Movement funding that had in turn 
kept the SMUSE solvent. Another was a generalized sense that a Common Market treaty 
was a significant and complex step in the right direction, which would require several 
years to be fleshed out, during which time it was perhaps better to move slowly. A third 
was the failure of the French Fourth Republic and the return to power of General de 
Gaulle, a staunch supporter of national sovereignty opposed the dilution of French 
power corollary to any further expansion of Europe. Analogous to the Conservative 
victory in the UK in 1951, it froze any French initiatives and presented further projects 
with a significant obstacle. Finally, the establishment of new transnational institutions 
provided fresh opportunities for supranational activism on a more concrete and 
granular level. The Movement’s adherents shifted towards these new institutions, 
reducing the relative usefulness of the SMUSE. The final part of this chapter will trace 





It had become disappointingly clear after the immediate post-war euphoria that 
despite the encouraging number of politically influential parties across Europe calling 
themselves Socialist, they had a wide spectrum of values and goals. A harmonization of 
these positions would have been the job of a Socialist International, but the highest-
profile International had foundered during the war, and though it was theoretically 
being rebuilt by the Labour-run COMISCO, the project was not advancing very fast or 
constructively. The MUSSE was heir to the rival “London Bureau,” but had never really 
been in a position to constitute a proper international of its own: any pretense of doing 
so had been functionally abandoned in the late 40s as the international situation left the 
French as the primary drivers of the Movement .  
Nevertheless, internationalist Socialism was the foundational philosophy of the 
Movement, and, though sidelined, it had never been officially abandoned. At the SMUSE’s 
fifth congress, in early 1952, Sébastien Constant (SFIO) had concluded his introductory 
speech with an argument that the role of the SMUSE ought to be to create a European 
Socialist consensus. He was a recent adherent to the movement, perhaps unaware of its 
history, so while he presented it as a new idea, it fell on receptive ears. The conference 
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conducted a preliminary review of the viewpoints represented by attendees. André 
Philip entertained federating the existing Socialist parties of Europe… Constant 
countered that there would be inevitable conflict and that in any case Socialism was 
inherently transnational. Hendrik Brugmans (Dutch, UEF) evoked the need for a new, 
explicitly anti-Stalinist “Left.” He also delicately raised a central conflict within the 
SMUSE: this new Left would have to resolve “the crisis between Marx and Proudhon.” 
While Marx had preached the abolition of the nation-state, Proudhon had argued for 
political federation: the SMUSE had waffled between these approaches. Philip notably 
espoused a form of Proudhon-Socialism, while others including Gironella and Constant 
advocated a more post-national Marxist variant. The issue would have to be resolved not 
just to solidify the Movement, whose founding British section had already been 
alienated over the federalist approach, but also to clarify the basis of its transnational 
platform. Consensus being evidently beyond reach at the Fifth Congress, a further, 
permanent discussion forum was needed to iron out the movement’s direction. A 
regular publication was proposed. 
There was another, more prosaic advantage to publishing a regular magazine. 
The Movement’s lack of visibility had always been an issue (see the Commons debate of 
January 1948, or the Colonial Congress later that year… or indeed the Movement’s 
persisting dearth of historiographical representation), and its propaganda thus far had 
consisted largely of localized rallies seeking to educate and empower voters; it 
maintained an intra-party circular and published the occasional specialized pamphlet, 
but it had no regular publications. The Fifth Congress thus resolved to put together a 
regular magazine, published in French, German and Italian variants, to establish that 
visibility. 
In March, 1953, the SMUSE published the first issue of Gauche Européenne, a 26-
page, black-and-white monthly magazine introducing itself as the work of a handful of 
committed activists seeking to define the goals of a united Europe.385 It purported to be 
an open forum386 for like-minded Socialists, Christian Democrats, trade unionists and 
technocrats to debate ideas. The movement was not exclusionary, willing to fight with 
the European Right towards common goals (though naturally also ready to fight against 
it if need be). The directors of the magazine included Belgians Spaak and Dehousse; 
 
385 Gauche Européenne No. 1, March 1953. Paris: OURS 281 
386 In French: “tribune libre” 
 166 
Dutch socialist representatives Marinus van der Goes van Naters and Koos Vorrink; the 
Italian socialist Mario Zagari; Hermann Brill and John van Nes Ziegler of the SPD; Bob 
Edwards; Zygmunt Zaremba representing Eastern Europe; and three Frenchmen: Philip, 
Gérard Jaquet, and Jacques Robin (managing director). Gironella was made Editor-in-
Chief. Initially almost a scholarly journal where relatively high-minded philosophical 
arguments for various positions were juxtaposed, it evolved in 1955 into a more 
popularly accessible, news-oriented magazine reporting more consistently the various 
integrative measures under consideration in Europe. The EDC and EPA naturally 
featured heavily in early issues, alongside reports on the so-called “Pool Vert” (a putative 
European Agricultural Community), the European Health Community (“Pool Blanc”), the 
Messina project, and on wider issues touching on the Soviet Union, German unification, 
the United States, etc. 
The magazine’s presentation of the Socialist dialogue of the early 1950s was 
noble, and remains valuable for posterity in that it brought together in one place the 
divergent interpretations of Socialism of some of the bigger names in the field at the 
time, and Zagari would credit the magazine with “a great contribution towards the 
technical and economic study of the various arguments.”387 However, there is little 
evidence that it achieved its principal goal of producing a consensus. The first issue 
pitted André Philip against Guy Mollet on European institutions: for Mollet , a weak 
European executive would leave the door open to new members, while Philip countered 
that a strong executive was necessary for Europe to function at all.388 No middle-ground 
was elaborated. The next month, Gérard Jaquet and Gaston Defferre (in favor) went up 
against Jules Moch and Daniel Mayer (opposed) on the question of the EDC.389 The April 
issue saw an 8-page rebuttal of the anti-EDC argument (pointedly titled “Réponse à Jules 
Moch”), but no fusion of positions. When Dutch Socialist Alfred Mozer described 
Europe’s potentially antagonistic position between the Eastern and Western blocs, his 
essay was subject to a lengthy rebuke by Philip.  
The coverage of national politics was no less confrontational: policy 
contradictions between the SPD, SFIO and Labour were presented, without much note of 
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areas of confluence,390 Georges Goriely (Belgian, PSB) further described the lack of unity 
among European Socialists, charging that most had essentially abandoned 
internationalism;391 Gironella likewise bemoaned the state of European Socialism in 
general and of the SFIO in particular;392 Philip wrote of the shortcomings of the French 
political establishment and faulted the SPD for its hesitant and contradictory foreign 
policy;393 German SMUSErs Karl Schiller, Klaus-Peter Schultz and August Enderle each, 
separately and over several months, attacked the SPD’s response to the EDC.394 Brian 
Shaev and Tabot Imlay have recently argued convincingly that, considering the wealth of 
transnational contacts, there was far less “nationalization” of European Socialist parties 
than has been postulated,395 but there is no question that such a perception existed at 
the time. Paradoxically, at least some transnational socialist collaborations of the early 
postwar period – and specifically the existence of GE – can be explained by the 
perception that trends were headed in the opposite direction. 
Rather than fostering a rapprochement of Socialist parties, however, Gauche 
Européenne limited itself to presenting opposing viewpoints and undercutting those that 
did not align with the SMUSE; likewise, its recriminatory appraisals of any non-
integrationist positions among European Socialist parties did nothing to establish the 
kind of solidarity that might have produced coordinated projects.  
The magazine’s coverage of other integrative measures was better suited to the 
secondary goal of educating the general population. Aside from regular discussion of the 
EDC process in various countries, the magazine devoted space regularly to the so-called 
“Pool Vert,” a catch-all term for the general idea of harmonizing European agriculture. In 
November 1950,396 the SMUSE resolved to pursue a supranational agricultural authority 
accountable to a European assembly, empowered to collect and share information, 
direct development, and negotiate trade deals with third countries. They were not alone 
in this goal: both the French and Dutch ministers of agriculture (Pierre Pflimlin and 
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Sicco Mansholt respectively) had called for some form of  agricultural harmonization 
since the late 40s,397 and both plans were launched publicly at around the same time: 
Mansholt presented his project to the OEEC (of which he was then president) in June, 
1950.398  Socialist and pan-Europeanist, Mansholt envisioned a functionalist integration 
of the entire European economy by sector, though he proposed the institutions fall 
under the OEEC umbrella. Pflimlin (Christian Democrat) submitted his version in 
January, 1951.399 Pflimlin had initially been aligned with the agricultural unions, which 
had been early drivers of state-supported agricultural development and harmonization 
but whose concerns were essentially national.400 Nevertheless, by the end of 1950, 
Pflimlin had come around to endorsing supranationality as well,401 and the two projects 
fell into the SMUSE’s philosophical line.  
The deliberations launched under the auspices of the OEEC lasted from 1952 to 
1954 and were compatible with the SMUSE’s goals. The Movement’s chosen inroads, 
however, were the Council of Europe and its Consultative Assembly, so despite several 
SMUSErs and SMUSE-adjacent actors on Pflimlin’s elaboration committee (Mollet, 
Maurice Faure, François Mitterrand,402 Gaston Defferre and Robert Buron403), the 
Movement had little leverage in or engagement with the negotiation process. The EDC 
loomed largest on the horizon in the period, and the SMUSE’s efforts were squarely 
focused on establishing its political umbrella. That umbrella and its supranational 
executive would be designed to absorb any and all further communities, including an 
agricultural one: thus, by comparison with the high-profile EDC, which justified the EPA, 
the ongoing agriculture discussions were of limited importance. Nevertheless, GE 
provided what might be termed public-service updates regularly. The first mention, in 
June 1953, saw GE argue for a push to get the project into the limelight and build public 
support, lest it be scuttled by “reactionaries.” In October, the magazine laid out the 
stages of the project thus far; and two further updates blamed stagnant negotiations on 
the UK before the project foundered (unlike the Pflimlin and Mansholt plans, the British 
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“Eccles Plan” rejected supranationality outright, and it insisted that the UK be allowed to 
maintain its preferential trade arrangements with the Commonwealth.404). 
Other news updates populated the pages of GE as well in the early years, notably 
on intergovernmental meetings involving the Soviet Union. A few updates on the “Pool 
Blanc” appeared: this purported “European Health Community” had been launched by 
French Health Minister Paul Ribeyre, though the initiative was ultimately scuttled by 
then-Foreign Affairs Minister Georges Bidault, who did not want to “overload the Europe 
boat.”405 Finally, the magazine covered national-section meetings and published their 
resolutions. 
All in all, the early version of the magazine struggled to reach an audience or to 
have much impact. In failing to build a constructive consensus, it was reduced to a sort 
of glorified internal bulletin where the leading figures of the movement expressed fairly 
long-winded philosophical opinions and denounced outside parties. The coverage of 
ongoing institutional projects was helpful and appropriate to the SMUSE’s mission, 
though it was short on analysis and neither contained much special insight nor proposed 
specific strategies. This left the reporting on national-section or even regional meetings, 
which were of little interest outside the SMUSE.  
The magazine, like the SMUSE, generated little money and survived almost 
entirely on funding from the European Movement. By the early 1950s, the treasurer of 
the European Movement was Belgian industrialist René Boël, whose personal 
relationship with CIA director Allen Dulles dated to Boël’s wartime stay in the US, when 
he had retained the Dulles brothers’ law firm for a business-expansion project.406 The 
CIA was now depositing congressional funds complemented by private donations into a 
Swiss bank account, which Boël laundered via the European Movement’s Youth Branch, 
of which he was also president. Boël added “Youth Branch” funds to the European 
Movement’s income, without provenance details, and then disbursed the lot among the 
European Movement’s constituent parties. There are no surviving records of GE print 
runs, but while the EM bought five subscriptions, it appears that the vast majority of GE 
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“subscriptions” were in fact not paid. In January, 1955, Gironella sent a letter to each of 
the local French sections with an ambitious program to collect 1500 subscriptions in 
three months. “It is an effort that the French section and the friends of Gauche 
Européenne can accomplish,”407 he insisted, although the only surviving list of 
subscribers at the time, for the French region of Charente, shows a total of seven people, 
five of whom were receiving the magazine for free.408  
The magazine was overhauled in February 1955, as part of a wider media 
offensive: Zagari’s Italian-language “Sinistra Europea” was improved, and a new 
publication – Europäische Monatschefte (“European Monthly’) – was scheduled to launch 
in Germany that November.409 They also reassessed the form and function of Gauche 
Européenne. It was expanded by about 30 percent, from 26 pages in black-and-white to 
34, partly colorized. In the first few months of 1955, Spaak and Raymond Rifflet’s 
contributions in Gauche Européenne expounded on the need for a well-educated general 
population – as noted above, the early version of GE could not be described as being of 
much general interest. This new direction was not entirely divorced from the SMUSE’s 
previous outlook, but it marked a departure from the Philip approach, which was more 
philosophical and involved a rather impatient attitude towards people who didn’t buy in 
to the European project. A small internal bulletin was launched in parallel to handle 
intra-SMUSE content like section resolutions. The new edition of GE cut back somewhat 
on the longer position papers in favor of several new features of a more general nature, 
rolled out over the first half of 1955. In an effort both to make the magazine more 
accessible, and to foster a sense of European consciousness and solidarity among its 
readers, there would now be regular background/news features on individual European 
countries. Philip, who had quit Paris in disgust over the EDC, produced four major 
centerpiece articles on Yugoslavia to anchor the new format. Gironella wrote frequently 
on Spain, and Germans SMUSErs contributed on the situation there; smaller one-off 
 
407 “C’est un effort que le MDSEUE et les amis de la Gauche Européenne sont en mesure d’accomplir” 
408  If this anecdotal subscription data was at all representative of the pattern across France, Gironella’s 
campaign would require a 350% increase in paid subscribers over three months, when the magazine had 
already been in circulation for two years. It gives an idea of the feasibility of the endeavor. 
409 “Campagne Populaire pour la Relance Européenne.” Florence: EUl ME-1924. NB: the name and timeline 
for the German publication are unclear. The strategic plan called for “European Monthly” to launch in 
November, 1955, but on 6 May, Belgian SMUSEr Lucien Radoux mentions an existing German variant of GE 
called “Europa der Arbeit” (“Workers’ Europe”), and there is a reference to a German “Europa Brücke” 
(“Europe Bridge”) in documents dated 1960. I found no copies of the German edition in the archives I 
consulted.  
 171 
reports covered the rest of Europe and French-African colonies moving towards 
independence. Each month featured a thematic collection of essays (the French 
economy, European Communism etc…), multiple features on the political construction of 
Europe, and a “Lettre de Washington” by American Socialist David Williams,410 covering 
Congressional deliberations on European issues.  
It was risky for Gauche Européene to undertake such a revamping: despite 
external financial support, the model was not sustainable and there were concerns that 
the magazine would fold. The first issue of the new magazine included a printed loose-
leaf insert from Gironella noting that recipients had received multiple issues for free but 
that this could not continue indefinitely.411 In the end, the expanded format only lasted 
six issues. After a three-month break starting in September, the December 1955 issue 
returned to 26 pages, though it kept the new editorial direction. The magazine, now in 
its final form, appeared until July, 1958.  
 
 
The Treaties of Rome 
 
The Europeanist establishment could not help exploding with bitterness and 
blame at the failure of the EDC in August, 1954. Some charged that French Prime 
Minister Pierre Mendès France was not properly briefed, nor strong enough to support 
the project, nor clear enough in his defense in the Assemblée Nationale. Philip 
immediately blamed the media, the Communists, Mendès France, the Gaullists, and 
public intellectuals (all this in one article)412 then took an extended working vacation to 
Yugoslavia.413  Spaak also blamed Mendès France, as well as French Ambassador to 
Britain René Massigli, “one of the principal saboteurs of the EDC.”414 Gauche Européenne 
decried nationalism, cowardice, and a 40-year regression of the European project. The 
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central illustrations in the September-October issue of GE were of a weighted toy soldier 
being pushed over by a giant disembodied finger, only to bounce back upright on the 
next page.415 It reflected a sense of helplessness and persecution, and though it put on a 
brave face, the Movement essentially came to a standstill for several months. France, 
meanwhile, where the Movement had based its primary political campaigns, would 
suffer a loss of confidence from Europeanists. 
 
 When the SMUSE published its “relance” objectives, they were comprehensive 
but focused on only four countries. Belgium, now the best hope for leading the 
integration project, was spared any criticism, but the general political goals for the rest 
of Europe were a) to obtain a Europeanist majority in the 1955 French elections416, b) to 
keep the Italian Socialist Party out of the hands of the Communists, and c) to re-orient 
SPD policy towards integration. The ambitious set of public activities (study retreats, 
regional meetings, conferences, and publications) were only articulated for Belgium, 
France, Germany and Italy. The Movement continued to draw increasing numbers of 
adherents from all over Europe (Baltic representatives had begun attending in 1953 and 
would remain involved at least through 1957), but the priorities evinced at the 
beginning of 1955 showed a restricted focus. Despite the Movement’s British roots, 
British participation had all but ended: Bob Edwards, sitting on the International 
Committee until 1954 despite the 1950 cleavage over the federalist road, was the last 
Brit to fade from the record. Nor did the Movement campaign actively in Luxembourg or 
the Netherlands, despite high-placed SMUSErs in both nations. The record does not state 
why. 
The Movement’s early goals had been impossibly lofty. Edwards and Ridley had 
initially proposed the MUSSE as the first step towards an inevitable United States of the 
World; within two years, the scope was reduced to Europe and its colonial sphere; this 
too proved unrealistic and as of late 1949, there was no concrete program beyond 
Europe itself; conflict with the British section and pursuit of the ECSC model starting in 
mid-1950 further reduced the SMUSE’s scope to the Six. The program published in 1955 
recognized serious issues with respect to the European project in three of those six 
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nations: a potentially fatal French reticence, fractured and politically impotent Italian 
Socialist parties, and a functionally anti-Europe SPD. SMUSE strategy now concretely 
amounted to activism that would salvage the potential of three nations to follow the 
example of Belgium.  
This significant reduction in the Movement’s international scope is mirrored in 
the narrowing of its ultimate institutional goals: initially a monolithic Europe bridging 
the Capitalist and Communist worlds, they morphed into a supranational and socio-
economically integrated continent acceptable to the United States, and since 1949 the 
Movement was chasing comparatively small – though, crucially, far more realistic – 
functionalist structures, soon anchored by the ECSC, under a political umbrella 
accountable to a vested, democratically-elected parliament. It is tempting to write off 
these developments as a massive retreat, evidence that the SMUSE project was 
hopelessly misguided from the start. However, while unfeasible at the time, the 
Movement’s goals were not impossible, as evidenced by the eventual passage of 
European treaties covering early goals like workers’ rights, transport infrastructure, the 
European Parliament, a common currency, foreign policy, a customs union and so on. As 
described in the previous chapter, the reduction in the Movement’s institutional 
objectives between 1946 and 1954 had very nearly succeeded in producing an EPA. The 
further step down in early 1955, from chasing a political umbrella to working towards 
ECSC-style supranational attributes in the discrete economic and atomic institutions of 
the Messina project, marked the moment when the Movement finally found the balance 
between its objectives and Europe’s political possibilities. 
Gauche Européenne’s introductory line in 1953, written while the EDC was still 
under negotiation, had established the movement’s next priority: “Gauche Européenne 
appears at the moment when the borders of the Six countries are disappearing before 
coal and steel, the first stage towards the common market.” In the following pages 
Sebastien Constant (SFIO) elaborated a vision that included free movement of workers, 
the rationalization of agricultural production, centralized investment by a European 
bank, and the implementation of a European currency. The administrative apparatus 
would, as ever, consist of a supranational executive accountable to a directly-elected 
European parliament.  
A SMUSE call for a common market was a continuation, and expansion, of its 
support for the Agricultural Community discussed above, and like the EDC, it was not 
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out of line with ideas circulating at the time. The wider European Economic Community 
(EEC) treaty soon to be elaborated in the Messina project included agriculture and a set 
of economic powers in line with the Movement’s broader political objectives. Moreover, 
there was a significant difference in the elaboration of the EEC treaty: while the 
Agricultural Community discussions of 1950-1954 were held under the aegis of the 
OEEC, an intergovernmental forum designed to distribute Marshall Plan aid, and whose 
membership encompassed all countries receiving ERP funding, the Messina Project was 
launched by the six members of the ECSC, a Community predicated on a certain degree 
of supranationality. The earlier Agricultural Community discussions had included the 
UK, which blocked any supranational control structures; Messina discussions did not 
require British assent (even if the potential adhesion of the UK remained a factor and 
they participated briefly as observers417). The SMUSE were fixated on supranationality 
and democratic control via the parliamentary assembly, both much more likely in the 
context of the Six than of the OEEC. The Movement’s human assets worked within the 
Consultative Assembly, the Council of Europe, and the High Authority of the ECSC; the 
key figure of the Messina project was SMUSE president Paul-Henri Spaak, “who 
supported supranationality much more than the government [he] represented;”418 and 
beginning in 1956, the French Mollet cabinet included several SMUSErs in relevant 
positions, as we shall see below.  
For the SMUSE, one major consequence of the failure of the EDC had been the 
elevation, by default, of Paul-Henri Spaak. Spaak’s concrete contributions to the SMUSE 
since 1952 had been threefold: his participation in general propaganda, both published 
and spoken; his general guidance of the Belgian Socialist establishment; and his 
management of the EDC treaty process (his leadership of the European Movement might 
have been advantageous, though it would be difficult to quantify). André Philip had been 
the movement’s policy leader and most prolific writer, its president, and the liaison 
between the Movement and the SFIO at the opening stages of European construction 
when the process had been largely in French hands. With the failure of the EDC, marking 
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418 Parsons, Craig. The Choice for Europe. Cornell University Press, 2003. 101 
 175 
a sudden French unreliability vis-à-vis the European project, Philip’s position as the 
Movement’s strategic lynchpin disappeared. Nor was Philip particularly gracious or 
constructive about the situation: as noted, he publicly excoriated a host of people and 
groups which he held responsible, and then left France for several months. Spaak’s 
immediate future was rosier: Belgium had emerged from the EDC process a clear 
supporter of further integration; Spaak had been “plugged in” to the European 
establishment at a higher level than Philip and was well-respected; in early 1955, Spaak 
was tapped to head Belgium’s foreign ministry, the top administrative job held by any 
members of the SMUSE until that time; finally, Spaak had financial connections in the US 
that allowed him notably to complement European Movement funds to the tune of some 
30 million Francs.419 Where Philip had been best-placed for the job in 1949; Spaak best 
encapsulated the Movement’s potential by 1955.  
There was no institutional recognition of any kind of transfer of power: Philip 
and Spaak remained co-heads of the movement, and the balance of each man’s 
contributions to the Movement’s publications remained as before (if anything, Spaak 
was less active), but the game had changed somewhat. In late 1949, the Movement had 
needed a general framework and approach, which Philip provided in the form of the 3rd 
Congress resolutions: a functionalist approach focused on institutions more than strict 
orthodoxy, with a strictly democratic, supranational executive. The passage of the ECSC 
and the launch of further ideas based on the same model validated and focused the 
Movements’ efforts. The precise form of Europe’s institutions, however was determined 
via a multilateral process that required balancing participants’ foreign policy, domestic 
imperatives, public emotions, power politics and political philosophy. Philip, as we have 
seen,420 was an ideas man – Gironella characterized him as a great talker (“causeur”) 
who was not good at following through on details421 – and had little patience or 
considerations for emotion, expediency, or anything he considered apostate Socialism. 
Philip’s legacy was to establish a political orientation and general strategy for the 
SMUSE, which admittedly failed to carry the EDC through but positioned it effectively for 
 
419 Dumoulin, 1999. 502.  
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421 Gironella to Raymond Rifflet, 6 January, 1960. Louvain: UCL, Rifflet Farde 98. The term “causeur” is 
vaguely pejorative, connoting a certain detachment. 
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the Messina project. Spaak signed on to Philip’s political and strategic orientation, and 
was in the right place at the right time to pick up the torch. 
 
This section will look closely at a few stages in the elaboration of the Messina 
Project, leading to the Treaties of Rome. While the topic is well documented, the 
historiography suffers from a by-now familiar issue: since the SMUSE is so little known, 
the role of SMUSE members has never been recognized as such. Two of the largest 
monographs on the topic, Andrew Moravcsik’s The Choice for Europe and Alan Milward’s 
European Rescue of the Nation-State, justifiably pay very close attention to the economic 
dimension of the negotiations – I do not disagree with the importance of the economic 
question, but the role of interpersonal relationships in facilitating agreements should 
not be overlooked. Edelgard Mahant notes that “the number of concessions made to the 
French point of view seems astounding,” proposing that two factors account for it: first, 
that the other five governments wished to avoid a repeat of the EDC; and second, that 
the French interests coincided with those of one or more other the other 
governments.422 A third reason might plausibly be the SMUSE network.  
A number of French SMUSErs were appointed to the Mollet government in 
February 1956; collaboration between Spaak and these French members, in the context 
of the French overseas territories (TOM) and of the supranational executive given to the 
European Economic Community (EEC), reveal a degree of familiarity and mutual 
understanding difficult to imagine in a strictly professional context. While I will not 
argue that the SMUSE is somehow responsible for the Treaties of Rome, the connections 
established in the years before Messina have a role analogous, at the very least, to that of 
the Geneva Circle in the launching of the Schuman Plan,423 and there is compelling 
evidence that the SMUSE network was directly instrumental in resolving some of the 
difficulties of the project.  
The launch of the Messina project for a common market and an atomic energy 
agency - both SMUSE goals - had much to do with Spaak’s being Belgian Foreign 
Minister. The notion of placing Europe’s atomic research and production under 
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centralized, supranational control was at least as old as – if not older than – the SMUSE’s 
3rd Congress resolutions of 1949; a “Common Market,” a notion that had cropped up 
perennially since the late 19th Century, had been advocated in GE since early 1953. The 
magazine had published articles on both in early 1955: one by Spaak in February, 
campaigning for an economic integration institution,424 and the other by Robert Lecourt 
(MRP) in March, proposing expanding the ECSC’s mandate to transport and atomic 
energy.425 Much of the historiography on the Common Market enacted in the Treaties of 
Rome traces its origin to Dutch Foreign Minister Johan Beyen, who had been pitching a 
variation of the idea since 1952.426 He had little success, however, until sending Spaak a 
memo in early April, 1955,427 outlining a plan for an integration of the European 
economy to be folded into the ECSC structure. SMUSEr Zagari, prioritizing the actual 
launching of the project, would opine that “the impetus for the creation of the Common 
Market came from Spaak, the Chairman of the Movement for the United States of 
Europe.”428 Around the same time, Jean Monnet is credited with approaching Spaak, 
chastened by France’s political climate and its rejection of the EDC, pitching an idea 
about joint atomic research and development.429 There remains a valid question as to 
whether credit properly belongs to the men who wrote the proposals, or the man who 
set them in motion. In either case, on April 23rd, it was agreed to fuse Beyen’s plan with 
Monnet’s and to formulate an official proposal to the rest of the Six.430 
The Benelux proposal went out on May 18th. It evoked both the economic and 
social dimensions of what would become the Common Market, and cooperation in the 
atomic field. Beyen explained to his colleagues at Messina two weeks later that while the 
Benelux memorandum did not endorse a specific structure for economic integration, the 
ministers had certainly envisaged that atomic energy would have to be regulated by a 
supranational executive. In the economic arena, each minister had preferred a 
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supranational economic community, but acknowledged that supranational economic 
integration would likely elicit strong objections (“not all of them rational”). The 
memorandum stopped short of excluding intergovernmental institutions, but opined 
that proper implementation of the concept would require supranationalism.431 German 
State Secretary at the Foreign Office Walter Hallstein echoed these sentiments, 
presenting the choice in stark terms: “integration, or disintegration,” but advocated the 
expansion of the ECSC, as opposed to the creation of new executive organs.  
By contrast, the French representative at the time, Antoine Pinay, agreed in 
principle but echoed a concern raised by others: that another failure would be 
catastrophic for the European project. He was under explicit instruction to “go ahead 
along the Euratom road, but not along the road to an Economic Community, which is 
quite impossible at the present time.”432 Pinay erred on the side of caution on the 
institutional question, and advocated integration by smaller sectors if it could get the 
ball rolling more quickly (rather divorced from the broad scope of the economic 
proposal, which would target a vast range of goods and services). He also argued for 
leaving the door open to Great Britain, which would require building new institutions 
outside of the ECSC, a challenge to the coherence of the supranational community. He 
felt the countercurrents among some of his colleagues, however, who saw more or less 
eye-to eye on the institutional question, and soon sought to recast his comments: far 
from being obstructionist, he would insist, he was merely trying to be expedient.433  
The biggest cleavage in the early stage of the Messina project was between the 
Benelux-Italian and Franco-German positions: both Pinay and Hallstein were resistant 
to a push towards supranational institutions; Pinay the more so.434 Spaak clashed with 
Pinay in the early evening of June 2nd, charging that the Franco-German proposal 
essentially froze any forward movement until a series of preliminary studies had been 
carried out as to the feasibility of various measures. Pinay shot back that one could not 
simply leap blindfolded into the unknown, and that in-depth studies had to be carried 
out. Hallstein concurred, explaining that while Germany was not opposed to 
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supranational institutions, at present it would be preferable to launch the process via a 
consultative body.435 Supranationality in the common market faced an uphill battle. 
 
The Messina conference concluded on 3 June, 1955, with four separate 
committees working on treaties covering atomic energy, conventional energy, transport, 
and a common market, still with the understanding that the atomic energy component 
would adopt a supranational executive. Spaak was elected to oversee the work of these 
committees. It was also determined that the institutional question, political as it was, 
should be left up Spaak’s supervisory committee, with the more technical details left to 
the subcommittees. In practice, Spaak provided the leadership. From the outset, when 
the institutional question was raised by the Euratom drafting committee, Spaak had 
made it clear that they should operate under the assumption of a structure almost 
identical to that of the ECSC: an executive Commission, a Council of Ministers, an 
Assembly, and an arbitration branch. By the end of January, 1956, it was proposed that 
the Assembly and the arbitration branch could be held in common with the ECSC. 
Within ten weeks, the work slated for the atomic energy’s technical committee 
was complete, their next task being the executive organ and its specific purview. Spaak 
encouraged the committee to address transnational issues involved in Euratom, to wit: 
common market measures for the goods, investments and labor involved in the atomic 
field, measures which didn’t technically fall under the purview of the atomic energy 
committee. By November, they officially advocated giving the atomic energy agency 
“power to create the common market [for nuclear research, material and manpower], 
including the authority to determine measures to be taken between members of the 
community and between those members and other countries.”436 Confirming the 
concerns of many, including Antoine Pinay, British representative Russell Bretherton 
commented that the measures elaborated by the Atomic committee were so broadly 
supranational that Britain would be unlikely to join.437 By the end of the month, the 
atomic energy working group formally proposed that a Nuclear Common Market be 
implemented independently, and that the structural details be forwarded to the 
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Common Market working group. Pinay resisted, submitting a note with France’s 
reservations.438 
The inauguration of the Mollet government in late January, 1956, was a critical 
development. (Mollet was at that time also president of SMUSE’s French section439). His 
personal leanings, beyond the positions he adopted as head of the SFIO, were towards 
more supranational integration, though he necessarily remained sensitive to public 
opinion and the necessity of political compromise. The conservative and pragmatic 
Antoine Pinay left the foreign ministry that month, replaced by avowed integrationist 
Christian Pineau, then vice-president of the SMUSE’s French section. Pineau and Spaak 
were “old friends”440 who had known each other since at least 1942441 and had crossed 
paths frequently in the context of the SMUSE in recent years. They reportedly spent 
hours poring over various aspect of the Messina project, and ate dinner tête-à-tête on 
the eve of the Conference of Rome, notably going over aspects of Spaak’s speech.442 
Maurice Faure (not to be confused with outgoing president Edgar Faure), appointed 
Secrétaire d’Etat443 in the Foreign ministry, was also a SMUSEr. He would work closely 
with Pineau, notably taking an outsize role in the European department at a time when 
the Suez crisis, the Hungarian uprising and the Algerian independence struggle often 
monopolized the Foreign Minister’s attention. Craig Parsons and Hans-Jurgen Küsters 
have both ascribed major credit to this new team in terms of making Rome a reality, 
though without drawing the institutional connection between them, or indeed between 
them and Spaak444 (in their defense, while Spaak drew special attention the same three 
as “committed Europeanists,” he did not mention the movement either445).  
The Mollet cabinet had three other SMUSErs in relevant positions: Gaston 
Defferre headed the Overseas (or TOM) Ministry; Albert Gazier was in charge of Social 
Affairs; and finally, Gerard Jaquet, future president of the Movement, was Information 
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Minister, perhaps complementing his role as Managing Director of GE, which ran pieces 
on the EEC and Euratom virtually every month. The Mollet cabinet marked a 
consequential shift in the balance of opinions over Messina. Whereas in June and 
September, Benelux and, to a lesser extent, Italy, had faced off against a strong Franco-
German front, the next Six Ministers meeting saw the emergence of a distinctly pro-
supranational consensus.  
But France’s recent history could not be ignored, notwithstanding this stacking of 
the deck, and the UK was seeing a wave of anti-European sentiment. Spaak was careful 
to manage the political optics. In February, 1956, he called a meeting to discuss the 
workings of his committee so far, and let it be known to French Ambassador Rivière that 
there would be mention of linking the EEC to Euratom, which was delicate since it would 
raise the specter of a supranational executive for the EEC. Rivière passed this along to 
Pineau under the heading “Secret,” noting that in light of the situation, Spaak would 
avoid putting anything in writing that weekend.446 Pineau’s opening statement to the 
assembled ministers, meanwhile was positive but also somewhat hedged: to avoid a 
repeat of 1954, he argued, it was crucial to manage public opinion; there would have to 
be some “préparations psychologiques” and opinion polling in France before things got 
too far down the line (Gauche Européenne’s January issue had included four pro-EEC 
articles, notably by Pineau staffer Robert Marjolin and Monnet collaborator Etienne 
Hirsh447). He reassured his colleagues, however, that the current administration was 
behind the project, citing Prime Minister Mollet’s call for a Euratom treaty as soon as 
that summer.448 
One of the perennial issues of the construction of Europe – voting rules in the 
Council of Ministers – would remain vague. The precise wording of the final document is 
as follows:  
“Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, the Council shall act by a majority of its 
members.”449  
This is something of a compromise, but it does emphasize that majority voting is 
the default option, and it establishes that the decisions of the Communities’ legislative 
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branch should be superior to the prerogatives of its constituent nations. This, concretely, 
is the difference between an intergovernmental and a supranational organization. It falls 
short of what the SMUSE would have wanted: the Assembly (or Parliament) was not the 
central decision-making organ, and the possibility of unanimous voting conserved the 
potential for member states to block any given measure. On the first point, the SMUSE 
had not finished working towards a vested Parliament; on the second, it was perhaps 
simply too much to expect that national governments of the day would not seek to hedge 
against a runaway Commission or a self-granted expansion of the Community’s 
mandate.  
Spaak’s management of the rather opaque and highly technical negotiations 
launched at Messina also let him camouflage one of the more technical issues of the 
Messina treaties: the institutional link between EEC and Euratom, and in particular the 
supranational nature of the executive organ. As noted, such supranationality was a hard 
pill to swallow for many on the Continent, and even more so for the UK, but remained, to 
the SMUSE and others, the sine qua non of a viable Europe. Spaak’s workaround had 
been to propose that the Euratom committee create its own limited “atomic” common 
market, and to forward the details to the Common Market committee.450 This would 
establish ECSC-style supranational administration at least for Euratom without explicitly 
granting the same executive to the Common Market. The end goal, however, was to do 
just that. On this point, there was almost certainly some coordination between the 
SMUSE and the Spaak committee.  
In March, 1956, Spaak reasoned that perhaps one could leverage the enthusiasm 
towards Euratom by making Euratom membership contingent on accepting a 
supranational EEC.451 André Philip, who had no involvement in the Mollet government 
or the Messina project, had proposed making EEC membership dependent on Euratom 
at a SMUSE National Committee meeting in late February.452 Philip pointed out the 
strong support for Euratom, and suggested that SMUSE should campaign to make 
Euratom contingent to some degree on the Common Market.  Almost simultaneously, as 
the Common Assembly met to endorse the Messina project, Fernand Dehousse, not 
involved in the Messina negotiations either, also floated the notion of linking Euratom 
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and EEC in order to increase the latter’s chances of success.453 The Belgian Senator was a 
long-standing contributor to the SMUSE, member of the Consultative Assembly and 
future president of the Council of Europe, and one of the leading Belgians of the 
SMUSE.454 It seems more than coincidental that the idea was raised almost 
simultaneously by Philip in Paris, Dehousse in Strasbourg, and Spaak at the negotiations 
in Val Duchesse, Belgium. The SMUSE was fundamentally a forum for coordinating 
strategy in different decision-making centers of Europe: Philip had managed a multi-
pronged approach to the EDC, and Spaak had attempted to rally SMUSE forces behind 
the ECSC in 1952.455 This new effort linking Euratom to the Common Market has been 
characterized, notably by Hanns Jürgen Küsters, as crucial to the success of the 
negotiations.456  
The remaining option would be to hold the Euratom executive in reserve on the 
assumption that the EEC committee would not be able to complete its work in time. 
They held institutional questions to a low profile throughout. Spaak was Belgian Foreign 
Minister, Pineau was French Foreign Minister, Dehousse was a senator and Philip was 
an influential member of the SFIO, but they did not interact in their official capacities: 
while all of them were in agreement on the strategic approach, Spaak could argue 
through the end of 1956, truthfully, that none of the Six governments ever intended 
(“prétendu”) to link the EEC and Euratom, and the elaboration of the treaties was 
progressing in parallel.457 His speech makes no mention of the Executive branch. Pineau 
likewise reassured the Senate in October that the door remained open to enlargement (a 
reference to British participation) and that there was no talk of a political authority, 
which was something of a dodge since they did envisage giving supranational political 
power to the executive branch.458 
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In early 1956, while the institutional question had still to be laid down in print, 
the Spaak Committee’s work was reviewed by the ECSC Council of Ministers in order to 
approve the structural changes implied by the Messina project. The Council of Ministers 
still operated on the basis of unanimity, giving each member an effective veto. France’s 
stated positions and its desire to integrate its overseas territories made it the hardest to 
win over. The previous administration, and indeed Mollet himself at one time, had been 
somewhat Anglophile and resistant to the supranational question; and Pinay had urged 
Spaak to hold off on anything to do with worker movement that might apply to colonial 
subjects.  The new administration was only 6 weeks old at the time of the meeting, 
operating in the highly treacherous political climate of the 4th Republic. There were also 
the altogether more tangible corollaries of France’s colonial holdings. Like most colonial 
powers, preferential trade agreements and purchase guarantees underpinned an 
important slice of the French economy: a common market seeking a homogeneity of 
resource access could wreak havoc. Also like other colonial powers, France had 
promised that colonial subjects would eventually benefit from the mother country’s 
tutelage, notably through access to education and employment opportunities, and the 
free movement of workers in various fields was integral to the viability of both Euratom 
and the Common Market. Algeria was experiencing a protracted independence 
movement just then, and while the French state was anxious to placate Algerians – it did 
not want to lose the colony altogether, having already lost Indochina and feeling Arab-
Nationalist pressure on French interests in the Middle East – it did not want to 
incentivize even larger numbers of French Algerians to migrate into Europe. None of this 
was lost on Spaak: Belgium has analogous issues with respect to the Belgian Congo. 
Aside from the population, Congo’s uranium would be contentious in the context of 
Euratom, though by and large, the Congo was so thoroughly subjugated that it was 
considered very unlikely that it would engender the kind of difficulties then on full 
display in French Algeria.459 
The Mollet administration coordinated with Spaak to paper over that difficulty, 
even if the issue did not disappear altogether. In his early report that February, Spaak 
had decided to avoid any reference to the French Territoires d’Outre-Mer (TOM) at all, 
and had separately assured Pineau privately that the committee did not intend to make 
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any specific prescriptions in that area.460 Meanwhile, Mollet instructed Pineau to accept 
Spaak’s February report, while only raising orally the possibility that some provisions 
may have to be rolled back because of the TOM.  
The Spaak Committee’s report was published in April, and a month later a 
conference took place in Venice to mark its enactment. One of the three main points of 
contention at Venice would in fact be the French “Overseas” question. It had been a 
perennial issue in the context of economic integration since at least 1954. One 
advantage of including the colonies in the Common Market was that investment funds 
might be spent on African infrastructure, improving prospects for French exports461 
(Belgium had analogous interests in the Congo); another is that it would avoid an 
economic reckoning from having to finally apply OEEC trade liberalization rules to its 
colonial arrangements.462 The ongoing Algerian independence movement might also be 
resolved by skipping the issue of independence altogether and moving towards an 
interdependent structure.463 The issue was so contentious that Spaak had tried to avoid 
discussing it altogether, meeting privately with SMUSEr Gaston Defferre of the Overseas 
Ministry the week before, to confirm that they would avoid the question.464 The issue 
was unavoidable for the French, but in the interest of avoiding a deadlock, Mollet 
brought it up in very broad terms to the effect that France reserved the desire eventually 
to integrate the TOMs; Pineau similarly glossed over the specifics. The issue would 
remain a significant obstacle, with Luxembourg, Italy and Germany notably reticent to 
contribute to the proposed overseas investment fund. The issue was not directly 
addressed until the final meeting of the heads of government in February, 1957, when 
Spaak formulated a compromise bridging the gap between the French proposal and the 
reservations of the others.465 
 
By the time the Spaak Committee’s report was published in April 1956, the new 
French government’s more forthcoming orientation allowed the acknowledgement of a 
link between the two projects. In a section titled “the Common Market of nuclear 
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Energy,” Spaak explained that Euratom had to be developed in all haste, and that by all 
means it had to avoid being built within or around the existing national structures. Nor 
could the free movement of goods, finance and people involved in the Atomic industry 
wait for the elaboration of the more complex Common Market. Euratom would therefore 
have to anticipate the creation of this limited common market for technicians and 
nuclear material, and, he closed, some cooperation would necessarily exist between the 
two drafting commissions.466 Spaak’s use of the term “cooperation” is ambiguous, and is 
not a public acknowledgement that the two treaties would have any formal 
interconnection or that they would share an executive, but it signals that 
supranationality was no longer the obstacle it had been with the Edgar Faure 
government. An immediate consequence of this approach from the French strategic 
perspective was to place Euratom in a position to guide the EEC by default in the context 
of its executive. 
The April report was validated in Venice the following month. In his opening 
remarks, Pineau proposed to restructure the four existing committees so that the work 
might be done by a single organism, split into two branches. He further proposed that 
Spaak lead said organism. Walter Hallstein, speaking immediately afterwards, endorsed 
the two-branch structure and Spaak’s leadership. Though neither Italy, Luxembourg or 
the Netherlands had made any comment to that effect, Spaak concluded that the 
ministers were in agreement on the single committee format. The so-called “action 
d’urgence” sectors (transport, labor, etc. as per Messina) were to be subsumed to the 
Common Market branch, streamlining the overall process but complicating the work of 
the EEC committee (perhaps coincidentally furthering Euratom’s strategic advantage).  
As it happened, Spaak’s Comité Directeur devoted the bulk of its attention to the 
Common Market treaty over the next nine months. Only halfway through the overall 
process, the Euratom committee was drafting market measures, and reasserted that it 
was anticipating a limited common market that would have to be applied immediately. 
By January 27th 1957, the Euratom treaty was entirely finalized, including its branches 
and powers.467  The Common Market committee, however, grappled into February over 
external tariffs, agricultural provisions, participation in the development fund, 
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transportation issues, the passage from the first to the second phase of the Common 
Market program, and still latently the inclusion of the TOM.468 Ultimately, with the 
deadline looming, the Common Market commission had few options but to adopt the 
administrative framework produced separately by the Euratom committee. In the last 
week of February, Spaak felt confident enough to announce publicly that there would 
indeed be a Common Market. A week later, a meeting of the Commission on Euratom 
and the Common Market was held at the SMUSE’s Brussels office. Light refreshments 
were served.469 
One final catastrophe was averted with the cooperation of the three French 
SMUSErs involved in the negotiations. In early March, the King of the Belgians, and 
consequently Belgian Prime Minister Van Acker, threatened to reject the final Common 
Market treaty. The opposition press had mounted an attack on Spaak and the Messina 
project, arguing that Belgium stood to lose out disproportionately, but the specific issue 
for the King was a series of disadvantageous tariffs demanded by the French. Mere days 
before the signing ceremony, Guy Mollet, François Pineau and Maurice Faure arrived in 
Brussels to hammer out the necessary concessions.470 
The result of linking, then uniting, the Common Market and Euratom processes, 
had been to give serious advantages to the Euratom part of the equation, since the 
Common Market committee was an unwieldy grouping of what had originally been three 
sub-committees, addressing a wide range of technical issues. Meanwhile, Euratom was 
fairly streamlined and politically less contentious, and putting the unimaginable power 
of the atom under supranational control was publicly palatable. Spaak carried Euratom’s 
supranational dimension over from the ECSC, and positioned it to be applied to the EEC 
as well. Pineau, years later, would describe Euratom as “a smokescreen for the Common 
Market,” and give Spaak special credit for working so accommodatingly with the French 
government.471 
Though the SMUSE’s modest but significant contributions to the Treaties of Rome 
have gone entirely unrecognized in the historiography on the subject, it was certainly 
celebrated within the group itself.  Gironella wrote an elated editorial for the front page 
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of the French section’s newsletter in April 1957, in the wake of the Rome Treaties’ 
signature, citing a litany of SMUSErs involved in the project. Spaak, Co-President and 
head of SMUSE’s international committee, got top billing, with Maurice Faure in second 
place along with a handful of current and former SMUSErs in technical committees; 
finally came Pineau and Mollet, both members of the French section’s Comité Directeur. 
During the Treaties’ ratification phase, a grass-roots campaign accompanied the French 
section’s endorsement of the Rome project.472 Several dozen conferences, meetings and 
rallies were held throughout France in 1957. Weekly meetings were held in Paris on 
technical issues, and there was mobilization among local leaders and militants in the 
surrounding suburbs. The eventual passage of the Treaties of Rome marks the SMUSE’s 





While the SMUSE and its adherents had very directly supported the project, there 
is a pertinent question about just how much Rome can be considered a victory for the 
SMUSE. Talbot Imlay, notably, has summarized European Socialists in general as having 
to “persuade themselves”473 that Rome was compatible with their goals. The treaties fell 
short of the more  orthodox socialist objectives, but they fulfilled more broadly 
federalist ones, so the answer with respect to the SMUSE depends on both to what 
extent there really were “socialist” objectives on the European level, and where the 
Movement was situated on the socialist-federalist spectrum. 
Imlay’s review of Socialism after the war, focused closely on the SPD, the SFIO, 
and Labour, identifies three sequential sources of major cleavage between the European 
parties: the IAR, the European Movement, and the Schuman Plan. While none of the 
parties went so far as to reject internationalism in general, the SPD balked on grounds of 
equality and Labour refused to give up sovereignty. He also delves into the intra-party 
disagreements between Keep Left, the Europe Group and Labour or between Pivert, 
Philip and Mollet. A conclusion of these observations must be that there was little in the 
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way of a comprehensive, unified socialist vision against which to weigh Rome, a point 
certainly borne out by the present examination and which the SMUSE was attempting to 
rectify. Imlay’s central argument with respect to the Treaties of Rome is that it fell short 
of what individual leading European Socialists (notably André Philip) really wanted, to 
the extent that it focused on a customs union rather than the application of a pan-
European socialist policies. The Treaties, he shows were only tentatively endorsed by 
the mainstream Socialist parties, with public statements which framed the treaties as 
steps in the right direction while masking deep reservations.474  
Philip’s reticence towards the terms of the EEC treaty has important implications 
for us, because based on Philip’s leading position in the SMUSE, it could follow that the 
Movement itself was ambivalent towards the EEC. It should be borne in mind that while 
Philip was certainly high-minded and principled, the SMUSE has adopted increasingly 
adaptable policies since his arrival, at the expense of the left-leaning Socialism, and that 
the SMUSE was more than just André Philip. The decision to work with other parties 
had, to some extent turned the SMUSE into a federalist party led by Socialists, which had 
thrown its weight behind a functionalist expansion of Europe despite the reservations of 
some of its members (Gironella grumbled consistently about the tradeoffs of joining 
forces with other movements, and the Brits more or less quit). By that token, the leading 
activist of the Movement in this period became Spaak, insofar as he was best-placed to 
enact its objectives. Nor had Philip been among the primary agents of the SMUSE’s 
efforts during the Messina Project; and it might be argued that he had outlived his 
usefulness when he burned his bridges to the SFIO by publishing “Le Socialisme 
Trahi.”475 The book denounced the fragmentation and lack of discipline in the party, 
which had cost it the EDC, and the mollification (perhaps Molletfication476) of a once-
principled party now guided more by politics than orthodoxy. In other words, Philip was 
no longer the embodiment of the movement’s ideology or strategy, and he no longer 
spoke for the Movement as he had in the first few years of his presidency. The 
Movement’s specific goals at the time, against which success should be measured, were 
for discrete institutions to have supranational executive powers accountable to a 
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democratically-elected, legislative parliament, and for the eventual creation of a single 
political authority. In other words, the degree to which the SMUSE’s objectives were 
mitigated had more to do with the institutional shortcomings of the EEC (its limited 
supranationality and consultative parliament) rather than its lack of a Socialist policy.  
In context, the application of supranational authority to the EEC, though it 
resulted from a successful coordinated effort and overcame widespread and long-
standing resistance, can be characterized as limited, but it should be remembered that 
the EEC was a stepping stone, not an end in itself. The SMUSE engaged on this 
functionalist trajectory purposefully and with a long-term plan, if perhaps not a fully-
articulated strategy, to build further on each institution. As we shall see, SMUSErs 
continued to work towards these objectives, notably in recommending direct elections 
to the European Parliament, and participating in the elaboration of the Merger Treaty 
which fused the three Communities in 1965. Another result of the Movement’s efforts 
was to push the EEC towards a sort of hybrid position on the spectrum between true 
supranationalism and strict intergovernmentalism, producing an institution that would 
draw positive engagement from actors across that spectrum. 
 
If the EEC was a step in the right direction, the Movement feared that absent a 
comprehensive supranational social policy and the means to enact it, the coordination of 
the European economy would be left, by default to (capitalist) transnational 
corporations. The Movement’s strategy to counterbalance these forces had been the 
creation of a European Socialist platform, but as we have seen, it was not to be. In May, 
1958, the primary forum for creating this consensus – Gauche Européenne – ended its 
run. There had been little to write about since Rome and the continuing coverage of 
European nations and general issues attracted neither consensus nor the kind of general 
interest that would keep the magazine afloat. Having failed to produce the foundations 
of a European socialist political force, the Movement shifted gears in the closing months 
of 1958. 
In November, word came from the General Secretariat that the most important 
issue for Europe now was the promotion of the agency and responsibilities of the labor 
force, and that the mobilization of those forces behind a common program was “the 
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essential task of the moment.”477 The SMUSE would embark on the creation of a 
European Workers’ Movement (Mouvement Européen du Travail, or MET). Its goal was 
to create collective bargaining capacity at the scale of the Six, which would empower the 
European workforce to participate in the development of new structures under the 
Rome statutes, and to engage with the multinational corporations that the Movement 
feared were fast becoming the primary agents of that development.478 A “’Europe of the 
Cartels” was the new enemy.479 
With a view to establishing this super-union and its program, the SMUSE 
arranged a Congrès Européen du Travail (CET). It met over three days in May, 1959, at 
the Palais d’Orsay in central Paris, adjacent to a certain repurposed railway station 
where, almost exactly a year before, General De Gaulle had announced his return to 
power.480 The conference was attended by a little over 130 individuals from the Six 
nations, representing some 20 political parties and labor unions.481 Mario Zagari, head 
of the Italian section, mobilized a coalition of five Italian parties. The spectrum ran from 
Republicans, represented by Ugo La Malfa, to the Radicals, and included the PSI. Zagari 
hoped to offer some common purpose to the Italian Center-Left, indeed he was 
optimistic that the SMUSE could offer some common labor-rights program to Europe as 
a whole.482 The French section had the strongest showing: over a dozen labor leaders 
and respectable delegations from the MRP, SFIO, and Mitterrand’s UDSR. Belgium 
brought a healthy contingent of cadres from the workers’ union, half a dozen high-
ranking members of the PSB, and several academic and student groups.  
While these larger contingents were cause for some optimism, it was 
immediately apparent that even within the Six, interest in the sort of transnational 
grass-roots cooperation envisaged by the SMUSE was not universal. Seven delegates 
represented the German bureau of the SMUSE, second only to France’s delegation, but 
the only representative of German labor was a single member of German metallurgical 
union, in an observer capacity. Luxembourg brought modest delegations from the CGT 
and the Socialist Workers’ Party, and the Dutch delegation consisted of a single member 
of the Dutch Workers’ Party. 
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André Philip put things bluntly in his opening speech: “The political struggle 
between the capitalist, conservative and liberal Right, and the Left representing 
workers, farmers, technicians and consumers, has begun.”483 That struggle was being 
undertaken at the national level: it was good but insufficient, in his view. Here was an 
opportunity to coordinate, to show solidarity, to work together across national lines in 
the great tradition of workers’ parties. And while they questioned and quibbled, he 
intoned, capitalism was getting organized; and where they could potentially drive the 
policies of progress and quality of life on behalf of all, capitalism was hard at work 
driving policies of prices and wages at their expense. At stake, he warned, was the fate of 
democracy itself. The grandes lignes of this speech, and the accusatory attitude towards 
capitalism and nationalism, were vintage Philip. It resonated well with the working-class 
base, indeed his approach was rather more appropriate in this context than it had been 
among the necessarily more pragmatic (perhaps implicitly culpable) audiences of a 
campaign at the national-government level. Other speakers were more moderated: 
Etienne Hirsch, president of the EURATOM Commission quibbled with Philip’s 
assessment of a slowdown at the ECSC, and Robert Marjolin, MRP SMUSEr and Vice-
President of the EEC, cautioned against painting corporations with too broad a brush, 
urging a more nuanced approach. 
 
The Movement was seeking to refocus on what amounted to a socialist workers’ 
international, but a perennial issue also resurfaced. Somewhat incongruously, Sunday’s 
debate included the issue of Europe’s responsibilities towards the developing world, 
particularly Africa. The discussion was launched by Christian Pineau, still one of the 
highest-ranking members of the French contingent, who had, until a few days earlier, 
been Foreign Minister. Framing the project as a guarantor of global peace through 
equality, Pineau argued for a coordinated approach to helping the developing world and 
reprised a tenet of the 1956 economic program, suggesting that countries donate some 
percentage of their GDP to developing their colonies. 
Notwithstanding the noble intentions, policy guidance such as Pineau envisaged 
would not be carried out by a workers’ movement, or at least not one focused on a 
coordinated campaign of engagement with multinational corporations. Logistically, the 
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SMUSE was envisaging two very different, though not mutually exclusive, campaigns: 
one at the organized-labor level designed to shape economic relations with both the Six 
and the large industrial interests, and one at the executive level designed to shape a 
common colonial policy. The career trajectories of leading SMUSErs would be relevant: 
the higher-profile political members of the Movement were far more suited to the 
political project than to brokering ties between organized labor and private 
multinationals.  
The CET’s final resolutions reflected this duality. The principal Plan of Action 
enjoined labor groups to: a) develop a common approach to social issues; b) elaborate 
and present common plans to help create continental conventions collectives;484 c) push 
to expand the public sector; d) elaborate job training and job creation programs; and e) 
develop links to consumer organizations to protect consumer rights. Below that was a 
policy statement on underdeveloped countries: European nations should devote 2% of 
their GDP to the developing world, and the Six should extend bloc-wide trade deals.  
Modalities for enacting the labor program underscored the size of the task: the 
network required simply did not exist. First, they would have to establish formal 
contacts with enough unions and labor groups; this network would then have to develop 
common transnational political, economic and social action plans; then create new 
national committees to lobby and coordinate at the national level… and only then could 
they claim to have created a new European Workers’ Movement. The SMUSE’s skill set 
and communications network, as elaborated over the past 12 years, were not suited to 
the task it now set itself. The Movement had carried out grass-roots campaigns, but they 
largely consisted of speaking tours by known personalities and rarely acted in concert 
with labor – few major unions participated in the SMUSE with any regularity.  
The Movement’s primary actors had been politicians and academics, and their 
fora of action were the new transnational institutions: the ECSC High Authority, the 
Consultative Assembly, the Council of Europe, the EEC and the European Movement. 
Tellingly, modalities for the Colonial program were not articulated at all; the machinery 
had worked well recently, and it was perhaps assumed that the political caste that had 
exercised power in the 1950s would continue to do so in the 60s. In France, at least, this 
would not be the case: with de Gaulle in power, neither Pineau, Faure nor Philip would 
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serve again in government, nor would the remaining Europeanists have much clout. 
Spaak, meanwhile, was occupied as General Secretary of NATO and chairman of the 
Atlantic Council through 1961. He also feuded openly with De Gaulle, a far cry from the 
collegial Mollet-era atmosphere that had been successful in negotiating the Treaties of 
Rome, and which did little to alleviate the chilling effect that the general’s return to 
power had on European cooperation. The European Movement, meanwhile, was barely 
functioning either by early 1960: there was little cash, the treasurer had resigned, and 
the executive committee had not met in two years.485 
In the end, the MET would come to little. Rifflet, in charge of the January, 1960 
conference, had to reduce his budget significantly. He also faced reticence and 
conservatism, particularly among the same Dutch and German unions who had shown 
so poorly at the CET, and found that in general the European Left was not the motivating 
idea it had once been.486 The result was an underwhelming 36 attendees, and an 
admission by Philip (presiding) that there did not yet exist anything like the structured 
and disciplined workers’ movement the SMUSE had hoped to create.487 A further 
conference in April, addressing a common agricultural policy, did somewhat better but 
still did not live up to expectations. Compounding the generally anemic state of the 
Europeanist institutions as a whole, the reduced power of the socialist establishments 
backing the MET, and a general conservatism within European labor unions, were the 
significant changes brought to the labor landscape by the implementation of the 
Common Market and the increasing engagement of transnational companies; it was not 
unreasonable to ask how a loose coalition of European minority parties proposed to 
harness European labor and meaningfully engage with foreign corporate 
superstructures. 
There is an irony in this last, unsuccessful SMUSE campaign. The Movement had, 
at least rhetorically, always had a focus on the plight of European workers; resolutions 
called repeatedly for the inclusion of labor unions in European policy, for concrete 
policies targeting the ability of the working class to travel and work freely, and for the 
spoils of economic growth to be passed on to workers. In 1951, Gironella had even 
attempted to rally Spaak, Finet and Dehousse for a workers’ union to operate within the 
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ECSC.488 And yet, in choosing to pursue their objectives at the national and transnational 
level, they had failed to develop a working relationship with the groups they sought to 
help. By the time they tried to help those groups help themselves, they found they had 
virtually no connection to them.  
 
Accompanying the radically different political situation, economic hardship had 
also followed the Treaties of Rome. GE had been forced to cease publication in May, 
1958. By January, 1959, the SMUSE had seen a two-thirds reduction in the number of 
dues-paying members.489 There are two possible explanations: a) that members 
considered Rome a deal-breaking failure, or b) that on the contrary the perception was 
that the mission was accomplished and there was little more to be done. Considering 
that membership had not been markedly affected by the failure of the EDC, and that the 
SMUSE appealed to a wide political spectrum with a relatively simple common 
denominator, the more likely answer is the second. In either case, on December 15th of 
that year, Gironella wrote a fatalistic letter to Paul Finet, president of the High Authority 
of the ECSC. The SMUSE was in a desperate situation, Gironella wrote, “practically 
condemned to cease all activity.” Casting about for some driving purpose, he proposed 
that rather than dying an “ignominious death” the SMUSE’s structure and networks 
might serve very usefully as a sort of transnational campaign organism working to 
support the expansion of the ECSC’s mandate.490  
At their executive committee meeting later that week, Gironella presented his 
perception of the difficulties facing the SMUSE.491 First, he argued that Europeanist 
sentiment had cooled somewhat with a reduction of Cold War tensions (new Soviet 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev had launched a conciliatory “Peaceful Coexistence” policy in 
1956, and had recently undertaken a two-week visit to the US). Secondly, the Common 
Market had, perversely, allowed multinational corporations to participate actively, if not 
play a guiding role, in European integration; this reduced the government-centered 
SMUSE’s potency. He bemoaned the Gaullist-led Right/Conservative assault on 
European socialism, and finally noted that, now largely relegated to the political 
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opposition, socialist parties could effectively only be an obstructive force, and not a 
constructive one.  The movement was hemorrhaging members and funds and was 
having great difficulty getting the MET off the ground. 
External sources of funding were drying up too. The American Committee on 
United Europe, which had provided between half and two-thirds of the funding for the 
European Movement beginning in 1949,492 began to wind down their payments after 
Rome. Baron Boël resigned his position as treasurer of the European Movement at the 
beginning of 1960, shortly before the ACUE voted itself out of existence entirely, 
considering that further efforts would be justified only by a “serious reversal of present 
trends” towards integration.493  
Facing an existential crisis, the movement’s general organizational framework 
was assessed in a comprehensive survey by Gironella, who concluded in October, 1960, 
that it could not produce the Movement’s stated objectives.494 The autonomy of national 
sections had once served a useful purpose in pressuring national governments and in 
rallying a base of popular support for integration: the range of party affiliations within 
the Italian and French sections, for instance, corresponded to potent pluralities in the 
respective legislative branches. However, these pluralities came with complicated 
ideological baggage and realpolitik corollaries, which made it very hard to texture or 
streamline the Movement’s platform. Furthermore, in the current climate, these national 
parties were increasingly ineffective. In the case of France, “Gaullism” had relegated the 
Left to a minority, and while the French section could help effect a rapprochement of 
those forces, it could with difficulty elaborate a unified strategy or carry it through. 
Italian socialism was similarly fragmented, and the fragile center-left coalition of which 
Zagari was a member remained wary of influence of anti-European Communists on one 
end of the spectrum, and Christian-Democratic conservatism on the other. In Germany, 
the SMUSE’s fraught relationship with the SPD had thawed somewhat, but the SPD held 
the SMUSE at arms’ length: open affiliation to both was tolerated by the SPD on the 
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condition that participation be confined to the German-language organ Europa Brücke. 
Effective coordination of these small parties at the local level was difficult enough; trying 
to coordinate at a continental level, as the SMUSE aspired to, was nearly impossible. 
Benelux saw more Socialist agency, but were split on strategy: the Belgian section, 
headed as it was by government-level activists, pulled towards a more government-
centered approach, while Luxembourg and the Netherlands were more focused on the 
labor side of things.  
Defining and enacting a European Socialism, a long-time aspiration of the SMUSE, 
and the raison d’être of the Movement’s various publications, seemed a distant and 
receding prospect. In his October report, Gironella frankly called the notion of creating 
of a pan-European party “ridiculous” and proposed the creation of a “supranational 
Fabian Society” comprising a limited number of “real activists.”495 Concretely, this meant 
ending the Movement’s drive to recruit members, raise awareness, or foster a pan-
European dialogue. Instead, a “supranational” International Committee would pass its 
own resolutions, to be pursued by a small number of members within their own 
countries (this caused deep concern within the SFIO, due to its very close relationship to 
the Movement, which were not overcome until the following June after clarifying party-
members’ allegiance496). At the same time, it was decided to rename the Movement once 
again: it would thereafter be named “Mouvement Gauche Européenne” (MGE).497 The 
new objectives were lofty: this Movement would work towards a European Federation 
(anticipating a “Global Federation”) to which would be granted powers to safeguard the 
common interest of the citizens of Europe, and to manage a common economic, financial, 
and social policy, international trade, defense, foreign policy, and a European currency. 
MGE would specifically support socialist policies like economic planning, investment 
strategies, development of the public sector, the democratization of education and 
information, and the participation of labor in all economic and social areas. 
It’s worth pointing out again, as I did at the beginning of Chapter 3, the 
Movement’s continuity of purpose over the years. MGE’s objectives are strikingly similar 
to those originally established over a decade before by the MUSSE. Edwards and Ridley 
had launched their program with the prediction of an eventual United States of the 
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World;498 the 1947 resolution had called for a “planned economy […] carried out 
through the organic structure of a real social and economic democracy, based on 
workers' control.”499 The 1949 program described a European executive with powers 
over foreign policy and European defense, managing a single currency and mandated to 
plan the economy in the interests of the people of Europe,500 and Constant’s vision 
articulated in GE in 1953 was much the same. The creation of the MGE heralded a 
recognition that their strategy of pursuing these goals by raising public awareness and 
developing political coalitions at the national and supranational level, was, after over a 
decade, a failure. The objectives in question remained – if anything, they were more 
likely now than they had been in the late 1940s – but they would have to be pursued by 
a massively reduced network of political-class activists.  
The expectation that a skeleton crew of politicians could move the needle on the 
European project was not entirely hopeless, and one last achievement bears mention. 
One of the Movement’s central goals had always been a vested, directly-elected 
European Parliament, and it had, since 1949, called for activism within what was then 
the “Assemblée de Strasbourg.” Over the years, this assembly had evolved into what 
might be termed the lower chamber of the European Communities’ legislative branch, 
even if it was little more than consultative, largely appointed by national parliaments, 
and in a junior position to the upper-chamber Committee of Ministers (it was once 
memorably described as little more than a “multi-lingual talking shop”501). Of the several 
high-profile SMUSErs who gravitated to the European institutions (Spaak and Philip, 
Paul Finet, Mollet), six were appointed to the European Parliament including Zagari, 
Maurice Faure, Lucien Radoux, Fernand Dehousse, Pierre-Henri Teitgen and Marinus 
van de Goes van Naters.502 The latter three are credited as central agents in making the 
European Parliament a driver of European integration federal future,503 and none more 
so that Belgian senator Fernand Dehousse.  
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Dehousse first appears in SMUSE records in 1950, when he, Gironella and Rifflet 
exchanged a flurry of letters on the proposed structure of the ECSC.504 He went on to  
represent the SMUSE on the European Movement’s international committee from 1951, 
sat on GE’s editorial staff from 1953, and was described with Spaak as the most active 
and constructive Belgian in the SMUSE (he sat on Spaak’s EPA constitutional 
committee).505  Within the Movement, he might be described as a centrist: identifying as 
a “federalist,” he nonetheless considered the latter to include as tight a union as possible. 
He parses the varying uses of the term in a two-part “Elements of a theory of 
Federalism” published in GE in June and July of 1955, steeped in technicalities and 
historic examples. Surveilling the contemporary situation, particularly the degree to 
which domestic policy could be separated from foreign policy, he ultimately argued that 
what defined “proper” federalism was the “volume of regulation held by the central 
government.”506 With this argument, he essentially created a framework within which 
the more ardent democratic-centralists of the SMUSE could co-exist with the 
Movement’s federalist allies and members, and as such, came as close as anyone to 
reconciling the Movement’s internal Marx-Proudhon contradictions. 
His interest in the European Parliament specifically dated to at least 1954, when 
he had argued in GE that the term “parliament” for the ECSC Assembly was a misnomer 
insofar as the Assembly did not vote on laws and was not elected by popular mandate. 
He got the opportunity to address the problem when he became president of the 
European Parliament’s Working Group on European Elections in October 1958. The 
resulting recommendations called for several measures, including a larger set of 
members to properly represent all Europe’s regions, and direct elections. These would 
provide a “salutary shock” to the system and resolve the lingering supremacy of the 
intergovernmental Council of Ministers endowing Parliamentarians with the “legitimacy 
and strength” to make the Council accountable to the Parliament.507  The Dehousse 
Convention met objections during the subsequent debate, and direct opposition from de 
Gaulle,508 leading to its languishing for some 20 years, but the Convention eventually 
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achieved a result sought by the SMUSE since 1949, and might properly be counted 
among the Movement’s successes even if it was delayed, and even if it came at a moment 
when the Movement was unwinding appreciably.  
In the trying days of 1959, the Movement was seeing less and less activity; 
Dehousse’s work fell into a specialized area that would not have required SMUSE-wide 
coordination, and consistent coverage of which might only have appeared in the now-
defunct Gauche Européenne. The internal bulletin was small and consisted mainly of 
(generally negative) articles about the state of Europeanism. However, a few weeks after 
the conclusion of the Committee’s work, but before it was submitted, Dehousse 
presented his results to the SMUSE.509 The only major quibble was a recommendation 
that one third of the Assembly be elected by national legislatures, which was less than 
the direct democratic investiture the SMUSE had sought. The logic was that it would 
prevent the possibility of opposition developing between the Communities’ Parliament 
and the national legislatures; despite some initial discomfort, the SMUSE endorsed the 
report without qualification.  
 
Unfortunately, neither the Dehousse committee’s work nor the massive 
downsizing of the Movement were enough to save it. SMUSE financial records for 1961-
63 reveal a dire and worsening situation: expenses for conferences dropped from FF 
12,183 in 1961 to a mere FF 361 in 1962, to 0 the following year, and travel expenses 
shrank by 60%. Salaries, amounting to some FF 37,000 in 1962 dropped to 7,000 the 
following year (Gironella would work pro bono). ACUE funds were gone, income from 
membership dues hovered around 1000 Francs, and subsidies from the European 
Communities dropped from FF 17,000 to just over 3,000. And yet expenses in 1961 were 
more than triple their income. The movement stayed afloat in 1962 only by selling their 
offices at Rue de Lille (ironically doubling expenses on office space). Half of the sale 
price went to paying off debts. Outside of that sale, the Movement spent close to four 
times its income in 1962. In 1963, reducing the budget by almost 80% (from FF 50,000 
to FF 11,000), and more than halving their rental of office space, was not nearly enough 
compensate for an anemic projected income of 3,027 Francs. 
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By mid-1962, the Movement was referring to itself internally as a “club,”510 which 
had seen “reduced activity” for the past four years.511 In June, 1963, the international 
committee faced some hard realities, with Gironella characterizing the movement as 
being in a “near-vegetative state.”512 The options were unappealing: wholesale 
dissolution, a merger with the UEF, or working towards some kind of Europeanist 
electoral coalition in France. The meeting disbanded with no definitive answer. Finally, 
in May, 1964, Gironella called for another “reorganization commission:” he advised 
members of the MGE that he would be stepping down as General Secretary, after some 
18 years, and that Philip would relinquish the presidency.513 Details of that final meeting 
have not survived. The name Mouvement Gauche Européenne would live on in various 
forms (see epilogue), but without many of the men who had most centrally embodied 
the Movement over the years. Gironella, the last founding member of the Movement, and 
its last connection to the London Bureau, never again participated in the ad hoc, MGE-





It’s difficult to pinpoint exactly where things went wrong for the SMUSE. In a 
sense, it ultimately fell victim to the very nationalist structures that it once aimed to 
abolish. The Treaties of Rome had been both a blessing and a curse in that they created 
the central structures necessary to the logistical development of a supranational Europe, 
satisfying and vindicating the efforts of the movement thus far, but simultaneously made 
the movement, in its extant incarnation, anachronistic and directionless. Its focus on 
activism at the level of European governments had been necessary to obtain the creation 
of the skeletal supranational structure, but was ill-suited to the next steps in fostering 
democratic participation and harmonization. The SMUSE had defaulted to autonomy at 
the national level to best tailor methods and strategies to national circumstances, which 
had borne fruit by the intermediary of a few well-placed members and parties. The 
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decline in the role of the SFIO in the de Gaulle years, and Spaak’s appointment as General 
Secretary of NATO deprived the movement of the political agency it had once had. Its 
network of activists was reduced to a small number of people working in specialized 
institutions, each with a restricted purview; there were no high-placed political leaders, 
no major new European projects behind which to mobilize, no opportunities for 
generalized campaigns or even policy alignment.  
The Movement’s most significant assets also found themselves much reduced. 
The SFIO had been the national party with the closest and most fruitful ties to the 
SMUSE; in the de Gaulle era, the SFIO became far less effective. André Philip proved 
perhaps overly principled, clinging obstinately to his core values, arguing constantly 
with others in his own Movement, and unendingly critical of those who disagreed. 
Expelled from the SFIO in 1957, he would also leave the Parti Socialiste Unifié, which he 
helped found, over the Comité Directeur’s attitude towards Algeria.514 He also split from 
the European Movement because it had chosen, in his words, to erect hollow institutions 
rather than debate and develop sturdy and intentional ones.515 His credentials, 
philosophy and headstrong attitude had once galvanized an SMUSE looking for some 
sure-handed guidance in the late 1940s, but as the European project passed into the 
hands of a politically heterogeneous collection of parties and movements, Philip became 
a liability rather than an asset. This left Spaak, a committed Europeanist and a skilled 
negotiator and strategist. Spaak’s strength lay in the ability to navigate the political 
landscape which stymied Philip, but he could not be expected to work without allies – 
the Belgian Socialist Party, despite a lot of cross-membership with the SMUSE, did not 
have the kind of formal, symbiotic relationship that the SFIO had with the Movement. 
Individual leadership of the SMUSE shifted towards Belgium in this final period, but did 
not bring with it the political power that had accompanied the Movement’s relationship 
to the SFIO. Spaak’s appointment as NATO secretary in May, 1957, effectively 
decapitated the Movement. 
The Movement found itself increasingly impotent at the political level, and 
became financially insolvent as well, in the wake of the Treaties of Rome. The MET 
would have resolved this issue satisfactorily, creating a politically powerful working 
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class movement expected to generate enough interest and income to survive.516 And yet, 
for all its ideology, the SMUSE had never been a workers’ movement, and the dawning of 
the European Economic Community was too turbulent a time for it to become one.  
 
In its early years, the European Movement had found the group to be a useful 
source of information: inquiring about the reliability of Greek socialists, access to 
Eastern European politicians, or even, on behalf of the Council of Europe, a summary of 
potential partners among the Spanish parties working towards European unification; all 
the fruit of the movement’s early years when it had sent feelers out into the far reaches 
of Europe. Meanwhile, a respectable range of notable personalities were drawn to the 
Movement: not just high-profile persons of the moment like Mollet, Spaak or Spinelli, but 
lifelong Europeanists like Raymond Rifflet, François Mitterrand and Mario Zagari, whose 
public profiles would continue to rise after its initial dissolution. These high-profile, 
ambitious men saw a movement with strong personalities, fairly simple, broadly 
acceptable goals with respect to the European institutions, and the demonstrable 
potential to transcend their restrictive domestic political establishments.  
Internally, the movement was surprisingly cohesive, with very few defections 
over the years (the British Center being a notable exception); its objectives too had 
remarkable staying power, remaining largely identical over the movement’s last decade-
and-a-half. But fast-moving externalities, with which the movement had struggled since 
its inception, proved its undoing. The Movement’s strategic adaptability brought it as far 
as Rome, but they could not find a way to adapt to the combination of the EEC, the 
return of Gaullism, and economic ruin. Despite concerted and repeated efforts, the 
Movement ultimately foundered in the face of massive and simultaneous strategic, 
political and financial obstacles.  
 
 Yet, while the institutional identity of the Movement came to an end in 1964 with 
the departure of Gironella and the dissolution of the Secretariat, the Movement’s 
network did not. Building a better Europe remained a goal in the next decades, and the 
Movement’s various members continuously found ways to reactivate the network. It 
became fragmented, with records spread even more disparately than those of the 
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SMUSE, but a fair exploration of the movement requires a complete story. The 











There is a degree of arbitrariness in ending the SMUSE story with Gironella’s 
departure in 1964: On one hand, in an institutional sense, the movement was 
unrecognizable after becoming the “Mouvement Gauche Européenne” (MGE) in 1961; 
yet on the other, even after 1964, many of the people associated with the Movement 
beforehand remained so afterwards, most notably Gerard Jaquet of the SFIO, Raymond 
Rifflet of the PSB, and Mario Zagari of the PSDI.  
The time constraints of this project have prevented a thorough examination of 
the Movement over the three decades after 1964, and there are several avenues for 
further research which will be detailed in the conclusion, but some things are clear from 
a superficial review of the archival record. The first is that the movement never again 
saw the kind of regular institutional activity that had characterized its early period. 
Meetings were regular but less frequent, there little evidence of a discernible program, 
and there is nothing to suggest the kind of government-level coordination that the 
Movement was able to muster in the 1950s. A significant reason for this is the 
establishment and consolidation of coordination between the Socialist parties within the 
European Parliamentary Assembly (EP) - after all, coordination at the European Level 
had always been a primary goal of the SMUSE and the existence of a Socialist Group 
starting in 1952 overlapped somewhat with the SMUSE. The principal activities of the 
Movement in that early period were carried out at the national-executive level, but once 
the political climate at the executive level became resistant to Europe in the late 50s, the 
possibilities offered by the assemblies was comparatively more promising. The first part 
of this epilogue will trace direct contributions of SMUSE members in the context of the 
European Parliament. 
The second major takeaway is that while the Movement would never be as potent 
as in the 1950s, it still drew a broad adherence, and could complement the Socialist 
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Group in a few ways. The Socialist parties were already national parties, with the same 
kind of constraints that had made coordination in the SMUSE challenging; in addition, 
there had to be some coordination between the parties and the national governments as 
represented in the Council of Ministers. Many senior figures in the early Socialist Group 
continued to meet in the context of the MGE. The GE also notably organized a large 
conference in 1974 on the subject of electoral strategy for the upcoming direct elections 
to the European Parliament. As the Community dealt with enlargement, the Single 
European Act and the treaty of Maastricht, the MGE remained a source of support for 
Socialist priorities. There are few scoops, but an overview of the Movement’s later years 
remains warranted. 
This epilogue will consist of a series of vignettes highlighting the sporadic and 
comparatively superficial archival evidence of the Movement after 1964. Three phases 
can be identified: a brief, largely obscure period immediately after the initial dissolution 
of the MGE in 1964, in which the Movement was nominally headed by Labour MP Sir 
Geoffrey de Freitas. Within 5 years, Gérard Jaquet, longtime SMUSEr and member of the 
SFIO, took the reins, leading a movement closely linked to the new French Parti 
Socialiste. This period lasted into the mid 1980s. Finally, Belgian SMUSEr Raymond 
Rifflet assumed a leading role the Movement in the late 1980s. Rifflet, working as 
advisor to EU Commission President Jacques Delors, first used the network in support of 
the Single European Act, and thereafter held periodic lunches and maintained a 
newsletter with the remaining members. He became the Movement’s last known 
president in 1992, with a final newsletter dated December, 1993. 
 
 
The European Parliament 
 
There was an inherent difficulty in maintaining an SMUSE-style organization 
after the early 1960s.  In the latter years of the SMUSE, many of the Movement’s 
members had become members of the European Parliamentary Assembly. Simon Hix’s 
1995 essay on the Socialist Group provides a useful retrospective and helps situate the 
SMUSE/MGE therein.517 The history of socialist groupings within European 
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Community’s various assemblies dates back to the Common Assembly of the ECSC, when 
Guy Mollet was elected president of the coordination bureau for Socialist 
representatives from among the Six.518  
Socialist collaboration continued, but its early agency was complicated first by 
the EDC debacle, then the passage of the Treaties of Rome (which prompted the 
launching of an unwieldy collaboration between the existing liaison bureau, national 
delegates from Socialist parties of the Six, and members of the Socialist Group itself), and 
the recalcitrance of General de Gaulle.519 Nevertheless, a number of the Movement’s 
members gravitated towards the European Parliamentary Assembly and its sub-
committees in the late 50s and early 60s. Fernand Dehousse had headed the Political 
sub-committee’s work on elections to the European Parliament. SMUSErs Maurice Faure 
and Marinus van de Goes van Naters were also regular fixtures of the Political 
Committee through most of the 1960s, the latter spending eight years as vice-president. 
Belgian SMUSEr Lucien Radoux sat on the judicial committee as well as several 
economic ones.520 
In its early years (1952-1957), the European Assembly was new and untested, its 
purview restricted narrowly to coal and steel, and its role strictly consultative. Though it 
was natural for the various political persuasions represented in the Assembly to 
establish some formal contacts, they had very little prospective agency with respect to 
SMUSE objectives until the Treaty of Rome added the Common Market to their purview 
in 1958. SMUSErs Guy Mollet and Gerard Jaquet were two-thirds of the SFIO delegation 
to the ECSC assembly, and worked with a number of SPD delegates of higher rank than 
those associated with the SMUSE. However, the SMUSE in the mid-1950s pursued rather 
different outcomes. The Assembly-based relationship produced significant convergence 
on issues like increasing the power of the Assembly, or industrial workers’ housing.521 
The SMUSE, in the same period, was focused on details of the EDC, and, from 1955, on 
supporting and shaping the Messina project, both beyond the competence of the 
Assembly. In other words, there was very little overlap between the potential of the 
Socialist Group and the SMUSE during the first six years of the Assembly, and there is 
little in the SMUSE record to suggest that they put stock in its potential or sought formal 
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contacts with it. Things changed drastically in 1958, when the SMUSE’s loss of funding 
and government agency coincided with the expansion of the Assembly’s powers to 
encompass a much wider spectrum of the European economy. The European Assembly 
would now afford much more direct potential than the shrinking SMUSE, and members 
who had pursued shared objectives within essentially intergovernmental structures in 
the SMUSE now pursued the same within the Assembly.  
As noted in the previous chapter, Dehousse had produced the report 
recommending direct elections to the European Assembly (despite languishing for some 
15 years, it was eventually endorsed in 1974,522 and enacted 5 years later). In the early 
60s, a proposal had been made for the fusion of the Communities’ executive branches as 
well as a fusion of the three existing treaties. The former came to pass in the form of the 
Merger Treaty of 1965, following the recommendations of a Political Commission which 
included Faure, van Naters and Dehousse. The SMUSE had ceased to function as a forum 
of policy coordination by then, and the Merger Treaty was finalized during the De 
Freitas period. In retrospect, this treaty simultaneously validated the 1949 strategy of 
activism in through the European Assembly and cemented the obsolescence of the 
SMUSE itself. In fusing both the executive branches and the Council of Ministers of the 
three Communities, the Merger Treaty in fact created the political umbrella that the 
Movement had pursued since 1950. 
Not all these efforts were entirely successful, naturally: the corollary to the 
Merger Treaty – a treaty to fuse the three Community treaties themselves – encountered 
serious trouble as a result of the 1965 Empty Chair Crisis, when De Gaulle boycotted the 
council of ministers in order to solidify France’s autonomy and primacy within the 
communities. The result was to crater the political feasibility of the fusion treaty.523 
Shortly after the signature of the Merger Treaty, Dehousse prepared a report on behalf 
of the political committee laying out the process by which such a treaty might be 
prepared. He proposed a maximalist interpretation of the communities’ goals, to 
“increase and accelerate European Integration,” including in the political sphere. He 
proposed to include provisions for fiscal and monetary policy, as well as joint policies on 
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scientific research and technological progress.524 The proposed provisions of this fusion 
would eventually come to pass, but only some 25 years later. 
In 1969, De Gaulle’s resignation seemed to presage a renewal of the European 
project. On that occasion, onetime SMUSEr and then-head of the Socialist Liaison Bureau 
Lucien Radoux co-authored a proposal to create a more active Socialist dialogue by 
establishing a number of annual conferences. The notion saw some resistance (notably 
from the German SPD, who feared that it would impact the autonomy of national parties 
and potentially constrain their behavior in the Council of Ministers), but it did lay the 
groundwork for more frequent contacts between Socialist parties and the Socialist 
representatives in the European Parliament.525 These contacts were increasingly 
formalized in the early 1970s, until a report, again authored by Lucien Radoux, 
inaugurated the “Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community” 
(CSPEP). Robert Pontillon, newly of the MGE, represented the Parti Socialiste as one of 
the Conference’s Vice Presidents.526 The Confederation would spend the next four years 




 Even if the European Parliamentary Assembly was not a panacea for the Socialist 
vision, it nevertheless represented a concrete and productive inroad. It had contributed 
to the unwinding of the SMUSE in the late 1950s, and complicated the role of the MGE ’s 
new president, British Labour MP Geoffrey De Freitas, who took over in 1964. Curiously, 
De Freitas had never before been associated with the movement, or at least does not 
appear anywhere in the SMUSE records used in this project. It is difficult to trace any 
direct connection to the SMUSE, but he did work in the same circles as Philip and Spaak 
in the 1950s. While an MP for Lincoln, from 1950 to 1961, he had been member of the 
UK council of the European Movement, heading its European Youth Campaign until the 
latter was dissolved in mid-1959;527 additionally, he had been delegate to the Council of 
Europe from 1951 to 1954.528 In both cases he would likely have crossed paths with 
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André Philip, who was delegate to both organizations in the same period. He was also 
delegate to the NATO Parliamentarians’ conference from 1955 to 1959, a period which 
overlapped partially with Spaak’s time as General Secretary; he would later refer to 
Spaak as a “good friend.”529 
Between 1961 and 1964, as the MGE was sputtering to an end, de Freitas had 
served as British High Commissioner to Ghana, then Kenya. He returned to England in 
1964, having been invited by the Labour Party of Kettering to run in the forthcoming 
general election.530 The exact date of his return is not clear, but, he gave remarks at a 
luncheon for SMUSEr Altiero Spinelli, in late September, where he was listed on the 
program as “President of the Mouvement Gauche Européenne.”531  
The circumstances of his elevation to the Movement’s presidency are a mystery 
but a few clues point to why he might have been tapped. He identified as a Fabian,532 
was an experienced Labourite, and was by 1964 well qualified in African affairs. Those 
three characteristics would seem to recommend him for a role in reinvigorating the 
Movement: first, the cash-strapped MGE had recast itself as a “supranational Fabian 
Society;” second, the SMUSE had once had a fruitful relationship with Labour, and the 
latter’s recent renewed interest in Europe seemed to offer a chance at refreshing the 
relationship; and third, the Movement’s interest in Africa had returned to the fore in the 
early 1960s. On paper at least, de Freitas would appear a logical choice to rejuvenate the 
Movement. 
Sir Geoffrey’s records reveal exceedingly little: beyond confirmation of his title 
are only a few remarks. At Spinelli’s luncheon, he advocated the creation of a “European 
Social-Democratic Party,” which would “act for [national parties] in those areas which 
are of essentially international concern.” In another speech some four years later, at a 
conference on the UK’s relationship to the Common Market, he explained that MGE’s 
task “remains the same” as it always had been: “a full economic and political union 
responsive to the will of a directly-elected European parliament.” There is no record in 
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his papers of any positions or innovations beyond the foregoing formulations of the 
Movement’s general goals. Nor is there any correspondence with SMUSERs, any letters 
under MGE letterhead, or evidence of any conferences or meetings. It would appear then 
that his presidency was little more than a holding action, or at least that he was not 
particularly sanguine about the movement or its potential.  
There had continued to be an international secretariat, headed by Jacques Enock-
Levi, which held a “first meeting” of the “Bureau de la Gauche Européenne” in mid 1967. 
A year later saw an conference in London hosted by the Labour Committee for Europe, 
described as the Movement’s “British section,”533 which De Freitas chaired. The 
conference was opened by de Freitas and British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, and 
centered on conveying the support of both the Continental socialists and of Labour for a 
“European democratic and supranational community.” The prospect of the UK joining 
the EEC would be a central feature of the conference.534 This meeting, though nominally 
an “MGE conference” does not seem to have yielded (or have been designed to yield) a 
concrete policy or plan of action; as such, it was more a networking opportunity. A real 
international conference came together slowly, with exploratory correspondence 
beginning in November, 1970; the conference was pushed back at least three times 
before eventually taking place at the end of January, 1972. It was held in Paris, under the 
auspices of the Parti Socialiste (as PS Party Secretary, François Mitterrand hosted dinner 
on the first night), and notably attracted delegates from Norway, a first for the 
Movement. The conference topics are not clear from the MSEUE archives in Amsterdam, 
but speakers included De Freitas, Jaquet, Zagari, Spinelli, Rifflet and Labour MP Arthur 
Palmer.535  
A pivotal International Bureau conference was held at the luxurious St Ermin’s 
Hotel in London in early 1973,536 working on a policy towards the Third World, a 
European Socialist Industrial policy, and the role of Socialist parties more broadly in the 
construction of a democratic Europe. The conference also produced new statutes and 
yet another new name for the Movement. Henceforth, it would be known as the 
“Mouvement Socialiste Européen (Gauche Européenne)” (MSE-GE). It would have an 
International Executive comprised of a President and a General Secretary, and three Vice 
 
533 Conference schedule, may 24-25 1968, London. Amsterdam: IISG, MSEUE 47 
534 Conference schedule, may 24-25 1968, London. Amsterdam: IISG, MSEUE 47 
535 29-30 Jan 1972 Colloquium Schedule. Amsterdam: IISG MSEUE 48 
536 Jaquet to Salomon, 29 November, 1972. Paris: Fondation Jean Jaurès, Jaquet 1 RE 5 
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Presidents, and would meet five times per year. A new International Bureau would also 
be constituted and meet twice a year. This bureau would be charged broadly with 
defining the actions of the Movement as a whole and of holding Study Seminars on 
questions of contemporary interest. It also defined a system of membership dues, tiered 
according to the financial resources of each party. The French section was exempted on 
the grounds that the PS had been subsidizing the movement since 1969 to a tune in 
excess of the top-tier contribution (the British section received no such exemption). 
Finally, it was clarified that national sections would work autonomously within the 
scope of their respective national parties. 
Taken together, these new statutes constitute a return to the pre-1961 SMUSE 
model, and while De Freitas spoke at the conference itself, there is no subsequent record 
of him in the archives I consulted. Instead, just as the SMUSE had in the late 1940s, the 
MGE gravitated back across the channel in the mid 1970s, where the French Socialists 





Gerard Jaquet had joined the Movement early, had been committed to the early 
“Socialist-International” format of the organization, and had long functioned as a senior 
representative in the SFIO Comité Directeur, especially after the break with Philip in 
1957. The final “Fabian” reorganization proposed by Gironella in 1961 had caused some 
consternation both for Jaquet and for the SFIO (which had until then maintained full 
support for the Movement) because Gironella’s proposed structure would have seen a 
small central committee hand down instructions to national sections and associated 
parties, rather than regular congresses at which competing ideas might be proposed and 
deliberated. The Comité Directeur had discussed the issue in February, 1961, issuing a 
temporary injunction against dual membership in the SFIO and MGE. At the same 
meeting, Jaquet had declared himself ready to quit the Movement altogether, though he 
intimated that he might be willing to head up an independent French Gauche 
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Européenne537 (the SFIO and MGE resolved the conflict in June, 1961538 and Jaquet 
would remain nominally associated to the Movement).  
As noted, Jaquet collaborator Jacques Enock-Levi had become General Secretary 
of the French MGE by mid 1967; he would soon also take on the secretariat of the wider 
MGE.539 Jaquet returned to the record in 1969, when the Organisation Française de la 
Gauche Européenne (OFGE), would become closely associated to the new Parti Socialiste, 
which succeeded the SFIO in 1969. The record here is still is rather thin, characterized 
unfortunately by a singular lack of resolutions or conference minutes, and illuminated 
largely by personal correspondence from the papers of Jacquet at the Fondation Jean 
Jaures in Paris.  
One of the first major OFGE  events was a colloquium on the so-called Werner 
Plan.540 Launched by the European Communities’ Council of Ministers and elaborated by 
Luxemburg Prime Minister Pierre Werner, it established a ten-year plan for a step-by-
step economic and monetary union. The plan was formally published on October 8, 
1970, and the OFGE held a conference in February, 1971 in Suresnes, just west of the 
Paris city limits. Robert Pontillion, a new member of the Movement, had been mayor of 
Suresnes since 1965; he would become senator for the Hauts-de-Seine in 1977,541 and 
was briefly president of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament.542 A collection 
of photographs survive, showing some 75 attendees. There appears no associated 
literature in the archives, so it is impossible to know what was said or decided. 
Photographic record reveals that OFGE had conserved many of its former 
members (including Jaquet, Albert Gazier, Georges Goriely, Maurice Faure, Sebastien 
 
537 “Compte-rendu du Comité Directeur,” 15 February, 1961. Paris: OURS.  
538 “Compte-rendu du Comité Directeur,” 14 June, 1961. Paris: OURS. The exact arrangement between the 
two parties is not clear, but the Comité considered the matter resolved and invited all its members to once 
again work with the MGE. 
539 Enock-Levi to Malfatti, 26 November, 1970. Florence: EUI, RR20. There is a two-year gap between in 
the record between evidence of his holding the national and international secretariats, though Gironella 
had always filled both roles. 
540 “Colloque de la Gauche Européenne – 1971” Paris: Fondation Jean Jaurès online collection. 
https://archives-
socialistes.fr/app/photopro.sk/archives/doclist?fpsearch=gauche+europ%C3%A9enne&use_armaform=
TRUE&xupd_fpsearch=TRUE#sessionhistory-1599593753076. The length of the conference is unclear, 
evidenced solely by a series of photos dated on a single Saturday. A banner behind the dais says “journées 
d’étude” in the plural, suggesting it may have been a weekend affair. 
541 Bonnin, Judith. “Pontillon, Robert Eugène”. Le Maitron. Maitron.fr. 
https://maitron.fr/spip.php?article158818  
542 His term lasted from January 1979 to March 1980. “Former PES presidents.” PES.org. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20071009211637/http://www.pes.org/content/view/917 (Archived from 
the original) 
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Constant and Robert Buron) and was now closely associated with the nascent Parti 
Socialiste (PS), which had fused the SFIO with several other parties over the course of 
1969. Attendees included Alain Savary, veteran of the Mollet government and briefly 
European Parliamentarian, François Mitterrand and Pierre Mauroy, each of whom 
would head the PS (Mitterrand would be on OFGE’s Comité Directeur by 1974543). 
Savary and Mauroy had never before been associated with the Movement, nor had 
former Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France, who also spoke at the congress. He had 
notably run for the presidency in 1969 on an American-style “ticket,” alongside SMUSEr 
Gaston Defferre, and would be an active supporter of François Mitterrand over the next 
decade.544   
The dynamics between OFGE and the wider MGE are opaque, though as noted, 
the latter, or its patron Parti Socialiste, appears to have funded the whole organization.  
The MSE-GE reform of 1973 appears to have cemented the primacy of the OFGE as the 
driving member-organization. 
 
The largest MSE-GE conference on record took place in late November, 1974, and 
its work centered on electoral strategy for direct election to the European Parliament. 
Based on the few records surviving in Robert Pontillon’s papers,545 it is likely to have 
been organized for, and financed by, the Socialist Group. The only list of national 
delegates names 22 Germans, including four members of the European Parliament: 
Gerhard Flamig (listed as vice-president of MSE-GE), Horst Gerlach, Ludwig Rosenberg 
(Vice-President of the EP), and Manfred Michel (General Secretary of the Socialist 
Group). There is also reference to 5 representatives of the Northern Ireland Labour 
Party, Ireland having joined the European Community the previous year – it was the 
only time Irish Socialists would be associated with the Movement. The conference lasted 
three days and included 2 nights’ board for attendees (including rooms at the Hilton for 
some dignitaries), three receptions, and simultaneous translation in four languages. 
Spouses were welcome as well. All this suggests that funding was not of great concern – 
the MSE-GE collected dues in this period, but the record does not suggest it could afford 
such an outlay.   
 
543 Jaquet to various news outlets, 24 April, 1974. Paris: Fondation Jean Jaurès, Jaquet 1 RE 12. 
544 Krakovitch, Raymond. “Mendès France, Pierre Isaac Isidore.” Le Maitron. Maitron.fr. 
https://maitron.fr/spip.php?article147602 
545 Three documents, dated 22 and 28 November, 1974. Paris: Fondation Jean Jaurès, Pontillon 8 FP 7/214 
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A conference of this scope is so out of character with the MSE-GE after the 50s 
that it seems reasonable to propose that the Movement was tapped as organizer, 
perhaps with financial support, by the CSPEP. MSErs Pontillon, Defferre, Radoux, Flamig 
and Zagari were all in the upper echelons of the Socialist Group, and the SMUSE had 
once held conferences of this size on an annual basis, though never at a Hilton. This 
conference remains a notable outlier for the Movement after the late 1950s, but is an 
indicator of its later usefulness as a networking facilitator. The conference proceedings 
and resolutions remain an open question. 
 
Jaquet became delegate to the European Parliament between 1979 and 1984, 
(and Vice-President of the same between 1979 and 1982), and there is some evidence 
that the MSE attempted to cultivate relations with the European Commission during his 
time as head – including a few contacts with Commission presidents Franco Malfatti 
(1970-1972), Sicco Mansholt (1972-1973) and François-Xavier Ortoli (1973-1977) – 
although it is not clear that they came to very much. By and large the Movement in the 
Jaquet period remained peripheral to the European institutions. A notable example of 
the kind of antagonistic purism that had always characterized the movement came at a 
1976 colloquium on the “Tindemans Report” on furthering the integration of the EC. 
Written by Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans, the report advocated, among other 
things, a common monetary and fiscal policy, some foreign policy alignment, and a 
common education policy.546 The MGE’s reaction was overwhelmingly negative. The 
group’s conclusions were formalized in a report by André Salomon of the PS Comité 
Directeur, was derisive and reminiscent of André Philip:547 he determined that it was not 
critical enough of the default Atlanticist current in Europe, did nothing to address the 
fact that capitalist enterprises were a leading force in the integration of the European 
economy, and lacked a coherent political vision for Europe. The report, he concluded, 
was merely a plan for a supranational organization to help capitalist nations resist an 
increase in the agency of the working class.548 
 
546 Deschamps, Etienne. “The Tindemans Report” CVCE.eu. Available at: 
https://www.cvce.eu/en/collections/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-
d4686a3e68ff/63f5fca7-54ec-4792-8723-1e626324f9e3 
547 Salomon would notably leave the PS in 1979 and publish a highly critical book attacking the party’s 
Socialist character.  
548 Salomon, André. “Le Rapport Tindemans.” Paris: OURS 7 EF 79/3 
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In 1979, the OFGE published comprehensive a “Program for a Socialist Europe”549 
that included a pessimistic appraisal of the state of the European Communities. Veto-
voting in the Council of Ministers informed by national technocrats meant that the 
European project was being led by intergovernmental agreements at the Council level 
rather than supranational ones at the Commission level. It also included the usual 
indictments of capitalist forces, multinational corporations and a general Atlanticist 
orientation. The program was a comprehensive effort to bring the Communities into line 
with the letter and spirit of the Treaties of Rome, but while it was certainly in the spirit 
of the Movement, the fact that it was published under the auspices of the OFGE raises 





In the mid 1950s, the center of gravity of the SMUSE had shifted from France to 
Belgium because Spaak had had a direct role in the development of the European 
project. Thirty years later the MSE-GE’s center of gravity shifted again from France to 
Belgium, this time because the PSB’s Raymond Rifflet was working inside a European 
Commission pushing the Single European Act. 
Rifflet had been national secretary and member of the International Executive 
Bureau of the SMUSE since 1947. As member of the PSB, he worked primarily in the 
Belgian Ministry of Education, after which he was tapped to be European Commissioner 
Jean Rey’s Chef de Cabinet in 1967; he would remain at the Commission as adviser to 
Commissioners Jenkins, Thorn, and Delors.550 There is little to indicate just when Rifflet 
took on a leading role in the MSE, but he was vice-president by 1987, and at that point 
he began to send letters to members to support the package of proposed reform that 
followed ratification of Delors’ Single European Act (SEA); he would also organize an 
MGE meeting in Brussels that June.551 A colloquium took place in late April, 1988, at 
which Rifflet was described as “President” (Rifflet had described Jaquet as “International 
 
549 Gateau, Elizabeth and Thomas Philippovich. “Un Projet Socialiste pour l’Europe.” Organisation Française 
de la Gauche Européenne. Paris: Imprimerie de l’Entreprise, 1979. Amsterdam: IISG, Bro 828-11 Available 
at https://archives-socialistes.fr/themes/archives/static/pdfviewer/?docid=112437&language=fra 
550 Vayssière, Bertrand. “Raymond Rifflet, européiste et eurocrate,” Journal of European Integration 
History, 23 - 1 (2017), pp.47-70. Available at https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01592219/document 
551 Rifflet to members, 24 May, 1987. Florence: EUI, RR 87 
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President” only a month prior, and the exact hierarchy in unclear). The one-day 
colloquium involved some forty members and featured European Parliamentarians and 
trade unionists discussing elements of social and economic cohesion elicited by Delors’ 
proposed reform package.552 Rifflet continued to tap the MGE network in support of the 
Delors policies at least through the end of 1988 and continued thereafter to use the MGE 
network to support the work of the European Commission. After the SEA and its 
subsequent reforms, the central topic was the treaty of Maastricht. Over the course of 
1992, Rifflet organized a number of “lunch-debates” centered on elements of that treaty, 
featuring relevant personalities, notably president of the Socialist Group Jean-Pierre Cot, 
(Cot had married European Parliamentarian Raymonde Dury, who had been associated 
to the movement since the 1980s) and Rifflet’s son Luc from the Belgian Ministry of 
European Affairs.553  
A final reinvention of the MGE’s role in European affairs began in October, 1992. 
At one of Rifflet’s lunches between members of the Socialist Group and the MGE, he 
proposed to establish the Movement as a liaison between the Parliament and the 
European Movement, so ensure adequate Socialist representation in the latter.554 The 
MGE was accepted as a member, but faced financing difficulties, which Rifflet apparently 
overcame by becoming member of the European Movement executive, upon which the 
European Parliament agreed to cover membership dues.555 Rifflet’s papers don’t 
describe the relationship in any detail.  
 Rifflet would remain the prime mover of the MGE until about 1993. Jaquet fades 
from view in the late 80s, and Rifflet remains best placed in the European context, 
officially acceding to the presidency in late 1992 or early 1993.556 The Movement was 
much reduced in number in this latter period: the “general assembly” of February 1992 
comprised 10 attendees, with 6 excused; the previous GA had been a year before.557 The 
Comité Directeur meeting of later the same year numbered 7, with 2 absences. The group 
 
552 “Problèmes posés par la cohesion économique et sociale dans la perspective du grand marché 
Européen sand frontiers.” Florence: EUI, RR 88 
553 “Procès-Verbal de la réunion du Comité Directeur,” 19 September 1992 Louvain-la-Neuve: Université 
Catholique de Louvain, Rifflet farde 125 
554 “Letter re EP Socialists - MSE Lunch, 22 October 1992. Louvain-la-Neuve: Université Catholique de 
Louvain, Rifflet farde 125 
555 Rifflet to Orsello and Blumenfeld [EM gen sec and tres], 11 January 1993. Louvain-la-Neuve: Université 
Catholique de Louvain, Rifflet farde 125 
556 The European University Institute’s online biography gives the year 1992; Rifflet announces it to the 
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described itself as “heterogenous,” though it apparently maintained a fairly broad 
network: the SPD was a member, and it had “association” in France, Belgium, Portugal, 
Spain, Greece, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Austria and Italy.558 Rifflet’s papers 
don’t list any specific names, but the Italian Mario Zagari remained actively involved into 
the early 90s. He was still publishing his “Sinistra Europea” magazine and had, in early 
1993, organized a conference drawing some 50 attendees.559 One of the very last pieces 
of evidence lists Rifflet and Zagari as co-presidents. 
 The archival record of the movement once known as the MUSSE ends 
unceremoniously with a “Lettre du Président,” the last of several two-page news-letters 
which Rifflet began sending upon his accession to the presidency in 1992. This last 
surviving missive, dated September 1993,560 is unremarkable except insofar as it 
betrays no sense of demise, and it strikes some very familiar notes. He opens with 
urgent encouragement to begin work on the new European Union’s economic 
institutions without tolerating equivocations from national governments over potential 
further enlargement or catering to special interests. He continues with a reminder of the 
importance of broad-based participation in the upcoming elections to the European 
Parliament, and he closes with a very optimistic appraisal of the feasibility of the next 
stage in European construction, announcing the imminent submission of a draft EU 
constitution – a decade early. It was every bit as impatient with national government 
inertia, as optimistic about the arrival of radical change, and as committed to democratic 
participation in a post-national Europe, as the movement had been at its founding over 





 To some extent, the Movement’s trajectory after 1964 mirrors its trajectory 
beforehand, and this latter period ought probably be the subject of a study of 
comparable length. The Movement remained consistently engaged with, though largely 
peripheral to, the continuing European project. Its institutional fortunes were subject to 
 
558 Rifflet to Claes [head of the Party of European Socialists], 14 May, 1993. Louvain: UCL, Rifflet farde 125 
559 Zagari to Copetti, 31 March 1993. Louvain: UCL, Rifflet farde 125 
560 “Lettre du Président, Juin-Septembre 1993.” Louvain: UCL, Rifflet farde 125 
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larger forces that it did not control, and it underwent a series of reforms and 
reinventions to remain relevant. It began as a somewhat inchoate grouping based in 
London, with French support, and whose earliest value had been as a bridge between 
the two; it then shifted towards Paris, which produced its most comprehensive set of 
policies; and it eventually defaulted into the hands of Belgians who were driving the 
concrete integrative measures of the moment. Its institutional peak, from about 1973 to 
1980, was only slightly shorter than that of the SMUSE (1949 to 1958) 
 The major difference between the early and latter lives of the Movement was that 
many of its most ardent activists, having worked towards the establishment of the 
European institutions – most notably the development of a (potentially-)democratic 
legislative body – found their way into those institutions. Fernand Dehousse and Lucien 
Radoux (Belgium), Maurice Faure (France), Marinus van der Goes van Naters 
(Netherlands) and Mario Zagari (Italy) moved into the European Parliament, where they 
worked, as they had in the SMUSE, towards consolidating a European Socialist program. 
In that context, however, they still found that the old network, with its institutional 
memory and organizational abilities, could be a constructive partner in establishing 
contacts below the official level. That distance from the official level allowed the 
Movement to act as a sort of “Shadow” Socialist Group analogous to British Shadow 
governments: freed from the constraints of political compromise and niceties, it could 
criticize, and propose ideologically-based Socialist programs, even if these had little 
official weight. 
 
 Ultimately, however, the MGE and its successor MSE-GE were never as potent as 
the SMUSE had been. The existence of a European parliamentary assembly with a 
comprehensive European economic purview to some extend obviated the need for an 
SMUSE-style transnational socialist group. The European Communities were now far 
larger and more complex than the European environment in which the SMSUE had 
worked and succeeded. The political actors who had launched the EDC and Messina 
Projects has been few, and had not been subject to the same international pressures that 
came to bear on further projects. SMUSE-fostered interpersonal relations between a 
restricted group of decision-makers in France and Belgium had been able to appreciably 
influence the development of the proto-European Community, but when further 
decisions involved a post-Rome hierarchy with its institutionalized national concerns, 
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and the addition of new member states, it became impossible for the group to influence 









“If we ever thought that all that would one day lead to the United States of Europe, 
we very well knew that the route would be long, that it was a long-term perspective.” 
- Christian Pineau561 
 
 
With one notable exception, the SMUSE was composed of individual socialist 
personalities who were to some degree dissatisfied with the agency of their respective 
national structures. For some, this was because their national structures had no agency 
to speak of: Poles, Balts, Yugoslavs and Spaniards flocked to the SMUSE in the vain hope 
of doing something about the domestic impotence of their own parties.  
Others sought to produce a transnational political system that was fundamentally 
incompatible with the national systems within which their parties operated. As 
Conservative MP Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe pointed out in January 1948, there could not 
be a “Socialist” or a “Conservative” foreign policy; “there is only a British one.”562 The 
same is true in any country. A committed Europeanist like Fenner Brockway, who left 
the ILP because of its lack of agency, was frustrated even within Labour when Keep Left 
failed to produce a European orientation and petered out to pursue the domestic gains 
of Aneurin Bevan in socialized healthcare. 
 Others still simply could not find satisfaction in the parties they had: Marceau 
Pivert, Mario Zagari, Enrique Gironella and André Philip all at one time broke ranks to 
found parties more responsive to their personal convictions. Even the towering Paul-
Henri Spaak – Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of Belgium, President of the UN 
General Assembly, President of the Council of Europe, President of the Common 
Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community, head of the negotiations that 
 
561 Griffiths, 1993. 58 
562 Mott-Radclyffe to House of Commons, 22 January 1948. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-
hansard/commons/1948/jan/22/foreign-affairs#S5CV0446P0_19480122_HOC_365 
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produced the Treaties of Rome – joined and wrote for and campaigned with and headed 
this movement, perhaps because it alone promised to help “finish the battles”563 and 
deliver a democratic, supranational Europe.  
These people often labored in relative obscurity, with few truly outstanding 
achievements to claim. And yet they labored on, in some cases for decades (Raymond 
Rifflet attended his first meeting at age 29, and his last at 73), in some cases when they 
might plausibly have had better things to do (see Spaak’s resume above), and in some 
cases when they may have had more promising avenues for their objectives (notably the 
European Parliament). In retrospect, what the Movement offered that no other avenue 
could, from the Foreign Ministry to the European Commission, was the ability to act as a 
loyal transnational socialist opposition, a sort of shadow socialist party that could meet 
and publish unencumbered by domestic or political concerns.  
The notable exception to the Movement’s constituency of individuals was the 
SFIO. While it is certainly true that the Movement owed a great deal of its success to the 
party, the power dynamics tended to favor the Movement.  The SFIO decided to bankroll 
the Montrouge conference because the MUSSE had contacts with Labour, which the SFIO 
sought to exploit. The Movement and the SFIO happened to generally see eye-to-eye 
over the next decade or so, but the SMUSE did not depend on the French: Mollet, as head 
of the SFIO, and Philip, as head of the Movement, supported the EDC for rather different 
reasons; the SFIO did not direct SMUSE policy or strategy; and Gauche Européenne could 
be critical of the party (though they eventually came to a cordial arrangement). When 
the Movement changed its statutes in 1961, it did so without input from or 
consideration of the SFIO (or the new Parti Socialiste Unifié). 
Unencumbered, the Movement could, at every stage, present ideologically-
grounded positions. These had a twofold advantage: first, they were divorced from 
national politics, and therefore had a degree of palatable neutrality; second, the very 
existence of joint positions offered a general direction to international integrative 
efforts. The movement was aggressively oppositional in its early years, but even once it 
became somewhat more mainstream it could be undiplomatically critical of parties it did 
not consider properly socialist. It also could be narrowly focused on issues it considered 
most important, as with the campaign for the Political Authority corollary to the EDC, 
 
563 Cf. his memoires, titled “Combats Inachevés” properly translated as unfinished battles.  
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which all but ignored nationally-charged debates about troop contributions and 
command structures. It would continue to act as a Socialist bellwether to the last, 
drawing support for the Delors legislation of the late 80s and early 90s that, to one 
degree or another, required national concessions to the benefit of a more supranational 
Europe. 
   
It would be a mistake to think that the members of the Socialist Movement 
genuinely thought they could change the world in a day – the 1949 program 
acknowledges openly that the time was not ripe for comprehensive change, and Pineau’s 
quote at the top of this chapter confirms that the Movement’s adherents played a long 
game. Concretely, the movement’s campaigns were fairly narrowly focused, its 
achievements significant but somewhat obscure. Additionally, the lack of reference to 
the SMUSE in Spaak’s memoirs, and the understated references by other SMUSErs like 
Zagari and Pineau suggest that they conceived of the whole affair with a certain 
moderation and modesty. Nevertheless, one cannot escape the conclusion that this 
network, reaching so thoroughly throughout the early European machinery, facilitated 
the construction of the modern European Union.  
 
The early SMUSE constitutes something of a missing piece in Socialist 
internationalism. In its earliest form, and despite not identifying as such, it was a direct 
continuation of the London Bureau of the 1930s. It is common to mark the Second World 
War as an important breaking point in political ideology, citing the end of Nationalism as 
a political system, the dawn of European transnationalism; the twilight of the French 
and British Empires with the loss of Indochina and India. These justify the starting of a 
new chapter in the history of Europe. In the case of the history of international 
Socialism, the story frequently centers on the Labour-led Socialist International, which 
was a (comparatively late) revival of the interwar Labour and Socialist International. 
The fact that it came back together so slowly, however, obscures any process of 
transition. The London Bureau, meanwhile, produced an offspring much faster that the 
LSI, and the early “MUSSE” years offer a glimpse of the unmistakable evolution of the 
interwar Left into something that could interact meaningfully with the new status quo.  
The contents of Gauche Européenne, meanwhile, constitute an important 
collection of position pieces from across the socialist spectrum in numerous countries. It 
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is limited by its short existence, and while it was certainly read by those same leading 
Socialists, it is impossible without further research to determine exactly how widely 
distributed it was or the degree to which it had any influence beyond the SMUSE. For 
posterity, however, surely a monthly collection of essays from Europe’s leading 
socialists is valuable in its own right. 
 The present story also invites a word about early US policy towards Europe. It is 
widely acknowledged that the US was able to pull strings, both economically – as in the 
Marshall plan – and politically – as in the Italian elections of 1948, – to further its 
general strategic goals. The immediate postwar Left, as represented by the MUSSE, was 
also deeply impacted by American policy moves, though Soviet intransigence clearly 
also bore a certain degree of responsibility for the Left’s move towards the center. The 
US legislative branch never approached the global Left with any degree of nuance, but 
the US intelligence community did find strategic advantages in the new European 
center-left. In one of its very first acts, the CIA orchestrated the funneling of 
congressional and private funds to socialist parties in the European Movement (there is 
more than a little irony in a rabidly anti-Socialist American legislature and the 
Rockefeller foundation bankrolling a deeply anti-capitalist SMUSE). The US was, it is 
easy to forget, something of a novice in hegemonic affairs in the late 1940s, and while 
the intelligence community understood – and had the luxury of acting on – variations in 
the political landscape, the government may have erred in not taking more notice of a 
burgeoning anti-Stalinist center-left at the heart of European affairs. 
  
 Two of the Movement’s most effective pursuits – Franco-British rapprochement 
and the EDC – ultimately came to naught, and dissecting a failure is less satisfying than 
dissecting a success, but the foregoing examination does offer some useful insights on 
both fronts. The first is the impression that Labour may have scuttled the possibility of a 
more productive relationship with the continent by being so thoroughly dismissive of 
the ILP’s efforts to broker a dialogue. Ernest Bevin’s Western Union, for instance had 
some elements compatible with the emerging international Socialist consensus, but the 
debate was muddled by a general misunderstanding of the positions respective to Bevin, 
Keep Left, and the SMUSE, and Labour consistently resisted overtures from both the 
French and the ILP. Labour’s decision some time later to give up on working with the 
SFIO altogether was based at least in part on their appraisal that the Socialists were a 
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spent force in France – an awareness of the SFIO’s links to a wider, active socialist 
community might have changed their calculus. 
 In terms of the EDC, this examination shows that the SMUSE was far more deeply 
involved than has been acknowledged. In 1949, the SMUSE had resolved to work within 
the Council of Europe to make its European Political Authority a reality. In August, 1950, 
Philip advocated a supranational defense community before the Council, then lobbied 
Churchill to endorse the idea. Churchill did so and the Council passed a resolution in 
support. Though Monnet is given credit for proposing the same idea in mid-September, 
René Pleven, in his announcement, cited the Council of Europe as the direct inspiration 
for the EDC. The second concrete contribution was the inclusion of language triggering 
the development of a supranational political authority separate from the EDC. A close 
examination reveals that leading SMUSErs, notably Spinelli and Frenay, were involved in 
including the clause launching an EPA immediately upon signature of the EDC treaty. 
When that process was launched, another group of SMUSErs worked to specify the 
putative EPA’s “supranational” character and set it in motion. In other words, the SMUSE 
consisted of the right people at the right time and in the right place, and who 
collaborated across borders to push an agenda. Despite the ultimate failure of the 
project, it should be recognized that the SMUSE was an effective force for Europe. 
 The Treaties of Rome were perhaps the culmination of what the SMUSE could 
concretely hope to achieve, even if the precise form of the institutions fell somewhat 
short of the direct democratic mechanisms they had wanted. The Movement was, as 
with the EDC, able to produce some targeted adjustments to the process. The arrival of 
the Mollet government and its decidedly pro-European foreign policy staff in early 1956 
has been widely acknowledged as decisive. The SMUSE records furthermore show that 
these men knew and understood each other well, able to work around touchy issues like 
the French colonies, and capable of coordinating a multifaceted campaign in support of 
linking Euratom to the EEC while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. Once 
again, the historiography has recognized the importance of these factors, but has not 
acknowledged the role of the SMUSE network therein. 
The epilogue is intended to establish the grandes lignes of the Movement after 
1964; its longevity alone recommends a further examination of the period. Despite the 
transition of many of its members to the European Parliament, there remained a role for 
the MGE, both as a “loyal opposition” and as a way of rallying like-minded activists 
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outside the official purview of their respective structures. This continued to be the case 
into the 1990s, when, even though the Party of European Socialists was well established 
and Rifflet benefitted from the highly visible podium of a newly powerful European 
Commission, he found it useful to rally the MSE-GE network to support further 
integrative policies. 
 
The foregoing conclusions point to a larger point about this historiography, 
which is the tendency to edify certain individuals in the launching of the early European 
institutions (this is, of course, hardly confined to Europe). The circumstances 
surrounding these projects, are simply too complex to be accurately boiled down to the 
work of single individuals. There are national governments, with specific cabinets, who 
appoint committees and subcommittees; these work internationally within often ad hoc 
structures, sometimes in dialogue with new organs like the Council of Europe or the 
pressure groups of the European Movement. The work and accomplishments of the 
SMUSE reveal the degree of coordination necessary to move the needle: theirs was a 
multifaceted approach which coordinated across borders and party lines, and via 
several transnational structures. Historiography by its nature seeks to synthesize 
complex events, and so it is both tempting and convenient to use popular short-hand 
titles like the “Plan Schuman” (ECSC) and the “Plan Pleven” (EDC), or to pile 
responsibility on personalities like Jean Monnet. However, tying ideas with long, 
complicated gestations and elaboration processes to the individual who made them 
public doesn’t do justice to the mechanisms involved, nor, I would argue, are they useful 
for drawing applicable skills from the study of history. The recent work on European 
Christian Democracy is in some ways a response to this objection, and further work on 
the center-left as represented by the SMUSE would add to the body of work on the 
transnational activism that underpinned the creation of Europe. 
 
 In the final analysis, it is clear that the SMUSE contributed concretely to the 
development of the European Union: specific actors, recognized to have played pivotal 
roles, relied on the network, as did the SFIO and the PSB; it produced Socialist answers 
to contemporary problems that functioned as signposts for Socialist politicians across 
Europe; it ran public-awareness campaigns  although in the grand scheme of things, the 
exact significance of the movement will require some more work: exactly how large was 
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the movement? What was its impact on the domestic landscape of its adherents? What 
did the Movement’s conferences and publications contribute to Socialist 
internationalism as a whole? How effective was the collaboration with the European 
Movement? Answering the questions above, seeking to assess with precision the reach 
and effect of the movement, will require a more pointed examination of the materials 
presented herein, but likely also require the inclusion of further sources.  
The exploration of Gironella’s papers, assuming he kept the relevant documents 
during the 11 years from the end of his secretaryship to his return to Span, would likely 
reveal a great deal more about the Movement. He is visible here only in what he has 
written for general consumption either in conference documents or publications or 
correspondence sent to members whose archives are available. It is likely that he would 
have received material relevant to the membership, organization, and financing of the 
movement: comprehensive lists of members in various countries and subscription 
numbers for Gauche Européenne would help paint a better picture of the movement’s 
reach than is currently available. Gironella also produced the documents outlining 
organizational restructuring, though it is unlikely that he was sole decision-maker: 
internal deliberations about the movement’s structure and directions might illuminate 
the movement’s general strategy and its perception of the European center-left in 
general (deeper study of the Jaquet and Enock-Levi papers at OURS/FJJ could fill these 
gaps too). Gironella was also the central link to the Spanish Socialists in exile, notably to 
PSOE general secretary Rodolfo Llopis, offering a window into Spanish socialism in the 
Franco years. Gironella returned to Spain in 1975 and passed away in December, 1987. 
According to his daughter-in-law, his papers have been given to the Partido de los 
Socialistas de Cataluña, based in Barcelona, Spain. He was the subject of a short 
biography published in Spanish in 1999.564 
 While the British, French, and Belgian stories are well represented here, two 
other national stories – Italian and German – are less visible. Mario Zagari joined the 
Movement in the late 1940s, remained a member until shortly before his death in 1996. 
He also published a magazine, Sinistra Europea, which, while initially reprinting articles 
from Gauche Européenne, outlasted the latter by some decades. Zagari was an early 
adherent to Giuseppe Saragat’s anti-Communist offshoot Socialist party in Italy. He 
 
564 PUIG, Lluís Maria de. Gironella, la izquierda europeísta. Madrid, 1999. 
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would go on to hold a number of cabinet posts and serve in both the Italian and 
European Parliaments. A thorough examination of his relationship with the SMUSE 
would complement any biographical works, but might also help place the offshoot 
Italian Socialists in the context of the existing international Left of the period. The same 
might be true of the SPD: relations between the SPD and other national parties has been 
told, notably by Shaev, Imlay et cetera, but several SPD members attended SMUSE 
conferences, there was a national section run at one time by SPD member Anna Siemsen, 
and there was a German-language publication. The German section was renamed the 
Anna Siemsen Circle after 1951 and the SPD had, by the 1990s, officially joined the 
group.565 Some work on the movement exists in German, notably a 1976 chapter by 
Norbert Gresch.566 
 There are also likely to be some useful added dimensions to work on the Delors 
Commission and specifically the Treaty of Maastricht based on Raymond Rifflet’s use of 
the movement network. His personal papers are frustratingly scanty, with nary a list of 
members and few clues as to the network’s reach, but insofar as he worked to drum up 
support for the Delors Commission, there may be clues in the Delors archives at the EUI 
and the Jacques Delors Institute.  
The final piece of the puzzle, if there is one, would be to find out if there is any 
continuity between the later MSE-GE and the current “European Left” (EL). The 
European Movement website describes this latter as having been formed in 1947, 
though the EL site refers to a founding congress in 2004. There are some historical 
materials that might elucidate the connection, though a number of emails have gone 
unanswered. Another potential lead is Raymond Rifflet’s son Luc, the very last living 
person I have found to have participated in the MSE-GE. I have been unable to track him 
down in person, but he has some papers at the UCL in Louvain-la Neuve. 
 
 Beyond the movement itself, the present work dovetails with a few other areas of 
exploration. First, any review of the European Movement could potentially benefit from 
 
565 Rifflet to Willy Claes [President of the Party of European Socialists], 14 May, 1993. In describing MSE-
GE, Rifflet states that the SPD “considers itself a member,” while French, Spanish, Italian, Belgian and 
Portuguese members participated on a personal basis. 
566 Gresch, Norbert Zwischen Internationalismus und nationaler Machtbehauptung – Die europäische 
Zusammenarbeit der Sozialdemokratischen Parteien. In: Zusammenarbeit der Parteien in Westeuropa. Auf 
dem Weg zu einer neuen politischen Infrastruktur? Bonn: Europa Union Verlag 1976. 143-249 
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a greater focus on the SMUSE. There is evidence that the SMUSE was a valuable resource 
for the European Movement in terms of contacts with political parties at the early 
stages, and in terms organizing conferences. The European Movement’s internal 
dynamics might also be illuminated by the fact of the SMUSE working directly with the 
UEF and the MFE, thereby almost constituting a movement within a movement. Second, 
Fernand Dehousse is being recognized as a valuable player in the early European 
Parliament: any thorough examination of his contributions ought to take into account 
the relationships he had with other parliamentarians from other countries (Faure, van 
Naters et al.) which predated the existence of the Parliament. His philosophical 
orientation might be illuminated by the numerous articles he wrote for Gauche 
Européenne, notably a series on the subject of federalism. 
 
 
 Whether or not the history of the European Union can be rewritten in any 
meaningful way based on the existence of the SMUSE, there is something instructive in 
its existence. It is instructive because it shows that transnationalism predated and 
ultimately produced the institutions that formalized it, in spite of the national structures 
that fought to fend it off. Conservatives like Churchill and De Gaulle were famously 
reticent to abdicate any form of sovereignty (despite the former’s constantly-cited call 
for a United States of Europe), but even Labour and the SPD could obstruct the drive to 
supranationalism. However, the mere prospect of transcending nationalism was enough 
to spur the creation of groups, staffed by committed personalities of the center-left and 
center-right, who did not wait for national governments to reinvent themselves, but 
seized a brief moment of post-war soul-searching to build the foundations of a new, 
post-nationalist system.  












The archives are presented in rough order of historiographical usefulness to this and 
any future research. 
 
 
International Institute of Socialist History [IISG]. Amsterdam, Netherlands 
 
 By far the largest collection of materials related to the Movement are here, under 
the rubric “MSEUE;” I have referenced MSEUE 4, 7, 8, 18, 19, 32, 47, and 48. 
 Virtually the complete print run of the magazine Gauche Européenne is collected 
under record group ZK 31205. 
 
 
Office universitaire de recherche socialiste [OURS], Paris, France. 
 
 The OURS has the archives of the SFIO and its members. The filing system is 
inconsistent but the archivist is very knowledgeable.  
 The records of the SFIO central committee for the relevant period is bound, in 
roughly annual increments, under Compte-rendu du comité directeur.  
Other records used herein fall under boxes “71” and “281;” 107 APO 10, and 7 EF 
79/3. 
The OURS also has an extensive library which includes: 
Desaix, Jean Frédéric. “Radiographie de l’Homme Politique Européen 
Christian Pineau, 1904-1995” Doctoral dissertation, Université de Paris VIII 
Saint-Denis-Vincennes, 1998. 
 231 
P.H. Spaak et Guy Mollet devant la C.E.D; discours prononcés le 5 Mars 1954 
à la Salle des Horticulteurs, Paris. Imprimerie Cerbonnet for MSEUE, Paris, France, 
1954 [pamphlet] 
Bulletin Intérieur du parti Socialiste SFIO; No. 68 à 87; 1954-1956. 
La documentation politique – Bulletin Hebdomadaire du Parti Socialiste 
SFIO, Nouvelle série; 1949-1955; no. 1 a 163 
 
 
European University Institute [EUI], Florence, Italy. 
 
 Records relative to Fernand Dehousse are labeled “FD;” I have referenced FD 80, 
143 and 345 
 Records of the European Movement are under “ME;” I have referenced ME 494, 
495, 822, 974, and 1924 
 The European Federalist Movement is labeled MFE; I have referenced MFE 32 




Université Catholique de Louvain [UCL]. Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium 
 
 Raymond Rifflet’s papers are collected in a number of “fardes;” I have referenced 
Fardes 97, 98, 99, 100, 106, 120, 122 and 125 
 
 
London School of Economics and Political Science [LSE]. London, England 
 
 The LSE holds the ILP’s records; I have referenced ILP 3/34, 3/36, 3/76, 5/1947, 
5/1948, 14 and 16/1949 
 I also used [Alexander] Mackay 5/1 
 
 
Centre d’histoire sociale du Vingtième Siècle [CHS]. Paris, France 
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 The CHS has an extensive collection of Marceau Pivert’s papers, under record 
group 599 AP; I have referenced 599 AP 11, 26, 29, 41, and 43. 
 
 
Fondation Jean Jaurès [FJJ], Paris, France 
 
 I have referenced the Gérard Jaquet collection: Jaquet 1 RE 5 and 1 RE 12,  
 as well as Robert Pontillion’s papers in Pontillon 8 FP 7/214 
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Those of Bob Edwards (GB 0394 BE “European Unity”); and 
International Department box 57.  
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AO 2 [Audio] 
20 QO 594 (P/12929-32) 
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